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Psychological operations encompass all courses of
action which are planned and conducted to create emotions,
attitudes, or behavior favorable to the achievement of
national policies and objectives. These operations support,
in the realm of ideas, national, political, economic, and
military policies from the nature and character of which the
psychological operations draw their strength.
Russian heritage provides a national value system
which predisposes the Soviet Union to the employment of
psychological operations in the conduct of a completely
integrated foreign policy. No policy action is taken without
consideration of its psychological impact.
Almost the reverse of this situation is encountered
in American experience, attitude, and employment of psyche-
logical operations. The history of this instrument in
American foreign policy has been one of rejection or reluc-
tant use*
Before the United States can employ the psychological
instrument effectively, it must develop an integrated plan-
ning process for the achievement of its foreign policy goals.
To coordinate and to conciliate a total program from the
individual programs of member activities has been the
American pattern. A solution will evolve only after the

iii
government agencies axe no longer permitted to decide whether
or not they will carry out the letter and spirit of the Chief
Executive *s policies* Effective organisation and positive
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TO THE SOLDIER WHO MARCHES WEST1
You aire still alive. It is wonderful. Everything
that lives is wonderful, even the green grass and the
birds.
The dead and the rocks and the soil and the dung
—
they are nothing, for they have no life.
We who have life have everything; we possess fabu-
lous wealth.
The rocks, the dead and the soil have nothing, are
nothing.
Where will your road lead you, soldier: Are you
going West? Are you going to Paris
v
Do you know what is in the West, soldier? I shall
tell you, soldier; listen.
In front of you are the English, you know thai
The French and the Americans are behind them. You
also know how they fire into the lines of your com-
rades. Perhaps they will retreat and new regiments
will march ahead. Then they will fire again. Then
the Allies retreat again.
But the firing never ceases • • • •
There is something else in the West. I shall tell
you what this "something" is. Nobody can tell you
exactly where it is, but it surely is in the West.
Your cave lies in the West*
If you march West, you can't help finding it.
Possibly it is far ahead of you, behind the mountains.
But possibly it is very near you, perhaps you can see
it. Today or tomorrow—nobody knows. But surely,
the grave lies there, as surely as does the sunset.
Do you march West, soldier? Then we say good-by
to you. All of us who live say good-by.
There are only two things on earth, the living and
the dead. The difference between these two things is
greater than that between friend and foe, greater
than that between man and animal. It is the greatest
difference in this world. With the dead one you can-
not marry, to the dead one you cannot be a friend,
you can't talk with him, you don't touch him. If you
march West, soldier we say good-by, we who are al *
British Combat Propaganda Leaflet, World War I.
Cited by Hans Speir, "Morale and Propaganda," Propaganda
** y&r *nd Crisis , ed. Daniel Lerner (New Yorki George
wT Stewart, 1951), p. 3.

Ken and women, dogs and birds and Insects—they
shall not be with you any more . « • •
Soldier, farewell*
Today, you are one of us; you are one with men and
women and everything that lives. You are master of
the rocks and the woods and all inanimate things*
Tomorrow you march West*
Soldier , farewel 1
•




PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR AND OPERATIONS
Psychological operations encompass those political,
military, economic, and ideological courses of action which
are planned and conducted to create in enemy, hostile,
neutral, or friendly groups emotions, attitudes, or behavior
favorable to the achievement of national policies and objec-
tives. These operations are included within and implement
psychological warfare and psychological activities. At one
time, it was fashionable to differentiate between these two
forms of psychological action on the basis of the existence
or non-existence of a state of war or declared emergency or
on the basis of the existence or non-existence of active
military operations in a military theater of war,
I . INTRODUCTION
Today, we live in a twilight world of half-war and no
peace. We have been involved in this twilight conflict
since the conclusion of the Second World War. The future
promises no foreseeable conclusion. At stake are the
national survival, the continuation of respective political
systems, and the pursuit of state goals of the United States
and the Soviet Union. Such a contest is a war, irrespective
of terminology or of the methods employed in its prosecution.

2It seems, therefore, fallacious to approach the conduct of
this war in terms other than those of stark reality* The
psychological operations involved are the strategies and
tactics of psychological war, nothing less. We are involved
in a war, not merely in an activity; and there are no
theaters where active operations are not in existence.
Modern, total warfare has three major divisions:
military, politico-economic, and psychological. Psychologi-
cal warfare serves as a framework or weapons-mount which
provides an interchangeability within and between these
three major divisions and which gives their integrated
employment the widest conceivable effectiveness. Hence,
psychological warfare emerges as a tool of national security
policy which
injects into the "unpsychological" wars of the machine
age the recollection and rediscovery of man as the
agent of aggression, the object of suffering, and the
human element in bureaucratized strategy and indus-
trialized battles.
1
II. DEFINITIONS AND EARLY USAGE
Psychological warfare has been defined as warfare
2psychologically waged; that is, operations carried out with
Hans Speir, "Psychological Warfare Reconsidered,"
Propaganda In War and Crisis , ed. Daniel Lerner (New York:
George W. Stewart, Inc., 1951), p. 464.
2War Department General Staff, Propaganda Branch,
Intelligence Division, A Syllabus of Psychological Warfare
(The Pentagon, Washington , 1946 ) , pp. 2-3.

3close and studied reference to the politics, opinion, and
morale of the enemy. In the broad sense, psychological war-
fare is the application of portions of the science of
psychology to further the efforts of political, economic, or
military actions. Its principal vehicle, propaganda, Is the
use of any form of communication to disseminate material
designed to affect the minds and actions of a given group
for a specific public purpose, whether military, economic,
or political. In American usage, psychological warfare con-
notes propaganda designed to achieve national policy goals
in the world political arena. This American concept of
psychological warfare is somewhat less comprehensive than
other terms with which it is closely linked. The more in-
clusive concept is that of "political warfare"—the term
used by the British—which encompasses more than the means
of mass communication or the handling of weapons to achieve
maximum impact on the will to resist » Political warfare
contributes the important concept that all instruments of
policy need to be correlated properly in the conduct of war.
Effective national psychological warfare demands the inclu-
sion of this concept of political wax"fare within its purview.
Psychological warfare is the recent name for an idea
3Harold D. Lasswell, "Political and Psychological
Warfare," Propaganda In War and Crisis , ed* Daniel Lerner
(New York: George W ."""Stewart, Inc., 1951), pp. 264-26

4as old and as widespread as mankind. The idea of using psy-
chology as an adjunct to military action is expounded in the
earliest known manuals on strategy and tactics. In the
fifth century B.C., Sun Tzu wrote in his Book of War on the
importance of destroying the enemy's will to fight by such
means as surprise, show, and noise* Essentially the same
principles are set forth in the military literature and pre-
vailing maxims of the ancient empires of India and the Middle
East. The East Indian political classic, Kantilya's
Arthasastra , contains advice on how to destroy enemy morale
and build up one*s own. In these works, emphasis is placed
on what is now called "propaganda of the deed'-j that is, the
assassination of important officials, the show of force, the
achievement of surprise, and the taking of emotionally sig-
nificant cities.
One of the earliest recorded applications was by
Gideon in his great battle with the Midianites (by tradi-
tional reckoning, 1245 B.C.). Another Old Testament story
relates how Joshua circled Jericho for seven times on seven
days, sounding the trumpet, "and the walls came tumbling
down."
The Greeks employed the "Trojan Korse" to infiltrate
and undermine a mighty fortress-city that they could not
Ibid., p. 261,

5reduce by siege. Herodotus tells how Themistocles subverted
the Ionians, who were satellites of the Persians* Messages
were engraved on stones near their watering holes to remind
them of their common Greek heritage, and with the added line
that, if they could not defect, they should behave badly in
battle. This was also a source of excellent propaganda in-
tended to make the Persians think that any Ionian less than
perfect was a secret Athenian sympathizer. This appeal was
sound by all modern standards.
The Romans employed a ritual of "evocatio," which
can be traced back to the Hittites , by which the Romans
implored the protective gods of the enemy city to pass over
to the Roman camp. Some versions tried to bribe the enemy
gods with promises of more sumptuous temples. Machiavelli,
in his fascination with the problems of besieged cities
,
came to the conclusion that the Roman method of psychologi-
cal operations was probably more effective than the measures
7
used against them by their enemies. An early example of
correct target selection occurred in the First Punic War,
when the Romans, having fled in panic on their first
Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (second
edition; New York: Duell Sloane, and Pearce, 1960), p. 7.
6Ibid.
7Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1940), p. 371.

6encounter with the Carthaginian war elephants, retaliated by-
driving pigs in front of them to stampede the elephants.
The Mongol conquests were accomplished through the
use of highly mobile forces, the exploitation of intelli-
gence, the coordination of strategy, and the application of
propaganda in all its forms. The Mongols deliberately used
rumor to exaggerate accounts of their numbers and ferocity;
they even used enemy spies to promote these rumors by boast-
ing and by staging demonstrations to impress known spies and
enemy emissaries in their midst. Although the Mongols
carried out superb strategic and tactical propaganda opera-
tions, they never solved the problem of consolidation and
failed to win the loyalty of the conquered peoples.
No examination of early psychological operations
would be complete without noting that Cortez used horses to
spread terror among the Aztecs and also exploited legends of
the Fair God; that the Inquisition was a psychological war-
fare instrument of the Spanish rulers, Ferdinand and
Isabella; that the European feudal classes identified the
peasants with filth, anarchy, murder, and cruelty; that the
Manchus, with odds of four hundred to one against them, used
terror to nullify Chinese superiority; that the Tokugawa
Shoguns used preventive psychological warfare, after 1636,
to enmesh the minds of the Japanese people; that the British
East India Company used propaganda in conquering India

7against overwhelming numerical superiority; and that both
before and during the French Revolution, revolutionary-
propaganda was rife.
In America, Whig propaganda was energetic in leading
to colonial defiance of England. At Bunker Hill, the
Colonists used one of the very earliest versions of front-
line combat propaganda, a desertion leaflet for British
soldiers, Paine *s Common Sense and Washington* s just and
moderate political and military measures provided a base for
patriot propaganda operations* During the Mexican War, both
sides employed propaganda, but which was t re successful
is difficult to determine. The Mexican effort was certainly
not without effect, for the guns defending Mexico City were
3
manned by traitor American artillerymen. Historians in
both countries gloss over the treason and subversion which
occurred on each side. In the Civil War, psychological
operations were carried out by both sides, both against the
other and to influence opinion in England and on the conti-
nent. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation ranks as one of
the great strokes of psychological warfar
III. THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY
An examination of the conduct of the various
8Linebarger, o£. cit . , p. 23.

8ramifications of international relations since 1914 reveals
an ever-increasing emphasis on ideology, or political faith,
as a driving force. An ideology is a system of deep-rooted
beliefs about fundamental questions in human life and af-
9fairs. Ideology, therefore, plays an important part in
psychological warfare.
a earliest form of ideology was apparently reli-
gion. It was the first group of ideas which decisively
influenced the mentality and behavior of primitive man and
primitive society. The social ideologies developed later
and were, at first, intimately fused with the all-dominating
religious conception of the universe. In the later evolu-
tional phase, the social and political ideologies separated
from the religions which, more and more, lost their domina-
tion over individuals and societies. The latest step in
this evolutionary process is the non-religious but totali-
tarian ideology which appears in recent history in a more
and more vigorous and sharply-defined shape.
Ideologies pass, at times, through inactive periods,
sometimes centuries in duration. There are also phases of
ideological expansion. These are the phases of conquest,
9Ibid ., pp. 30-32.
Bela Szunyogh, Psychological Warfare (New York:
The William-Frederick Press, 1955), p. 46.
'.
'
9the stage for the most active propaganda, for the blindest
fanaticism, and for merciless intolerance. These phases
represent a very important form of psychological warfare;
they are Wars of Faith.
The expansion of the Muslim Creed and Empire pro-
vides a great deal of information which should not be
neglectod in the twentieth century. The emirs of the Arab
conquests demonstrated two principles of long-range, psy-
chological warfare which are still valid,
A people could be converted from one faith to the
other if given the choice between conversion and extermina-
tion, stubborn individuals being rooted out. To effect the
initial conversion, participation in the public ceremonies
and formal language of the new faith were required. Sus-
tained counter intelligence remained on the alert against
back sliders. Formal acceptance would eventually become
genuine acceptance by denying public media of expression to
the vanquished faith.
If immediate, wholesale conversion required too ex-
tensive or severe operations, the same result could be
achieved by toleration of the objectionable faith, combined
with the issuance of genuine privileges to the new, pre-
ferred faith. The conquered people were left in the private,
humble enjoyment of their old beliefs and folkways. However,
all participation in public life, be it political, cultural,




or economic, was conditioned upon acceptance of the new
faith, In this manner, all up-rising members of the society
would move in a feitf generations over to the new faith in the
process of becoming rich, powerful, or learned; what was
left of the old belief became a gutter superstition, pos-
sessing neither power nor majesty*
These two rules worked admirably in the Muslim con-
quests. The Germans employed them in World War II; the
Soviets have employed them continuously since 1917, The
first method is difficult and bloody, providing quick re-
sults. The second rule is slow but as irresistible and as
sure as the movement of an ice age glacier. Whether the
process is termed the "capture of the rising elite" or the
"utilization of potential leadership cadres from historically
superseded classes," the effect is the same. If men are
placed in a position of underprivilege and shame because of
their beliefs and if a way is provided for voluntary conver-
sion to the winning side, the winning side will, sooner or
later, convert almost everyone who is capable of making
12trouble.






IV. THE ROLE OF PROPAGANDA
Psychological warfare is waged before, during, and
after wars—it is everlasting and no one, anywhere, ever
escapes its tentacles. It has become a constant part of
international relations. Its principal vehicle is propa-
ganda. Propaganda is by no means something new in the
struggle of mankind; but its conscious and scientific appli-
cation by means of modern, high-speed methods of mass commu-
nications has lent it an importance infinitely greater than
it enjoyed in by-gone days. Because it has the means of
reaching mass audiences, psychological warfare is, therefore,
a potentially deadly weapon.
The word "propaganda" was originally applied to an
activity which was inspired by very laudable motives. In
the Roman Catholic Church, the College of Propaganda was a
committee of cardinals whose task it was to adapt the teach-
ings of Christianity to the practices and customs of people
13in widely different parts of the world. Every doctrine or
ideology, no matter how noble, is likely to encounter diffi-
culties in getting itself properly understood. A good
propagandist is merely one who knows how to present his
ideas effectively, and the arts of propaganda are merely the
13Carroll C. Pratt, Psychology : The Third Dimension
of War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), p. 13.
aia
12
means by which a point of view can best be made acceptable.
Propaganda, however, is successful only when there is a
positive policy to be sold, imaginative and creative spokes-
men to sell it, and detailed knowledge about the audience
and its aspirations.
V. ELEMENTS OF PROPAGANDA
In the field of propaganda, there are five general
areas or elements into which it may be broken and examined:
source , time , audience , subject, and mission . These analy-
sis factors are useful in portraying the spectrum across
which propaganda is employed.
Source is the most important element. An overt and
acknowledged source implies that the government issuing the
message is placing it before the world. This requires dig-
nity and an eye to the future and is most effectively accom-
plished through responsible public officials, preferably
with international reputations, who will realize the best
effect from the use of the name and facilities of the govern-
ment. If the source is faked, it is very important for the
government to ensure that the propaganda cannot be traced
back readily. Covert sources require persons adept at





In American practice, source is generally considered
as falling into three categories:
1. White propaganda issued by an acknowledged source,
usually a government or an agency of the
government
•
2* Grey propaganda issued by an ill-defined source.
3. Black propaganda purportedly issued by a source
other than the true one*
In terms of the time-span of the propaganda, a sub-
division into the categories of strategic and tactical can
be made*
Strategic propaganda is directed at enemy forces,
areas, people, or nations in their entirety and, in coordina-
tion with strategic planning, is designed to achieve results
planned and sought over a period of psychological changes
that may extend over long periods.
Tactical propaganda is directed at specific audiences,
usually named, and is prepared and executed in support of
localized, ad hoc operations. It is employed to achieve an
immediate, short-range purpose and normally does not cover a
long time interval*
Propaganda is so intimately keyed to the news and
opinion situation that it does not usually bear elaborate
pre-operational analysis* However, on a national policy
14Linebarger, op . cit
• , pp. 44--
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level, propaganda can be categorised as offensive or defen-
sive in nature with regard to the audience envisioned.
Defensive propaganda is designed to maintain an
accepted and operating form of social or other public action
in the face of a simultaneously hostile propaganda operation.
Offensive propaganda is designed to interrupt a
social action not desired by the propagandist or to predis-
pose to a social action which he desires, either through
revolutionary means (within the same society) or interna-
tional means, diplomatic or belligerent (between different
societies).
Among the infinite number of propaganda purposes
which a psychological warfare group may have in mind for the
audience are several broad categories of mission ;
Conversionary propaganda is designed to change the
emotional or practical allegiance of individuals from one
group to another*
Divisive propaganda is designed to split apart the
component sub-groups of the enemy and thereby reduce the ef-
fectiveness of the enemy group, considered as a single unit.
Consolidation propaganda is directed toward civil
populations in areas occupied by a military force and is
designed to insure compliance with the commands or policies
promulgated by the commander of the occupation forces.

15
Counter propaganda is designed to refute a specific
point or theme of enemy propaganda*
Most of these distinctions are in reality theoretic
terras and rarely find expression as a single, pure, opera-
tional entity. The basic distinctions are determined by the
15task involved and not by the propaganda content.
The voice of propaganda must be self confident and
convincing at all times. The propagandist must take the
imperturbable stand that he can prove anything. He is never
wrong, and he must never show any resignation or depression.
He can prove any statement, even if it appears absurd at
first view. Even if a part of the audience ridicules t
speaker, others will give him credit. No failure can b«
allowed to weaken the speaker's confident words, When all
people despair, he cannot despair; for when the propaganda
fails, the fall of the movement is inevitable.
Propaganda is made up of words which are adjustable
to every situation. It is of minor importance what tl
subject of the discussion is; what matters is the way it is
spoken. Proper words may conceal any fact or may glorify
unimportant details to an extreme. The importance of vocabu-
lary is easily recognized by reading the following collection
of words and expressions taken from communist writings
:
15 lbid ., pp. 43-48 ff.
.
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. . • aggression, flunky, warmonger, enemy of the
people, exploitation, mass-demonstration, hostility
toward the workers, world peace organization, heroic
laborer, reactionary, fighting group, landrobber,
stooges, imperialists, the great patriotic war.
The mere collection of these word3 evokes a certain
feeling. They are heavy with emotion, power and intolerance;
and they are without mercy. The success of communist propa-
ganda is to be attributed, in part, to such powerful and
very dynamic language which strikes the opponent with an
annihilating verve and passion.
VI. POLICY GOALS AND PROPAGANDA
Propaganda is the tool, not the master, of policy,
although effective propaganda always has some policy. The
policy probably will not have heen made by propagandists,
and it most certainly will not remain forever the same. If
the propaganda is consistent with what is known, or believed,
of the policy, then it can be effective, otherwise it cannot.
Long-range goals are statements of ultimate and mid-
course purposes of life in the body politic. The task of
policy is to re-examine and redefine the operational connota-
tions of these long-range goals in the light of current
events , needs , and demands , so as to insure that these
parameters continue to define th e of future sought by
the state and its people. Since policy is the sequence of
governing decisions in any body politic, it inevitably

17
fluctuates as changing conditions alter issues and modify
alternatives. Although its guiding policy may shift, the
purpose of propaganda remains constant: to serve policy
with maximum effectiveness. However, without clear policy
goals firmly in control of utterances, propaganda may move
its audience—but in no direction or in the wrong direction.
In world politics, policy employs four instruments to
achieve its goals: propaganda (persuasion), diplomacy
(negotiation), economics (bargaining), and war (coercion).
Their respective vehicles are symbols, contracts, commodi-
ties, and violence. War, economics, and even diplomacy
operate upon the material environment. The propaganda func-
tion is to advance policy goals by manipulating the syrabo.
environment.. What people believe about the future 3ha^
their responses to present events. It is tti .iefs
about the future—-the structure of expectations—v;hich
propaganda attempts to modify on behalf of policy goals.
The manipulation of expectations is an instrunk.
with powerful uses but also with definite limits. 1
fundamental limitation is inherent in the instrument: Its
strategy is persuasion and its vehicle is the symbol.
Propaganda does not change conditions but only bel- about
16
Daniel Lerner, "Effective Propaganda: Conditions
and Evaluation," Propaganda in U-ar and Crisis , ed. Daniel




conditions) it cannot force people to change their beliefs
but can only persuade them to do so*
Propaganda is effective when it achieves a modifica-
tion of audience behavior which alters the distribution of
power in ways advantageous to the policy ox the propagan-
17dist* Policy .pals thus define one set of limits for
propaganda activity—by postulating what is desirable* A
second set of limits is defined by audience predispositions—
which determine what is possible* Propaganda strategy
operates within the terrain bounded by these policy and
audience considerations*
It is important to recognize that the behavioral con-
sequences of modified expectations need not appear immedi-
ately* In fact, some of the most important consequences of
any attitude alterations appear only in the long-range
future* Propaganda attempts to adjust the timing of the
behavioral consequences it seeks to the short-range or long-
range aims of its policy goals*
One requirement of sound policy is the classification
of goals) a second is their instrumentation* Psychological
warfare in support of policy must, first, clearly define its
objectives and the methods through which it proposes to





objectives and methods, the popular aspirations of those to
whom the psychological appeal is addressed. Third, it must
determine to what extent psychological warfare is capable of
supporting political policy.
VII. INTELLIGENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Assuming that clear goals and firm policy are availa-
ble for the conduct of psychological operations, to move
towards instrumentation of these goals demands adequate
intelligence of conditions. The crucial service rendered to
policymaking by the intelligence function is perhaps the
most serious area of ignorance in our present understanding
of the political process. The instruments of policy activate
policy decisions by continuously modifying present conditions
toward future goals. Policy specifies the desired ends;
intelligence appraises the available means. Each of the
policy instruments (propaganda, diplomacy, economics, and
war) has its destructive techniques, but all are to be ap-
18praised by the criterion of effectiveness. Intelligence
is, therefore, indispensable to both policy and psychological
operations
•
Each sphere of policy is to some extent an end and to
extent a means. Thus, for example, every proposed




military policy must be evaluated with reference to other
objectives in that sphere and to the goals in the spheres of
diplomacy, economics, and psychology* Intelligence can
clarify goals and alternatives and provide needed knowledge.
The types of knowledge needed for psychological policy may
be classified: (1) distribution of attitudes, (2) trend of
attitudes, and (3) comparison of available alternatives with
past situations and with scientific findings. Attitudes, in
turn, can be inferred from many kinds of data such as: (1)
what people say and do, (2) what is said to people, and (3)
19
what is done to people*
The organization of the intelligence function calls
for the proper articulation of many specialists with the
policy makers* Psychological operations and propaganda are
not the same as advertising* Psychological warfare is a
task of extraordinary complexity, requiring intellectuals,
scholars, journalists, political philosophers, and special-
ists with creative imaginations in the fields of political
sociology, social psychology, history, cultural anthropology,
and communications* Psychological warfare must understand
and reach the people for whom it is intended* This is not a
job for stodgy, conformist bureaucrats*
19Harold 0. Lasswell, "Policy and the Intelligence
Function," Propaganda In War and Crisis , Daniel Lemer (ed*)






VIII. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AMD
POLICY FORMULATION
The relationships between those who formulate authori-
tative declarations of policy and those who perforin the
intelligence function require constant refinement and redefi-
nition. Psychological material is less definitive than
technical reports, and its adequate presentation demands a
close personal relationship amongst planning personnel. If
psychological operations are to be correctly related to
policy, psychological planners must occupy a prominent posi-
tion in all circles and levels of policy councils. Only
through constant emphasis can policy makers come to recog-
nize and sense the full degree of their reliance upon cer-
tain facts for basic clarification of their task.
Policy makers often leave goals phrased in ambiguous
language that is open to misinterpretation, and it is one of
the functions of the intelligence branch to point out any
ambiguity and to seek out an authoritative declaration.
Psychological operators continually ask for new specifica-
tions of objectives. Many times the goals enunciated by the
makers of policy are inconsistent or even contradictory. On
other occasions, authoritative statements are entirely miss-
ing in reference to many zones of action. In this process
of clarification of goals, the psychological operator
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rapidly discovers that there can be no clarification unless
the need for integrated policy is widely felt. It is at
this point where the nicest balance must be observed. To
attempt to force a rigorous proclamation of purpose may not
only fail to carry the policy group along but may lead to
20the rejection of disciplined fact gathering. Yet, failure
to keep the need of clarity at the focus of policy-making
attention may result in a critical delay in adjustment to
reality.
IX. IMPONDERABLES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
In physical warfare, the inherent instability in
every situation, including such variables as weather, is
partly compensated for by the ponderable factors. In psy-
chological warfare, there is virtually nothing that can be
calculated. The target—the enemy mind in its entirety—is
a factor beyond the absolute, finite understanding of man.
The propagandist can define: (1) the specific kinds of
demoralization or discord he wishes to create, (2) the par-
ticular enemy audiences in which he wishes to create them,
(3) the types of arguments he proposes to use, and (4) the





21little more. The honest psychological operator will admit
that he does not know where he is at any given moment, how
far he is from his starting point, or how near he is to his
goal. The propagandist can never say, "this consideration
is now finished; let us proceed to the next phase.
"
Psychological warfare is far more complex than a
single propaganda campaign, and the key to its effective use
lies in an appreciation of its possibilities and its limita-
tions. Psychological warfare officers and researchers must
develop a realistic, specific, and mature approach to the
problems that actually arise. They must realize that the
basic principles of war apply also in psychological warfare.
Further, psychological factors must be taken into account in
making command decisions. This involves the gathering of
psychological warfare intelligence, including information on
the political and psychological effects of tactics and weap-
ons systems.
At present, it is a rare American political or mili-
tary leader who consciously considers psychological implica-
tions when making command decisions. Possibly this failing
is due to the fact that it is a rare intelligence officer
(civil or military) who looks for or adequately reports






operations. It is certainly due, in part, to a national
indisposition towards psychological operations. Irrespective
of the reason, the need for more and better psychological
warfare intelligence is great. To he effective, psychologi-
cal warfare demands valid measurements of the motivational
forces affecting groups whose behavior and thinking it is
wished to influence. Accurate data must be available on
current attitudes, interests, and beliefs of target popula-
tions. It is imperative to know what information and misin-
formation they possess, the source of information they trust,
the concepts they hold, and the values they seek to realize.
X. MORAL AND TRADITIONAL OBJECTIONS
The world is governed in accordance with political
customs, ideas, and structures that developed long ago. Psy-
chological warfare is in one sense reactionary, because it
goes behind the target state and appeals to the individual as
a member of the human community. The greater the success of
psychological warfare in inducing treason, the more humane it
is as a weapon. Nevertheless, there are unpleasant and im-
moral overtones in the use of psychological warfare. In the
hands of the wrong persons, it is capable of being converted
into a drastic instrument of domestic confusion. On a
broader, international scale, "warfare psychologically waged 1*
by a total state against a free one can be a vile and
—n
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effective instrument, achieving victories by exploiting the
peacefulness , indecision, and disunity of its victim. The
most powerful countermeasure to hostile, prebelligerent
attack is high national morale, which, in turn, depends upon
the mental, emotional, and physical health of the people.
Apart from the opinion that propaganda is a form of
deceit, and thus immoral, specialists often regar<~ other
instruments of policy—diplomacy, armaments, economic meas-
ures—as both more respectable and more effective. By
tradition and experience, Foreign Service officials are in-
clined to observe the time-honored ways of communicating
with their peers in other capitals and to view communications
to people at large as either wasteful or dangerous. Indeed,
no degree of righteousness and veracity in mass propaganda
can alter the fact that propagandist aims are often subver-
sive* •
XI. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AS
AH INSTRUMENT OF POLICY
Psychological warfare is only an instrument of policy,
not a policy itself. There are certain things it can do,
others it cannot do. It cannot, in the long run, perpetuate
falsehoods. It cannot impose an alien system of values on
one that already exists. It cannot satisfy physical needs
or permanently substitute words for deeds. Where used in
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connection with a political or military policy, it can give
life and impetus to political goals, it can encourage friends
and discourage enemies; militarily, it can cc.iuse and under-
mine the enemy, damage his morale, and put him on the defen-
sive. It can do much to dishearten the enemy's allies and
to win over neutrals. Properly used, and always in coordina-
tion with a policy of action, it can neutralize the poten-
tially hostile or wavering* The policies and particularly
the acts of a government are the most potent ammunition of
psychological warfare; not only is the nature of these acts
significant, but, equally significant are the wording of
their announcement and the time of its release*
Psychological warfare is but the impact, in the realm
of ideas, of the political, economic, and military policies
it seeks to support* It is the ideological expression and
projection of the objectives and methods of these policies*
From the nature and character of these policies, it draws
its strength* With them, it triumphs or fails* If it is to
be effective, it must be coupled with political and military
policies that have the makings of victory* Deeds speak much
22louder than words*
In the sphere of political action, there is no such
22Hans J* Morganthau, In Defense of the National






thing as one and the same truth for everyone. Different
people will each consider the same news item, the same idea,
from their own particular philosophic, moral, and political
perspective. Each will see the idea in a different color
and interpret it differently.
Propaganda cannot assume that the sender has the
whole truth and the only truth and disregard the basic in-
terests and outlook of the foreign audience. Ignoring the
audience's expectations may lead to propaganda boomerangs.
Even the most truthful statement can return "home to roost"
if it is not attuned to the range of the audience *s beliefs
and experiences.
XII. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND DEMOCRACY
Psychological warfare subordinated to satisfying the
home public is not psychological warfare. One of the greatest
difficulties encountered in establishing a psychological war-
fare program is the failure, at all levels, by officials to
recognize the totality of effort required. Every act of a
nation has either good or bad psychological implications.
For all representatives to have the desired unity of purpose,
every agency of the government, every newspaper and magazine
must be oriented to give the same view. This requires an
indoctrination of officials, a degree of policy guidance,
.:-...:. ) i
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and a level of internal control which is generally unavaila-
ble in a democratic nation*
The character of psychological warfare as a policy
instrument derives from the social structure of the nation
whose policies it serves. The conditions of its communica-
tions industry will determine the number and kinds of
channels available for propaganda. The national educational
system will determine the personnel available-—their number
and quality. The values, goals, and aspirations of the
nation will condition the policies that psychological war-
23fare will be designed to serve.
Psychological warfare is an instrument of foreign
policy: it always has been; for psychology and propaganda
are nee saary in peace and in war in the pursuit of national
goals. Some critics claim that propaganda, psychological
operations, and psychological war are antithetical to a
democratic way of life. So is war; yet democracy has waged
just and honorable wars, and democracy has repeatedly used
psychological warfare and propaganda in the conduct of its
wars and foreign affairs. To deny the state an effective
tool in the international field on the grounds that it is
not correct practice in "peacetime" to influence a nation's
own people, its friends, the neutrals, the enslaved, and the
23Daniel Lerner, Sykewar (Cornwall, New York s Corn-





conquerors through psychological operations is a moralistic
bit of nonsense left over from the era of the Light Brigade,
within those limits imposed by national values, the rules of




THE FACTORS OF HERITAGE AND IDEOLOGY
I. THE SOVIET UNION
The roots of Russian civilization go deep into the
ancient Indo-European background which is common to all
European nations. Like all modern peoples, the Russians
have acquired a certain admixture of alien blood through the
centuries. The Varangians (Norsemen) swept througn the land
in the eighth and ninth centuries A.D.; and both before and
after this period, the eastern Slavs mixed freely with
peoples of the Ural-Altaic family—Mongols, Turks, and Finns,
Yet, the Russians remained essentially a Slavonic people and
did not differ appreciably from such other Indo-European
peoples outside of the Mediterranean area as the Germans and
the Baits,
The ancient Russian civilization profited greatly
from intercourse with the Iranians—also an Indo-European
strain—who, in those early days, were firmly established on
the south Russian steppes, Slavic mythology, folklore, and
heroic songs show wide and unmistakable evidence of this
George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (fifth revised
edition; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 1-19.
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influence. Thus, a combination of original Slavic and re-
lated Iranian elements underlies Russian civilization.
The Effect of Byzantine Christianity
In the course of the ninth and tenth centuries A.D.
,
Russia was officially converted to Christianity in its
Byzantine form. This conversion was of tremendous importance
for the whole subsequent course of Russian intellectual and
cultural history. Although this conversion laid the basis
for a closer relation between Europe and Eurasia, the poten-
tial unifying force was greatly inhibited by the eleventh-
century breach between the Roman and Byzantine churches.
This tended to turn the Russian people inward and laid an
early basis of separation between Russia and the West. The
constant military pressure exerted by the Poles, Germans,
and Swedes against Russia's borders further widened the
separation.
The Impact of the Mongols
Across the great sweep of Eurasia, from time imme-
morial, had surged waves of conquering noma's, each tribe
forcing its predecessor onward as inexorably as the pressure
of the next outpouring mounted against it in turn. Scy-
thians, Sarmatians, Huns, Avars, and Khazars followed in
historic procession, leaving an indelible heritage of fear,
conquest, and oppression. Yet, during this long, continuing
.
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assault, the Russian principalities grew, developing a
political organization which combined elements of monarchi-
2
cal, aristocratic, and democratic forms of government.
These three elements of power appeared in varying degrees of
importance from place to place. Even the Suzdalian monarchy-
the nucleus of the future tsardom of Moscow-—where the monar-
chical element had particularly developed was a constitu-
tional monarchy and not absolute. As late as the thirteenth
century, Russian political institutions were based upon a
free society. The knell to this evolutionary process was
struck in the year 1223 A.D. when the Mongols first emerged
from the wastes of Northern Persia and Transcaucasia and
penetrated the south Russian steppes.
Historically speaking, the Mongol invasion was the
last great drive of the Eurasian nomads to the West. The
Mongol's intention was "to establish a world empire under
which international peace, the pax mongolica , would be
3
achieved." The full fury of their assault was not exerted
for another fourteen years} but when it finally struck in
December of 1237, it carried all before it. By 1241, Russia
had been overrun and for the next two hundred and forty






Mongol rule left many indelible traces in Russian
life. City crafts and population declined, while agricul-
ture continued to expand. It was in the Mongol period that
4Russia became a predominantly agrarian country.
Politically, the decline of the cities meant the
weakening and eventual destruction of the democratic element
in the old Russian system. While the prince was completely
subordinated to the Khan, the Khan's patent now protected
him against the political claims of either the townspeople
or the boyars. Thus, the very nature of princely authority
began to change. As the Khans delegated an increasing num-
ber of administrative duties to the princes, particularly
the responsibility of collecting taxes, these rulers were
able to use, for their own benefit, the administrative and
military machine built up in Russia by the Mongols. The
Russian princes emerged from the Mongol period much stronger
rulers than had been their predecessors before the conquest.
Of great importance was the psychological condition-
ing process through which the population passed. The people
were trained by the Mongols to accept orders unquestion-
ingly, to pay taxes, and to supply manpower without delay.
They were subjected to brutal and immediate punishment for






resulted in a new concept of state and society. The old,
free political institutions were replaced by the authority
of the Grand Duke. The free society was gradually trans-
formed into a network of social classes bound to state
service.
Another important source of influence on Russian
heritage lay in the development of the power of the church.
Under the protection of a charter of immunity granted by the
Khan, Manger-Terair , the church became less dependent upon
princely power than in any other period of Russian history.
Furthermore, it was in the Mongol period that the rural
population was Christianized,
Effects from the Fall of Constantinople, 1453
As a branch of the Byzantine Church, t.. Russian
Church was deeply affected by the grave political and reli-
gious crisis which developed in the old Near East between
1350 and 1450. Though Orthodoxy was restored by the Turks
in Constantinople following its capture in 1453, the politi-
cal and psychological conditions inherent in the See of the
Patriarch's being in the camp of the infidels forced the
Russian Church into self government. It was, thereafter, a




symphony of church and state—the concept of Byzantium as
the Second Rome—to be adapted to the Russian milieu. Thus,
Moscow became the Third Rome—the last Rome; there would be
no other. There was also to develop a near mystic concep-
tion of purpose: a deep, emotional sense of defending the
faith; and, eventually, the concept of caesero-papism which
vested in the Tsar the spiritual as well as temporal leader-
ship of the state.
The Effect of Europeanizc t ion
The Europeanization of Russia brought with it new
political, religious, and social ideas. It also brought pro-
found internal conflict and a crisis of national psychology.
The new ideas reached the governing and upper classes and
were absorbed by them before they reached the masses. Con-
sequently, a split developed between the top and the bottom
of society which was never bridged.
Peter the Great accomplished this political emergence
at a great price. In the course of his program of westerniz-
ing the state, the people were deprived of political power
and local government was abrogated. The Orthodox Church,
the chief psychological basis of the old Russian state, was




lost influence to such a degree that it faced a threat of
disintegration in 1917,
The majority of the people resisted the program of
Europeanization, and their inherent suspicion and distrust
of the West was further heightened by the forceful imposi-
tion of the reforms, Peter's "primary concern was the good,
not exactly of the Russian people, but rather of the Russian
7
state," He stopped at nothing in pursuing the interest of
the state. His concept of absolutism, as a part of Russian
heritage, was to become habitual and traditional.
Familiar Traits
The reports of foreign observers on the status of
affairs in those early days have a prophetic tinge and, in
retrospect, seem to presage the conflict of these times.
Traits were then becoming visible that were destined later
to play an important part in the psychological composition
of Soviet power. There was a tendency to a messianic con-
cept of Russia's role in history; an intolerance of foreign
outlooks and values; a pronounced xenophobia on the part of
Russian officialdom; an insistence on isolating the Russian
people from foreign contact; a secretiveness and deviousness






anything in the nature of a permanently peaceful and equal
relationship between states; a tendency to view every treaty
of peace as being in the nature of a provisional armistice;
and a tendency to think of conflict as the normal
—
peace as
the provisional and abnormal.
The Rcle of Ideology
Prophetic as these historic Russian traits may be, it
was the linking, by means of a doctrinaire ideology, of a
totalitarian party systeir ad national power aspirations
which has effectively produced that mutation known as the
"cold war." This ideology is woven through the organization
of the Communist Party system and interacts with the power
considerations of a large block of nations. Therefore, in
examining the predilections of the Soviet Union to the use
of psychological warfare and psychological operations, it is
necessary to examine this ideology for its contribution.
The Contribution of Karl Marx
Karl Marx deriving his concepts from Feuerbach and
Hegel combined the materialism of the former with the his-
8torical concepts of the latter. "Historical material ism"
8Gerhart Nieraeyer, "The Ideological Core of Communism,"
American Strategy for the Nuclear Age , Walter F. Hahn and




was the derivative: the idea that history occurs because of
changes in material, economic conditions which, in turn,
lead to changes in human existence and which proceed accord-
ing to an inescapable logic.
From this derivative, it develops that: (1) life is
fundamentally a relation between man and matter (out of this
relationship issues a communist's certainty that his beliefs
are corroborated by scientific proof); (2) the laws of
history can be scientifically determined and the Marxist
interpretation is the only "scientific" key to the knowledge
of history; (3) one can find general truth about human af-
fairs only by participating in historic change—the point of
philosophy is not to interpret but actively to change the
world. Out of this purpose, revolutionary activity as a way
of life becomes apparent.
The core of the communist teaching about society is
the doctrine that all societies above the primitive level
are split into classes. These classes are locked in an un-
i
ceasing and irreconcilable struggle. Thus, struggle is not
an abnormal condition, but rather the characteristic trait
of all historically recorded societies. In modern society,
this struggle has narrowed to a conflict between the
bourgeoisie, who are those who produce commodities t ^h
hired wage-labor, and the proletariat, who are the property-
less wage workers. In this social conflict, power is
.
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interpreted, basically, as the rule of one class over
another
•
According to communist theory, it is private owner-
ship of the means of production which enables a class to
rule. Since the proletariat possesses no means of produc-
tion, being without property, its victory in the class
struggle cannot result in another class rule.
The revolution of the proletariat is, therefore,
expected to end all class rule and to inaugurate a
new type of society in which there will be no classes,




Communist doctrine holds that all societies pass
through successive phases of development—primitive , slave-
holding, feudal, bourgeois, and, finally, socialist. In
the course of this development, the class struggle has fas-
tened itself upon mankind as a result of the institution of
private property, for it is private ownership of the means
of production which enables a class to rule and wealth can
be generated only at the price of poverty. Classes, then,
developed a machinery for oppression—the state. Only when
human society is free of class n will mankind be re-
lieved of these plagues.
In Karl Marx's view, the capitalists exploit the
people for profit and rule all men in bourgeois society.
9 10
Ibid., p. 59. Ibid . , pp. 54-60, passim .
.
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This system is inherently evil and must be destroyed in its
entirety. It also is shot through with inherent contradic-
tions and thus bears the seeds of its own destruction and
overthrow by the proletariat. Thus, Marx left to Lenin a
target for hostility, a motive for irreconcilable hatred of
the world's society, and the prediction of a catastrophic
but hopeful end.
Lenin ' s Adaptations
With the legacy of Marx, developed in his Capital , as
bedrock, Lenin proceeded to transform these teachings into
the basic Bolshevik doctrine of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union.
To Lenin, capitalism had advanced from the competi-
tive to the monopolistic and imperialistic stage. This was
the final stage, and the capitalist nations could now be
expected to turn on each other in mutually destructive wars.
The world was, therefore, to be the scene of a final,
titanic conflict between the industrial nations on one hand
and the socialist and anti-imperialist states on the other.
The latter group comprised the "overwhelming majority,"
according to Lenin, and was, thereby, given a kind of demo-
cratic justification.
The struggle was now to be a world-wide conflict be-
tween two international "camps" and was, in addition to a
contest between the revolutionary forces and capitalism,
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also a struggle against war. In this manner, world politics
and revolutionary cause were to be woven into a single
11fabric. x
Marxism-Leninism thus postulated a struggle of the
future against the present—the Socialist Revolution or,
simply, "the Revolution." It summoned all "toilers," under
the unifying leadership of the Communist Party, to fight the
revolutionary struggle to bring about the inevitable end of
present day capitalist society. Any method required to
bring to pass the catastrophic destruction of this bourgeois
society was to be justified in the name of the hoped-for
result. Deliberate action and political organization would
be necessary to accomplish the deed, and no sacrifices could
be deemed excessive in the struggle for victory.
While he borrowed heavily from Marx to formulate his
views on "the Revolution," the basic operational doctrine
for implementation of the revolution was shaped entirely by
Lenin. 12
We live not only in a state, but in a system of states
and the existence of the Sovi public side by side
with the imperialist states for a long time is unthinka-
ble. In the end, either one or the other will conquer.
And until that end comes, a series of the most terrible
collisions between the Soviet Republic and bourgeois
states is inevitable. 13
11Ibid., p. 63. 1 Ibid ., pp. 64-69, passim .
13Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Selected Works (New York:
International Publishers, 1935), p. 107.
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Hence, the struggle would continue with undiminished
fury against external enemies long after the communists had
seized power and dealt with their internal foes. Marx's
concept of a single upheaval was now transmuted into a "pro-
tracted struggle" in which the Communist Party, Communist
strategy, the role of the state, and the place of the Soviet
Union all had doctrinal functions to perform.
The Role of the Party
The Party was defined as the "vanguard" of the pro-
letariat, and was entrusted with guarding and developing
revolutionary theory. It was, therefore, implicitly the
judge of the correctness of all thought. Its members would
be comparatively few in number and dedicated to the profes-
sion of revolution.
Lenin developed a number of strategic principles most
of which proposed methods by which a small, compact organiza-
tion could use revolutions made by others to control large-
scale revolutionary movements and change. The use of alli-
ances, neutralization, legal as well as illegal activities,
and bourgeoise revolutions which were later to be subverted
are all examples of basic tactics.
The road to a society of full freedom when the state
has withered away leads through the dictatorship of the pro-





is "nothing amy more to suppress," the state is to be used
dictatorially, not as an instrument of the common good but
for combat operations of the Party as a "rule based upon
14force and unlimited by law."
The Role of the Soviet Union
The Soviet Union was assigned the role of the power
base for the world revolutions. Here, the Party could con-
solidate its power} and Soviet Russia, therefore, became a
chief instrument of the world revolution, and the Communist
International became the tool of Soviet Russia. "Henceforth,
the national power, national security, and national expansion
of the Soviet Union came to be intertwined with communism as
15
an ideological cause."
Any agreements between the Party and outside groups must
be regarded as aiding the future liquidation of these
groups and as barriers against the liquidation of the
Party by them. Therefore there is no essential dif-
ference between coming to an ostensibly amicable agree-
ment with an outside group or using violence against




Bolshevik Combat Philosophy and the Place of
Psychological Operations
Therefore, there is no place in the Marxist-Leninist
14Cited by Niemeyer, 0£. cit • , p. 67.
15 Ibid ., p. 68.
16Nathan Leites , The Operational Code of the Politburo





outlook for genuine compromise or coexistence or for any
reconciliation of differences. The struggle against the
capitalist enemy is the law of life. To end it, even to
interrupt it, would be to die. Once an opportunity arises,
action—immediate action-—is the only permissible course*
"History," said Lenin, "will not forgive revolutionaries for
procrastination when they can be victorious today . . .
,
17
while they risk losing much, in fact, everything tomorrow."
Struggle, consequently, must remain the key to Soviet
tactical and strategic thinking. Relaxation, "normalcy" in
the conduct of relations with others, peace, as the West
understands the term, are by definition incompatible with
what the Soviet leaders avow to be their solemn obligation
to history. The contest, they themselves insist, must be to
the death.
From its earliest days, communist conflict doctrine
has revealed a remarkable affinity to military thought. The
pith of communist doctrine is the concept that military and
political instruments are interchangeable in the execution
13
of one vast strategic plan. War, be it fought with
17
Lenin, op . cit
. ,
p. 237.
18Alvln J. Cottrell and James E. Doughety, "The Larger
Strategic Vision," American strategy for the Nuclear Age,
Walter P. Hahn and John C. Neff (eas.) (Garden City x~" Double-
day and Co., Inc., 1960), p. 56*
•
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military hardware or through non-violent, political, and
psychological operations, is a unity. "Hot" and "cold" are
but degrees of intensity in one and the same war.
According to standard communist procedure, the pre-
dominant enemy group should not be attacked in a decisive
manner before its leaders and cadres have become unsure of
their capabilities, intentions, rights, and, above all, of
their chances of success. This doctrine firmly establishes
the operational requirement for psychological warfare and
psychological operations as a tool of Soviet foreign policy.
Since foreign policy is conceived within the parameters of a
nation's values as they have developed out of heritage and
ideology, it follows that the Soviet conduct of psychologi-
cal operations would be in accordance with Bolshevik con-
flict doctrine. Since war, politics, diplomacy, law, science,
economics, and psychology all form a continuum and are closely
integrated in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy, psycho-
logical operations can be encountered in every act of the
Soviet Union. Soviet National Security policy marinates
military, foreign, and domestic policies in a vehicle of
psychological operations. No action is taken without con-
sideration of its psychological impact upon the entire
spectrum of short and long range objectives.
.it
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II. THE UNITED STATES
Since the remote ages of pre-history, the land had
been there, shielded behind the heaving, restless barriers
of the North Atlantic and North Pacific oceans and the
19
swirling sea mists. Perhaps as long ago as 50,000 B.C.
man had reached its shores. Kin of the same nomads who
periodically welled up out of the depths of Eurasia and
surged into the European peninsula, Asiatic migrants crossed
the land bridge between Siberia and Alaska. Driven by cold,
searching for more game, questing for an easier life, these
migrants gradually dispersed through the entire landmass
from the Bering Strait to Tierra Del Fuego.
These early arrivals from Asia brought with them a
primitive Stone Age culture and knowledge of the use of fire.
In time, some of them learned how to work metal; others
never advanced beyond stone weapons and tools. In the
jungles of Central America, the Valley of Mexico, and the
Peruvian highlands, great civilizations comparable to those
of the Mediterranean and Western Europe flowered.
No such empires were developed in the vast, near
empty sweep of land that would, one day, become the United
States and Canada. Here, by the end of the fifteenth century,
19Richard B. Morris, The New World (New York: Time
Inc., 1963), p. 9.
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the Indian population numbered no more than a million.
These people were split into a large number of tribes marked
by the utmost diversity and fragmentation. They did not
look alike, speak alike, live alike, or even pray alike.
Their weapons and tools were primitive, and they possessed
an ineffective political organization. Psychologically,
most of them could not unite, which placed them at a great
disadvantage when faced by an organized invader. The geog-
raphy of their land placed them at an additional disadvantage
The coast line provided innumerable attractive sites for
initial settlement, while the network of lakes and rivers
provided strategic highways of penetration. Only the North
Atlantic Ocean protected the seemingly fixed and unalterable
patterns of the Indian* s way of life.
The first coming of the European was an historical
accident which yielded no enduring results, exerted no in-
20fluence, and for centuries was all but forgotten. The
Norseman, Leif (the Lucky) Ericsson, sailed from Norway in
the year 1000 A.D. to bring the Christian faith to his pagan
homeland in Greenland. En route, he was struck by a violent
North Atlantic gale which set him far to the southard. When
he raised the land, it was an unknown shore. This was the







Leif sailed away to be followed by one Thorfinn
Karlsefnei, a trader, who pursued a colonizing enterprise.
The venture was ill-fated and, largely because of the vio-
lent contact with a strange and hostile people, he withdrew
after three years of terror and combat. For almost another
five hundred years the North Atlantic remained unconquered.
The New World
From first light on the morning of October 12, 1492,
dates the impact of the New World on the course of history.
The Americas now lay before Europe. Spain, with her armed
forces freed for the first time in seven hundred years from
conflict with the Moors, immediately poured her captains and
adventurers into the Western Hemisphere, bent on conquest
and the search for gold. France and Britain Joined in the
early explorations, but while the Spaniards exploited the
Americas for precious metals, the French and English amassed
less glamorous wealth and developed thriving fishing and fur
industries, thus laying the basis for a commercial coloniza-
tion.
The Results of the Defeat of the Spanish Armada
Following the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588,
the pace and scope of English expansion into the New World
burgeoned. On the eve of that great naval engagement,
Philip II of Spain ruled all of the permanent European
rbfi
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settlements in the New World. A century later, the English
were entrenched along the North Atlantic coast from Maine to
the Carolinas, as well as in the Caribbean, Much of North
America was already lost to Spain,
Had British sea power been defeated in the Channel,
the character of North America would have, without doubt,
developed along entirely different lines. Its culture would
have been Latin, its religion Catholic, its native races
would have been exploited rather than ejected or extermi-
nated, and its precepts of government and political stability
would have been in the Hispanic-colonial style rather than
in the Anglo-American traditions of constitutional rights,
representative government, and civil liberties.
Emergence of the American
And those who came were resolved to be Englishmen,
Gone to the World* s end, but English every one,
And they ate the white corn-kernels, parched in the sun.
And they knew it not, but they»d not be English again. 2 *
Many of the emigrants were farmers seeking cheap or
free land. There were weavers, tradesmen, laborers. There
were vagrants, bound men and women, pickpockets, convicts,
paupers, and prostitutes. Some sought to escape the degra-
dation and hopelessness that had been their lot in the
father land. Others sought a freedom of worship not granted
21Stephen Vincent Benet, Western Star (New York:




to them in the old country. But no matter their reason for
leaving Europe, they all sought a freedom and a liberty that
was not available to them in the Old World. Some gave up
home; all gave up country; all faced a savage, wild, prime-
val wilderness. No one can gainsay their collective bravery.
Despite the conditions at home which led the emi-
grants to sail for the Her World, England occupied a posi-
tion of deep regard in the hearts of the early colonists;
and it was natural that they attempted to reproduce, in the
wilderness, the Institutions of government as they remem-
bered them at home. Yet, the very threat and challenge of
the wilderness compounded by the vast problem of communica-
tions forced the mutation and evolution of the transplanted
political institutions to commence almost as soon as the
first crude settlement was laid out. The New World was
isolated, and autonomous action was necessary for survival.
Any arrangements between the Crown and the Colonies which
inhibited the action necessary for the physical, economic, or
political survival and well being—as the Colonist saw these
factors—would be and was intolerable. The roots of the
American tradition of Isolationism can be found in this
early demand for freedom of action and the necessity, later
grown to a felt preference, to rely chiefly on one's own




22The Crown ruled the colonies in a paradoxical manner.
While granting home rule to the Colonists, it waged a con-
stant campaign to prevent their ruling. The Empire counted
upon the loyalty of the Colonies yet appeared not to trust
them to remain loyal. While the Colonists were regarded as
English citizens, they were, at the same time, denied many
of the basic rights of Englishmen. The colonies were re-
quired to assume a share of the burden of empire and simul-
taneously denied a serious voice in the imperial decision-
making process. The fleet effectively protected the Colonies
from foreign attack to such an extent that the Empire con-
sidered it much less necessary to provide troop protection
for the Colonials.
It was difficult to tell at just what point the
colonists ceased to be loyal English subjects outraged over
taxes and repressive measures imposed from abroad. Perhaps
one third remained loyal. But gradually others, at first a
few, then in ever-increasing numbers turned to the idea of
liberty. King George Ill's American subjects had ever been
quick to defend their ancient English liberties; his English
23
subjects had let theirs erode.
22Morris, op_. cit







The American Revolution, which developed gradually
from a series of political skirmishes for the defense of
colonial rights, finally exploded into a full-scale war for
political independence, unleashing pent-up demands for
political and social reform. The Americans carried into the
conflict a deep concern for, and emphatic stress upon, le-
gality. They fought for the rights they believed were
guaranteed them as Englishmen under the British constitution
and for the rights of man as they understood them to be
derived from the "Laws of Nature and of Nature's God." This
sense of community, achieved through an explicit commitment
to particular concepts of social and political organization,
was later to be reenforced by a growing nationalism. The
resulting compound defines one of the basic elements of
American experience and heritage, and it continues to shape
American values.
The Declaration of Independence with its affirmation
of the natural rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness would become the conscience of the American people,
reminding them of standards by which to judge the conduct of
their national life. When Jefferson wrote into the Declara-
tion the natural right of the individual to the pursuit of
happiness, he was providing a theoretical base for an ex-
perience in the open-class system already a century and a
.
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half old, A man could aspire to heights limited only by his
ability, and he could enjoy acceptance by his fellows on the
basis of his character and his accomplishments. The idea and
reality of the open-class system was one of the most impor-
tant contributions of the Americans to the social thinking
of Western civilization.
The successful conclusion of the Revolution resulted
in the throwing off of the English allegiance—the rejection
of the only embodied authority which was generally recog-
nized. It was not, at the time, the replacement of one
authority by another. The birth of the American Republic
was marked by the rejection of authority as such: authority
was coercive, arbitrary, despotic, morally wrong.
For eleven years the thirteen independent Colonies
pursued widely diverse paths. The almost complete bank-
ruptcy to which this near anarchy brought the Confederation
demonstrated that it was impossible for them to survive
without some sort of central authority.
The Advent of the Constitution
All hope for the future of America was centered in
the Philadelphia convention which opened in May of 1787.
The remarkable document which was produced created a federal
structure that endowed the national government with both
power and energy. It reflected the American suspicion of
authority and the dedication to freedom of action through an
..
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ingenious system of checks and balances and the principle of
divided powers. Thus, authority was jealously circumscribed
by the erection of insuperable legal barriers to the exces-
sive hegemony of one person or group.
The typical American attitudes toward authority have
remained substantially the same as those manifested by the
framers of the Constitution. Authority must be as circum-
scribed, diffused, and limited as legal ingenuity can devise,
and the holders of these positions should be under constant
scrutiny and should be watched as potential enemies.
Washington's Farewell Address
Prom 1492, American had been involved in the overseas
ramifications of every European conflict. Her independence
had been gained through the support of France to the extent
that Paris assessed the positive net worth of such a mili-
tary venture in the overall Anglo-French contest. In an
attempt to frame American perspective in terms of the
Napoleonic Era and the still precarious national position,
Washington spoke on a general theme embracing domestic and
foreign policy. The shadow of this Farewell Address has
lain across the development of American thought ever since.
Washington attempted to focus attention on a distinctive
course of action for the nation so that its national interest
could be related to the world environment in which, perforce,




nation, sufficiently strong militarily, to protect itself
from a position of maneuver purposely kept free from formal
commitments to any nations involved in the European power
struggle of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies. This would provide the American people the oppor-
tunity to develop their land and destiny free of European
destiny. Only in this way could Washington foresee unlimited
horizons for the new American commitment to its distinctive
set of values in political and social life.
-1-.
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The Nation accepted this advice and turned itself to
the task of building and consolidating its hold upon the
land of North America; and it was a marvelous land—its
earth rich, its streams filled with fish. The primeval
stand of woodlands stretched to the great plains where the
immense, waving buffalo grass prairies, undulating in the
wind, whispered and heaved like a sea. Only nature, the
aboriginal tribes, and its own internal limitations blocked
territorial expansion. For another hundred years, the day-
by-day life of America would be directly challenged by the
undreamed rich potential of this land, and this century-long
steepage in such an environment was also to play a large





Without childishly denying the relevance of the past,
can we not recognize that the American past does not,
like the past of many other peoples, extend downward
into the soil on which we at any moment stand • Our
past, by and large, extends laterally backward across
the mountains or plains, or across the sea, to some-
where else. Our history is the process of westering
and the counter process of return . • • . A long, com-
plex, and sometimes rapid sequence of consecutive
change. America is not an artifact. It is not a
fixed and immutable ideal .... America is process,
and in so far as we are American, the work of our
heads and hands and hearts inevitably reflects that
fact. 24
Their eyes are fixed upon another sight: The American
people views its own march across these wilds [and]
... this magnificent image of themselves does not
meet the gaze of the American at intervals onlyj it
may be said to haunt every one of them in his heart as
well as his most important actions and to be always
flitting before his mind. 25
The Westward movement further attenuated America*
s
political ties with Europe ; the acquisition of the Louisiana
territory and conclusion of the War of 1812 accelerated the
process. The power of attraction of this westward movement
is to be felt even today in the rich American connotations
of the word "frontier.'' As the American center of gravity
moved westward, America's national culture became continually
more remote from its European origins.
The frontier became the milieu in which a unique
24John Kouwenhoven, "What is American About America,"
Colorado Quarterly (June 1956), p. 54.
25Cited from de Tocqueville by W. W. Rostow, "The
National Style," The American Style , Elting E. Morison (ed.)
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), pp. 231-252.
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American national character was shaped. The man who could
solve the urgent, material, day-to-day problems, organize
and operate profitably a productive enterprise, and deal
effectively with the daily local social and political life
rose in status and repute. His operational approach to all
matters became the American approach. His faculties, at-
tuned to an assessment of concrete problems, an empirical
method of resolution, and a pragmatic solution became the
national approach to all problems. It followed naturally
that this same national approach, preoccupied with ad hoc
solutions to arduous, practical tasks and generally unable
to take time for reflective thought, generated a proclivity
towards the accumulation of a store of general concepts. As
can be the case with empiricism, these general concepts were
not always demonstrably related to each other or, for that
matter, related to the bodies of fact they were supposed to
encompass.
The Religious Input
Religion had ever been present throughout the colo-
nies. Some offered sanctuary to oppressed faiths, some
forbade all but their own; generally Protestantism pre-
dominated. The Puritans contributed much to the spiritual
heritage of the nation. Politically, reaction to Puritanism




to the constitutional separation of church and state. How-
ever, the Puritan character, diluted in its westward move-
ment, spread throughout the country and is still reflected
in the character of modern America in the sense of the moral
content of life and in the mixture of practicality and
militant zeal for humanitarian causes. It underlies the
sense of mission, first carried westward by the settlers and
frontiersman, that the Nation created in 1776 exists as a
corporate entity not only to further the peace and security
of its citizens but to aid—at home and, by example, abroad
—
the cause of freedom and humane living.
The Nineteenth Century Balance of Power
America was singularly blessed in that fortune granted
the young nation, after 1815, a century during which a pro-
tracted era of international peace existed. The geographic
protection afforded by two large oceans and a British for-
eign policy, supported by naval power, which found it to be
in the Imperial interest to deny the Western Hemisphere to
incursions by other European powers, permitted uninterrupted
national development. Throughout the greater part of the
nineteenth century, therefore, there was no autonomous cen-
ter of military power, other than the United States, in the
Western Hemisphere and, consequently, no immediate threat to
its existence. By historical accident, it was to be that
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the great theaters of the nineteenth and twentieth century
wars would be in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Far
Cast; for over a hundred years, the European balance of
power remained such that no substantial European coalition
could likely be brought to bear to threaten the security of
the American Republic,
The domestic impact of such fortune seemed to support
the Washingtonian policies of non-entanglement in world
politics. It would have seemed the height of folly to aban-
don such a position and willfully become involved in the
shifts and realignments of European balance-of-power poli-
tics. European disunity and American remoteness, then,
acted to protect the United States. Both conditions made
alliances superfluous—alliances which would, at best, have
reduced America* s own security in world politics. Unencum-
bered, American diplomacy retained a freedom of action
within the Western Hemisphere, established a benign reputa-
tion among nations and peoples who considered themselves
victims of the European balance-of-power system, and per-
mitted a physical and industrial growth to occur which was
commonly viewed with indifference rather than with concern
by the European powers. Consequently, the continuity of
national life seemed to validate the initial cultural,
political, and value choices and decisions followed since





As the expansion continued , the waves of immigration
poured into the Atlantic ports
•
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to be free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,
Send these the homeless, tempest-tossed to me.
I hold the lamp before the golden door .26
These new immigrations sustained the widespread
belief that America was a refuge from Europe and its discon-
tents. Most of those who came did so voluntarily. Yet, for
many of these ethnic groups, particularly the Irish and the
East Europeans, cultural assimilation was difficult. In the
land of equality, they found themselves considered as social
inferiors. Memories of Europe were simultaneously humiliat-
ing reminders of their incomplete assimilation into the
American culture and society and a source of a comforting
ethnic subculture which lessened the loneliness and isola-
tion they felt. The effect of these ethnic tensions was to
reenforce the basic concept of neutrality towards the
European balance of power.
So long as one's own personal renunciation of Europe
coincided with the broader national purposes of
America, there was no reason to expect that foreign
policy crises would tear apart the seam of American
nationalism. 2
7
26Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus (inscribed on the
pedestal of the Statue of Liberty, Bedloe Island, New York).
27Paul Seabury, Power , Freedom and Diplomacy (New
York: Random House, 1963), p. 44.
•.
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In this manner, the multi-national background of American
society served to enhance the country* s isolationist im-
pulses.
Self-Sufficiency
With the opening and exploration of the land, the
continent was found to contain most of the natural resources
necessary to sustain a constantly enlarging standard of
living. The absence of internal tariff barriers and restric-
tions on interstate commerce opened a gigantic internal
market within which industrial and agricultural production
could be marketed. Concurrent increase in agricultural pro-
ductivity rendered the United States virtually self-sufficient
in foodstuffs. This set of circumstances was in direct oppo-
sition to the European pattern which, in quest of materials,
markets, and food, had turned outwards upon the world and
thereby increased the relative involvement of these nations
in world trade and the international implications of each
other's economic policies. In America, the consequences of
economic growth were just the opposite and served as yet
another source of validation for the chosen national path.
The Developing Pattern of Organization
The industrial and governmental complex expanded with
the growth of the nation, and concurrently the matter of




these organizations received increasing attention. Through-
out the developmental process, American politics and indus-
try "relied on the ability of an individualistic society to
28throw up a succession of innovating leaders*" The
operating code of this American organizational pattern
became centered about a planning process which projected
into the future the pattern of the familiar on-going proc-
esses and trends* The emphasis became one of operating a
relatively static process efficiently rather than developing
solutions to radically new problems.
American heritage developed out of the individualist
society of a pioneering people conquering a new, virgin land,
There was no feudal heritage or society and no political
past, in the European sense, from which the Americans had to
free themselves. The natural concepts and conditions which
were taken for granted in the young America had to be bought
in blood, if ever achieved, in other lands. Consequently,
there has been little in the American heritage would could
provide an operational source of experience for the empiric
American planning cycle to employ in dealing with the politi-









The Pains of Emergence onto the z/orld Stage
America was able to pursue its internal expansion and
national interest, the course and nature of which established
its national values and heritage, through an unwitting (and
occasionally a witting) exploitation of the balance-of-
power struggle between the major European states. By the
beginning of the twentieth century, this kind of exploita-
tion was no longer sufficient* No longer did the fragmenta-
tion of Europe assure America that no single power or power
group would dominate Eurasia and thereby simultaneously
threaten the security of the United States, No longer did
the determination of European national interests correspond,
even approximately, with those which defined the Washington
policy. American interests now collided with issues con-
sidered to be of primary importance to the European powers;
no longer could American policies be predicated upon the
benign fall-out from major European power clashes, America,
henceforward, would be unable to finesse her international
way; willy-nilly, the United States would be i squired to
participate on the international political stage.
It is on this international political stage that the
United States has performed since 1900. It is not surpris-
ing in the light of her past that the performance has been a
reluctant, often grudging, one. Some of the instinctive
rejection of the position into which Americans have found
J4 ne
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themselves pushed since the debut was voiced in the late
General Patton»s order-of-the-day issued to his troops imme-
diately prior to their amphibious assault on Sicily in July,
1943:
When we land, we will meet German and Italian soldiers
whom it is our honor and privilege to attack and
destroy. Many of you have in your veins German and
Italian blood, but remember that these ancestors of
yours so loved freedom that they gave up home and
country to cross the ocean in search of liberty.
The ancestors of the people we shall kill lacked the
courage to make such a sacrifice and continued as
slaves .29
A century and a half of insulation from world poli-
tics developed traditional American attitudes that will long
continue to influence the development of American policy.
The uninterrupted decades of national life which produced a
continuous growth of wealth, power, and standard of living
seem to be irrefutable proof of the worth of the system.
The democratic institutions, the relative absence of class
conflicts, and the attainments of its multi-national society
all seemed to be highly exportable qualities and lent fervor
to the definite messianic traits that existed in the liberal
traditions of America.
The conquest of the continent was a straightforward
military operation. A good Indian was a dead Indian. His
heart and scalp, not his mind or eternal soul, were the
29Cited by Geoffrey Gorer, The American People (New
York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1948), p. 23.
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targets. There may be considerable validity to the observa-
tion that the European settlers of Africa and Central and
South America exhibited a fatal lack of foresight, as com-
pared to that of their cousins in the settlements of North
America, with respect to the policy applied to the native
populations encountered. Be that as it may, the American
method was certainly effective* It was in keeping with the
pragmatic, total solution sought by the frontiersmen and
reflected the American aversion to chronic insecurity and
preference for a complete clear-cut victory.
Factors Inhibiting Psychological Operations
There was a rough honesty that wove its way through
the process of taming the continent. There was little in-
clination to consider psychological methods, and even less
time or material means for affecting such operations. The
moralistic foundations of Puritan and evangelical Protes-
tantism that spread over the land lay across any such course
of action. The soul and mind were the province of God and
to trespass into this domain was not fitting. It smacked of
deceit and bordered on immorality. Practically, it was too
slow and inconclusive.
Although the developing features of the American con-
duct of the government process had little if any effect on
American attitudes towards psychological factors in politico-
military affairs, nevertheless the developing pattern had
-I
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definite bearing upon any future, effective use of psycho-
logical operations. The empirical approach tended to permit
small, long-ran je problems to be overlooked until they
reached major proportions. There was a developing tendency
to permit fundamental policy decisions to take the form of
compromise solutions, to accord all units in the organiza-
tion a voice in major decisions. The fundamental American
distrust of authority and hegemony lay behind the marked
propensity towards multiple, overlapping, and layering agen-
cies, bureaus, and offices working in the same field. The
constitutional principle of division of powers, when applied
at the working level, produced large-scale units which
tended to obscure the field of vision and limit flexibility
and rapidity of response.
The American heritage, therefore, does not reflect a
basic set of values or operational patterns which predispose
the American people to the employment of psychology against
the masses of the world. That such is the case is reflected
in the reluctance with which the employment of psychological
operations is approached. Although there have been note-
worthy instances throughout American history when psycho-
logical operations have been employed, the overall history of
this instrument of foreign policy has been one of rejection
or reluctant use inhibited by a moralistic sermonizing which
has, to date, prevented the development and employment of an




SOVIET ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
The Cold War is not novel. It closely resembles the
intercivilizational wars of the past in which competing
civilizations with divergent moral and political foundations
fought one another for final survival. The struggle being
waged in mid-twentieth century is similar to the protestant-
catholic Thirty Years War of 1618 to 1648. The only parallel
in American history is to be found in the frontier Indian
Wars, with the exception that the American Indian never
posed the threat of sweeping a white and Christian civiliza-
tion, once it had established a foothold, from the conti-
nent.
I. THE ROOTS AND NATURE OF SOVIET
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
The Cold War is, therefore, a struggle, which is now
being waged between non-communist states and a communist
group of nations. The roots of this conflict can be found
at any one of several dates (1848, 1917, 1943, and 1946 are
a few of those given). However, this East-West relationship
Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (second




is mainly the product of developments of the present century,
the two most important of which were:
1. The completion of the expansion of the Russian
state to a point where further expansion was
practically impossible except at the price of
conflict with some other great power. Hand-in-
hand with this went the development of Russia
into one of the World's major military and
industrial powers.
2. The capture of power throughout Russia by a group
of men, led by Lenin, and inspired by the
Marxist ideology as Lenin had developed it.
With the healing of the ravages of World War I , the
Soviet Union began to resume the march of economic and mili-
tary development which had been in progress before that war.
World War II only temporarily halted the physical.—though
not the planning
—
progress toward that ultimate realization
of the traditional role of Russian rulers—supremacy in the
competition for position amid the territorial and military
rivalries of the Eastern European and As a. tic areas.
The conduct of this Soviet campaign has been carried
out by means of a precisely orchestrated application of all
four tools of foreign policy: diplomacy, economics, coer-
cion, and psychology.





We don't fight America* But when we shall have de-
prived America of her markets, crisis will come, and
that crisis will call forth confusion, and the American
Workers will appeal to us to come over and restore
order* Presently, the American worker is well off,
and, of course, we can't get to him* The Worker will
not submit* Consequently, we must cause unemployment
in America* After we have taken her markets in Europe,
expelled her from Asia and elsewhere, she will have
no markets to dump her goods on* She will curtail
production and there will be unemployment* We shall
then be able to settle our accounts with America. 2
The chief target, as the foregoing quotation and
countless others indicate, has been the United States* The
Soviet master plan is global in scope and finds support in a
worldwide psychological warfare campaign and propaganda
apparatus* The "peaceful coexistence" campaign is one major
aspect of these psychological operations* within the plan,
direct Soviet military force is to be withheld* Soviet
psychological operations seek to frustrate or nullify the
will of individuals or nations, to inhibit action, confuse
and instill doubt, promote inertia, and keep its victims on
the Ideological defensive* Once general moral dislocation
has been brought about—total paralysis of Vietstem will and
debilitation of Western military, economic, and political
power—the optimum time will have arrived for the decisive
2Robert S* Byfield, The fifth Weapon (New York: n*p*,
1954) cited from VGA broadcast by Dr. Vencas Krev
Klckevicius in 1952, p. 7*
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contest. Only at this point, provided the military capa-
bility of the USSR to launch an effective surprise attack
and subsequent second and third strike blows of exploitation
has been brought to the qualitative and quantitative level
required, and provided the risks of the contest are consid-
ered acceptable, will direct military action be applied.
In examining Soviet psychological operations , it
shortly becomes very apparent that the study is not one of
some new power of the word, but rather a study of an organi-
zational weapon. The word—propaganda—does not stand alone
in Soviet planning. Communist leaders and theorists have
ever maintained that words had to merge with deeds and that
3both of these must submit to organization. Rather than
directing their efforts to fighting a battle for all men's
minds , Soviet psychological operations seem oriented towards
winning the minds of certain key groups in order to seize
the material sources of power by which the minds of the
masses are supposedly influenced.
II. SOVIET CONCEPTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
The Soviet concept of psychological warfare is
realistic and unified. As there is no sharp separation
3Wilbur Schramm, "The Soviet Concept of Psychological
Warfare," Four -.orking Papers on Propaganda Theory (Univer-







between words and deeds, so also there is no demarcation
between political and military warfare. Rather, there is
the concept of a Party acting—using words and deeds in such
combinations as are needed to further the class struggle.
There is no differentiation between war and peace since
there can be no peace so long as the class struggle continues
It is the power of a disciplined, ruthless, Combat Party
which, in the last analysis, represents the communist "dis-
covery" in the field of psychological operations. To study
Soviet psychological warfare it is, therefore, necessary to
examine the concept of this Combat Party, its beliefs and
goals, its world view, its organization, and its tactical
doctrine.
The communist theory of psychological warfare rests
upon the importance of clear doctrine. Whereas, the Party
leadership need not be concerned with the consistency of
statements it makes, it must be sure of the consistency of
its position on all issues.
Running through Lenin's writings, and current Soviet
ones as well, is the horror ... lest one small
ideological slip lead to a catastrophic political
error. Under Bolshevik assumptions ideological error
automatically and inevitably leads to political
disaster. The consequence has been the development
of strict central control over vital questions of
doctrine. 4
4Barring ton Moore, Terror and Progress (Cambridge:





Poor theoretical leadership to the communists! con-
sequently, means poor organizational leadership* "Lack of
theory has been primarily responsible for • • past oppor-
5tunistlc mistakes," ". • • if our party propaganda for
some reason goes lame • • • then our entire State and Party
work must inevitably perish*"
That the Soviet leaders subscribe to the foregoing
view of Stalin is unquestionable in the light of the extent
and ramifications of the psychological operations of the
Soviet Union.
III. BOLSHEVIK THEORY AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
In Bolshevik theory, power is social, resident in
people, latent in all social institutions, and generated in
the course of all kinds ox social actions* To Lenin, the
mass represented the greatest reservoir of energy. The
availability of this energy increases with the intensity of
the class struggle and gain in efficiency as it is organized
5Communist Party in the Philippines, Report on the
Political Situation , A Report of the General secretary of
the Communist Party in the Philippines (no publishing data,
T326 or W47). *
Louis Nemzer, "The Kremlin *s Professional Staff,"






The proletariat has no other weapon in the fight for
power except organization • • • the proletariat can
become and will become a dominant force only because
its intellectual unity created by the principles of
Marxism is fortified by the material unity of organi-
zation which welds millions of toilers into an army
of the working class.
o
This power of organization is possessed by the Party
which consequently regards itself as the advance guard and
leader of the mass. The Party thinks of itself as a sort of
general staff which transforms a diffuse population into a
mobilizable source of power through the establishment of
organs of access and control. It is custodian of basic doc-
trine, expert in organization, eyes and ears for the mass,
and the guide into action.
However, when the mass accepts this guidance, it also
accepts strict control. Scholars have observed that the
Party operates on the Bonapartist assumption that delegation
of authority to leadership places the leadership in un-
9limited control during its period of office. Consequently,
attacks against the leadership are equivalent to treason
7Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon ; A Study
of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (New York: McGraw Hill,
T9"50), p. 254.
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against the state, and the political apparatus must provide
whatever control structure is necessary to mobilize and
direct the energy of the mass.
These controls fall into three categories: (1) Party;
(2) secret police and armed forces; (3) the Soviet appara-
tus. The Soviet apparatus is largely a technical means;
the police and the army represent the ultimate negative con-
trol. Under the Party is found the politically positive
function performed by the elaborate propaganda apparatus and
by the control and deliberate manipulation of all media of
mass communications.
Soviet information policy ... seeks to deny to men
the data and concepts required to formulate an alter-
native to the system. Police and Party control are
designed to prevent men from crystallizing effective
action should they formulate an alternative. **
Since the 1920 • s, the role of the mass has become
more passive and the role of the Party more important. This
does not imply that the power of the mass is not still basic
to Bolshevik thinking or that the Party does not still think
of itself as a general staff of the mass. Rather, the im-
plication lies in the increased importance attached to the
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As the mass must submit to the dictatorship of the
Party, so must the Party submit to the dictatorship of its
central bureaucracy and the Party leaders. Here, as every-
where else, appears the Bolshevik faith in organization.
Such organization implies a strictly monolithic party. No
competing power structures and no substantial deviations in
ideology are permitted. No other type of organization could
withstand the changes of course and the ceaseless combat
required of the Party.
The Party is never thought of as identical with the
entire mass. It is always a minority whose central task it
is to guide the mass in the desired direction, to interpret
doctrine, and to specify the relation of that doctrine to
strategy and tactics in a given situation. The Party is,
therefore, carefully organized, rigorously disciplined, con-
stantly at war. Only when the proletariat achieves total
victory will there be peace.
The mass, then, is the chief source of power for the
communist strategy and in seeking to arouse, harness, and
direct this power, communism turns to those points in the
modern, industrial world where permanent and reliable ten-
sions exist—to the colonial countries, to the "peasantry"
where oppressive conditions still exist in wide areas of the
world, to the labor movement, to any situation which creates
resentment. Communism seeks to place Party agents at the
.
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head of whatever social forces will set the masses in motion
and, at the appropriate time, strike paralyzing blows at the
capitalistic economy. The basic communist view is "not to
create a mass movement, but to link itself to one which his-
tory has already begotten, to establish leadership over it,
12
and to ride to power on its shoulders,"
IV. GENERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY
The role of psychological operations at this juncture
is to gain adherents and transform them from adherents into
agents from whom total conformance can be demanded. The
propaganda employed for this purpose has a high doctrinal
content
•
Once the nuclei are available, the Party can begin to
operate and maneuver. It works at first from within, and
its targets are the nerve centers of society—key industries,
political parties, and other organizations which fulfill
enduring needs and which offer tensions that can be capital-
ized upon.
Once the nerve centers of society have been pene-
trated, the Party's agents can begin to maneuver in terms of
government itself. The communists are, by this time, strong
enough to act as political parties, unions, and the like and
12Selznick, o£. cit
. , p. 171.
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to make alliances with other power groups* These alliances
are f however, fleeting relationships to be entered into with
due caution and wariness and used as steps to greater power.
At no time does the Party lose sight of the fact that its
momentary ally is a future enemy; and it never places more
than momentary reliance on the support of outside groups.
This was the stage of maneuver when the USSR allied
itself with the United States and the Western European
powers against Germany, maintaining a suspicious and wary
attitude throughout the relationship, and discarding its
allies as soon as the objective of the alliance had been
achieved
.
Psychological operations during such a period are
oriented towards: (1) maintaining a sense of mission among
the faithful; (2) fostering a sense of complacency toward
the Party amongst the present allies and future enemies; (3)
diverting attention to a common enemy; (4) encouraging dis-
unity and disaffection among other power groups.
The encouragement of conflicts among potential enemies
is a late stage in the period of political maneuvering
through alliances and applies not only to maneuvering within
a country but also to operations on an international scene.
The objective is to set the stage for the final act for which






In a conflict between two powers, the Party will try
to intervene late in the conflict and in a decisive manner.
Such a policy was followed in the case of entering the war
with Japan in 1945. In such a struggle, said Stalin, the
Party should ". . . not sit still with idle hands. We will
have to come out, but to come out after the others. And we
shall come out for the purpose of throwing the decisive
L3
weight into the scales of fate." The Party should always
be ready to take advantage of such a crisis and the great
opportunities for swift advancement which often present
themselves. This is the objective of the organization and
training of the Party—to be ever ready with proved tech-
niques, unquestioning discipline, and a clearly understood
goal in order to take advantage of every opportunity small
or large.
In the final stage of operations, when the Party is
strong enough to liquidate its temporary allies and seize
power itself, the task of psychological operations is to
demoralize the enemy, strengthen confidence within the Party,
and once power is gained, maintain proper orientation of the
mass.
The time table for such operations is a long one, and
the rate of advance is uneven. Party patience and constant
13Joseph Stalin, Works (Moscow: State Publishing
House, 1952), p. 201,
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pressure underlie the operations. This kind of strategy re-
quires long-range policy. Stalin stated: "We cannot move
forward without knowing where it is necessary to go, without
knowing the aims of the movement. We cannot build without
14perspectives •
"
V. PROPAGANDA, AGITATION, AND ORGANIZATION
Communism has never relied entirely upon propaganda
for its program; rather, it has sought to control directly
the arena of conflict. This has required the refinement and
employment of all phases of psychological operations for
effective intervention through the Combat Party and periph-
eral organizations. It entails the direct weakening of
propaganda targets and the development of an organizational
strategy designed to afford maximum accessibility and to
neutralize opposition. It is, therefore, very clear that
the action aspects of psychological warfare are not re-
stricted to the "propaganda of the deed," but include efforts
to control the conditions under which agitation and propa-
15ganda are carried out. Propaganda, agitation, and organi-
zation represent an unbroken continuum within Soviet
psychological warfare.
14Cited in Selznick, op_. cit
• , pp. 8 and 279.
15 Ibid. t p. 7.
.
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Plekhanov defined the famous distinction between agi-
tation and propaganda. A propagandist, he stated, presents
many ideas to one or a few people, whereas an agitator pre-
sents only one or a few ideas to a mass of people. An
agitator fastens his attention on a concrete injustice,
leaving to the propagandist the task of giving a complete
explanation. There has never been a sharp dichotomy between
agitator and propagandist in Soviet thinking. Both are
needed in the operations of the Combat Party, and, as the
technology of mass communications has developed, the distinc-
tion has faded.
Soviet psychological operations are based, in part,
upon the discoveries and accomplishments of the psychologist,
Pavlov. Just as Pavlov substituted the ringing of a bell
for food in the mind of a dog as a stimulus to cause the
reaction of hunger, so do the communists use propaganda to
make their programs palatable in the minds of men.
... for years research has been going on in the
USSR into the mechanisms of verbal propaganda,
probably in conjunction with research into methods
by which the effect of such verbal stimuli can be re-
inforced with accompanying visual stimuli.^
The application of Pavlovian principles is systematic
16
G. B. Plekhanov, Works (Moscow: State Publishing
House, 1927), p. 187.
17Alan M. G. Little, "Pavlov and Propaganda," Problems







and pushed with great energy. As soon as the communists
establish monopoly over the means of communication in a
newly-acquired area, they set in motion a highly semi-
scientific process of enforced indoctrination.
It is the Soviet system to analyze thoroughly the
conditions prevailing in a given area and to deduce from
them the ideas which are most likely to appeal to the minds
of men. The propaganda is then related to men's environment
and their state of mind. No values are projected into the
area. The values assumed are those maintaining in the area
where the party line is propagated. There is a convenient
confluence at this point between the Pavlovian relationship
between oral and visual stimuli and the Marxian principle of
primacy of men's physical surroundings over their thinking.
While these principles may be debated, the undeniable fact
remains that their application in propaganda brings results.
Pavlov' s dog responded to a bell only after constant
repetition and reinforcement of this response. The remarkable
single-mlndedness of purpose and the relentless reiteration
of clearly-defined ideas followed by the communists are
based on this principle. "This constant repetition is the
most notable feature of Bolshevik propaganda, and is the







18desperately monotonous • The repetition and pounding may
seem monotonous to be sure, but the desired effect is
achieved when the idea is finally lodged in man's sub-
conscious mind. Men learn the party line not knowing how.
They learn the communist way of thinking, even while they
imagine they are offering resistance. Thought-provoking is
the observation:
Fire and sword were necessary to impose faith upon
our more remote ancestors. Pressure had to be used
to make their children say their prayers. But their
grandchildren and great-grandchildren prayed without
constraint and from conviction. 19
Soviet propaganda does not rely on overt methods
alone. The several sections of the Department of Propaganda
and Agitation attest to this; movies, the theatre, fictional
literature, and music—all are employed for their revolu-
tionary significance or for their portrayal of the evil and
follies of bourgeois life, particularly the greed and self-
ishness that is provoked by money and property under the
capitalist order.
Aside from the camouflage which these indirect means
of conveying the party line provide, an essential feature of
them all is their capacity to awaken emotion in the mind of
a recipient. Coupling an aroused emotion with a suggestion
18Alexander Uralov, The Reign of Stalin (London: The
Bodley Head, 1953), p. 189.
19Uralov, o£. cit





from party doctrine is effective in indoctrinating those
targets of Soviet psychological operations whose lives are
notably drab or without hope, and who are, therefore, es-
pecially susceptible to such methods*
VI. THE ROLE OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS
The Soviet regime places great emphasis on wide dis-
semination of its decisions anc policies. The monopoly over
all media of mass communications gives it unique opportunity
and virtually unlimited resources. It can direct and con-
trol the flow of information and, at any given moment,
virtually saturate all public media with whatever subject is
considered of greatest importance.
The press and radio are the principal media by which
decisions of the Party and government are publicized. Fravda
and Izvestia are the two largest central newspapers. Pravda
,
the official organ of the Party, lays particular emphasis on
Party matters; Izvestia , the chief organ of the Council of
Ministers, stresses government affairs. Of the two, Pravda
20is the more authoritative. Pravda, Sovetskaya I osslya—
the newspaper of the Party bureau for the RSFSR (the largest
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, "National Policy Machinery in the Soviet
Union," Organizing For National Security , Vol. II (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 407.
'.
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Republic) --and Kommun^t , the Party's theoretical journal,
21have the status of departments under the Party secretariat.
As such, they receive guidance directly from the Party sec-
retariat and not, as in the case of Izvestla and other
Soviet newspapers, from the Propaganda and Agitation Depart-
ment. However, these three publications and the Department
work closely together, and their activities are well coordi-
nated •
The radio is another important medium of communica-
tion for the regime. All radio stations in the USSR are
under the general supervision of the All-Union Radio and
Television Committee which, although an organ of the govern-
ment, is closely supervised by the Department of Propaganda
and Agitation. Radio Moscow, the largest station, is equipped
with the most modern and powerful transmitters for long-range
broadcasts to foreign as well as domestic audiences. Its
broadcasts are monitored by local stations throughout the
USSR and relayed to remote areas or rebroadcast locally.
Radio stations play an important role in familiarizing
the population with important Party and government decrees
and in transmitting official explanations and "clarifica-






heavily on the press. Radio stations allot considerable
time to broadcasting texts of Pravda editorials.
Pravda is an official channel for informing lower
22level officials of policy decisions. Pravda not only
transmits the texts of decrees but, in accompanying edi-
torials, interprets them and lays down broad policy guide-
lines. Second-echelon officials are expected to read Pravda
daily and act accordingly.
The Soviet wire service, Tass , is yet another medium
of government communication. It is an agency of the Council
23
of Ministers. Tass
, with offices throughout the world,
gathers foreign news for the use of Soviet domestic radio
and newspapers and transmits domestic Soviet news abroad.
It is also a major network for the gathering and transmission
of news between Moscow and the provinces. Tass bureaus
throughout the Soviet Union play an important part in re-
porting important local developments, and Pravda prints
numerous articles received from local Tass offices.
VII. THE DEPARTMENT OF PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION
The organ of the Communist Party which is designed to
mold public opinion and to conduct psychological operations





of this Department, prescribed by the Central Committee of
the Party, is as follows:
The Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist
Party of Bolsheviks decrees: To concentrate in the
department of propaganda and agitation all work on
written and oral propaganda of Marxism-Leninism and
mass political agitation (Party press; publishing of
propaganda and agitation literature; organization of
written and oral propaganda of Marxism-Leninism; con-
trol over the ideological content of propaganda work;
selection and assignment of propaganda cadres; politi-
cal training and retraining of Party cadres; organiza-
tion of mass political agitation, )*4
The Party maintains direct or indirect control over
all public information and permits no independent commentary
or analysis of its decisions and policies. Since the func-
tions of propaganda and agitation have remained one of the
most important considerations of the Party during its entire
existence, control of these activities is at a very high
point in the Party hierarchy.
The Department of Propaganda and Agitation is admin-
istratively located in the Executive Staff of the Party
25Secretariat. Within the terms of guidance and top policy
decisions developed by the Presidium, the Department deter-
mines both the general line and the specific courses of
24Cited in Albert M. Leavitt, Propaganda and Agita-
tion in the Soviet Union ( Oberammergau : Army Institute of
Advanced Russian Studies, 1956), p. 14,
p. 407.




psychological action to bring the Party decisions to frui-
tion. Both the Presidium and the Secretariat are headed by
Nikita Khrushchev. Consequently, the interlocking arrange-
ment of policy formation and implementation can be focused
directly on the psychological facets of execution.
The title of the organ which has fulfilled this func-
tion within the Party has often changed, the internal ar-
rangement has varied, and the importance of its role has
fluctuated. It has always existed, however, and generally
has been very important, fulfilling its functions as eyes
and ears of the Party and, more important, the voice.
The directors of the Department have been prominent
in Party affairs. Zhdanov reorganized the Department in
1938 and remained closely connected with it until his death
26 27in 1948} Shepllov and Suslov served as directors.
Other lesser-known men step from the Department of Propa-
28ganda and Agitation to high government and Party posts.
Despite the range of its responsibilities, the Depart-
ment is not primarily an operational agency. The Department
does not make basic propaganda policies—that function is
Nemzer, ojd. cit . , pp. 72-73.
27Pravda, 26 February 1956.
28Meisel and Kozera, Materials for the Study of the









the prerogative of the Presidium and the Central Committee,
Nor does the Department actually administer the program of
propaganda, agitation, and psychological operations in gen-
eral; responsibility for day-to-day operation of the program
rests with the government agencies. The Department does no
major publishing and does not operate the Soviet radio or
newspaper networks. It functions, instead, as planner,
director, and watch dog for all media. Its authority
touches every realm of intellectual endeavor and every form
of organized activity which might conceivably influence
public opinion.
At every level of Party administration, there are
propaganda and agitation departments with their own personnel
in key positions in all local communications media as well
as in important factories and other enterprises. Directives
and instructions are sent out from the parent Department to
local offices and the worldwide network of Party cells.
Every Party cell is a nerve end for this system. From these
nerve ends as well as from local offices flows a constant
stream of reports back up the chain to the Department. This
basic data is gathered and analyzed for the consideration of
the Presidium and Central Committee in the development of
psychological policies. The high-level policy decisions
thus reached are then interpreted and disseminated by the







which constantly integrates the evaluated results of the
"feed back" function of its operations into a regenerative
cycle of psychological policy formulation and thereafter
applies the policy correction to the operating conditions in
the field.
Until 1920, there was no institutionalized system of
propaganda and agitation in the Soviet Union* There was, of
course, a propaganda and agitation effort, but it was not
until 1920 that the Department of Propaganda and Agitation
was created within the Secretariat of the Central Committee.
In 1921, the Department was formalized as a Party organ,
receiving an extensive mandate which foretold the extent of
29present-day activities. In 1928, the formerly separate
Press Section was incorporated into the Department structure.
In 1930, in connection with the reorganization of the
Secretariat which had as its purpose the decentralization of
cadre responsibilities within the Secretariat, a change was
30
made in the Department of Propaganda and Agitation. The
functions of the old Agitation and Propaganda Section were
divided between two new sections: Agitation and Mass
29Alex Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press,"T950)
,
p. 32.
30Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1953) • ThTs volume presents an
outstanding, unclassified, source on the early history and








Campaigns and Culture and Propaganda, The section for Agi-
tation and Mass Campaigns was mainly concerned with creating
enthusiasm for industrialization and collectivization. The
Culture and Propaganda Section had in its sphere of super-
visory operation the press, education, science, literature,
and propaganda of Marxism-Leninism.
In 1934, the old Culture and Propaganda Section was
replaced by a new Section on Culture and Propaganda of
Leninism.
In 1935, this new section was dissolved and five new
ones developed to fulfill the same functions. These new
sections were: Party Propaganda and Agitation, Press Pub-
lishing, Schools, Cultural-Industrial Work, and Science.
In 1939, in connection with the return of the func-
tional arrangement of the departments of the Party, the
function of propaganda and agitation now was to be fulfilled
by the Propaganda and Agitation Administration. Zhadanov
proclaimed
:
The Central Committee of the Ail-Russian Communist
Party of Bolsheviks must have a powerful apparatus of
propaganda and agitation in the form of an Administra-
tion for Propaganda and Agitation, concentrating all
work of written and oral propaganda and agitation. 3*
In 1948, functionalism was again discarded and the
31Cited in Leavitt, op. cit . , p. 20, from a speech by
Zhadanov at the XVIII Party Congress.
I
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industrial branch system re-adopted. The major change seems
to have been a change of name to the Agitation and Propa-
ganda Section and an assumed return, to the Section, of the
control over assignment of key personnel within its sphere
of activity. At the same time, propaganda activities were
also assumed by the industrial-branch departments*
In 1952, the Rules of the Party effected a major re-
organization of the higher Party organs by the formation of
the Presidium. However, there was apparently no change in
the organization of what had now become the Department of
Propaganda and Agitation; it remains one of the departments
of the Executive Staff of the Party Secretariat.
VIII. ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION
The scope and diversity of Party psychological opera-
tions is reflected in an examination of the internal organi-
32
zation of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation.
32
In dealing with the organization of the Department
of Propaganda and Agitation, the student immediately encoun-
ters the lack of information published concerning detailed
organization of the Party, in general, and the Department of
Propaganda and Agitation, in particular. Since 1952, the
Rules of the Party omit the more detailed description of the
higher Party organs found in the earlier rules. There is no
known unclassified Soviet source. The works of Barrington
Moore ( Terror and Progress ), Louis Nemzer ("The Kremlin's
Professional Staff* and "Word-of-Mouth Communication in the







At the apex of the structure is the Chief, his depu-
ties, and personal assistants. Under the Department Chief
comes the staff of the Department's publication: "Culture
and Life."
In general, four vertical division headings can be
assumed for grouping the various sections of the Department.
These are: (1) Press; (2) Other Means of Mass Communication;
(3) Education and Science; (4) Campaigns and Lectures.
Under the Press Division are sections for the Local
Press, the Central Press (nationally circulated Moscow
Press), Intermediate Press (republic, territorial, and re-
gional press activities), and Publishing Houses. These sec-
tions supervise the activities of some seven thousand local
newspapers, hold regional conferences for editors, conduct
briefings and criticisms, check on performance, and closely
supervise the Soviet publishing industry which is one of the
most extensive in the world. The system of newspapers and
publishing houses is considered to be basic for all other
means of propaganda. It is a "megaphone" from which all
33
other propaganda agencies take their cue.
Alex Inkeles ( Conu,. nlst Propaganda and Counterpropaganda and
Public Opinion in Soviet Russia ) serve as foundations for
e ^mining the current organization that can be derived from
a study of the Department's operations and the bits of
organizational information on the Party and the Government






Under the Division of Other Means of Mass Communica-
tions are located sections for Radio, Motion Pictures, Art
Affairs, and Fictional Literature. Although films and
broadcasting are administered directly by other government
agencies, these activities are closely watched and guided.
Communist attitudes on the role of literature, movies,
and the arts—theater, music, painting, etc.—are revealing
in so far as their inclusion within the purview of the
Department is concerned:
... Communists cannot believe that an artist may be
apolitical no matter how much he may wish to be.
Since, in their view, a work of art is bound to have
political consequences, it is understandable that, as
the Communist rulers of Russia, they wish to control
these consequences. Hence, they demand partlinost in
art. Partlinost ... carries all the overtones of
enthusiasm, intelligent, loyal, and yet essentially
uncritical acceptance of the Communist belief system. 34
Also,
Art provides one of the main channels through which an
approved Party idea can be conveyed to a person without
that person's realizing he is being "sold" on it. 35
Under the Education and Science Division are three
sections: Cultural Enlightenment Institutions; Schools; and
Science. The Cultural Enlightenment Institutions Section
guides the activities of more than eight hundred clubhouses,
34Moore, 0£. cit . , p. 105.
35Cited by Leavitt, op_. cit . , p. 21, from the writings
of Karmakov in Institute for the Study of the History and
Culture of the USSR (Munich: series 2,~T7o. 13TI
a?
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trade union centers, reading rooms and other cultural facili-
ties in rural areas which are established by local educa-
tional authorities and Kolkhozes throughout the Soviets.
The School Section informs educational authorities of
the Party Line, ascertains compliance therewith, and studies
educational problems with a view to determining new policies.
The school system is one of the most widespread canals
through which propaganda is disseminated.
The Science Section is concerned with all scientific
endeavor, from agriculture to oil and gas research and the
teaching of theory in higher institutions. Convinced Com-
munists do not believe that it is possible for science to be
non-partisan and place the same demand for partilnost upon
the scientist as that placed upon the artist.
The fourth division is the Division of Campaigns and
Lectures and is made up of two sections—Propaganda and Agi-
tation. The Agitation Section utilizes trained agitators to
promote current Party programs. The Propaganda Section
operates through trained Propagandists, personnel more
highly qualified ideologically than the agitators. It is
through the workings of these two sections that the Depart-
ment of Propaganda and Agitation most closely approaches an
operational body. Propaganda depends on techniques of com-
munication. Agitation includes not only communication but





cadres. This conception underlies the continuity of propa-
36ganda, agitation, and organization. The work of the
Division of Campaigns and Lectures insinuates itself into
every other division of the Department and pervades the
entire scope of Soviet psychological operations.
This monolithic structure represents a total program.
Its structure extends downward from the central government
organization through the levels of the republics, regions,
districts, and municipalities. Its specialist formation
exists at every level of this vertical structure. Further-
more, at each level there is a horizontal structure which
embraces the propaganda services of the Supreme Soviet, the
different Kinisteries, the professional unions, the Commu-
nist youth, and the Armed Forces. The entire life of i
target becomes the object of a program which spins a tightly-
structured web of converging influences. The Combat Party
operates everywhere; it uses the same organizational weapons;
it responds to the same monolithic control. Its influences
go into its human target's home, his work, his leisure.











IX. EDUCATION FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Zinoviev observed: "With us, propaganda and agita-
tion are based on instruction • • • • Propaganda, instruc-
tion, and agitation are a unity which must be realized
38
according to the Leninist conception of education. " This
concept has three parts: (1) the mastery of Marxist-
Leninist doctrine by the small group of advanced leaders
who, in turn, (2) supervise the instruction and organization
of the masses in the light of this doctrine, employing (3)
all teaching devices, formal and informal, including schools,
meetings, mass communications, and personal instruction and
leadership.
The Farty is responsible for training the masses and
carries out its assignment through a complete network of
schools. The school system is under the direction of the
Department of Propaganda and Agitation and extends downward
from the Academy of Social Sciences through universities of
Marxism-Leninism, political schools, circles, Party evening
schools, and also includes much-emphasized provisions for
self-study of the works of Marx and Lenin.
The indoctrination and preparation of Party leaders
is conducted with extraordinary care. The political school
38Citec in Jean-Marie Domenach, "Leninist Propaganda,"





is the basic step in this training and is conducted at the
level of the primary Party organization. It is designed to
give students the basis of political knowledge, to develop
in them elementary knowledge of how to study, and to accus-
tom them to systematic development of their ideological-
theoretical level. The instructors are trained propaganda
specialists. Those who attend classes are Party members,
candidates for the Party, or non-Party activists. Upon com-
pletion of a t —year, 120-classroom-hour course of study,
graduates are expected to become members of the vast army of
agitators.
The school system is organized in a pyramid for can-
didates throughout the Soviet world, and a promising leader
can rise through it as he rises in Party prominence. The
schooling is a continuous operation. Refresher courses are
constantly in progress on all levels of the pyramid. A two-
or three-year course is usually followed at appropriate
periods by a nine-months* refresher.
The first step upward in this education pyramid is
the district Party school. It is attended by lower Party
and Komsomol (communist youth) functionaries who study such
subjects as history, geography, five-year plans, and govern-
mental and Party structure.
From the district Party school, the path leads to
schools operated at regional, territorial, or national
-
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republic level. At these levels, two-year courses axe con-
ducted for officials at the district and city level for
assumption of duties; such as, Party or Komsomol secretary,
propagandist, newspaper editor, or intermediate level
government official. The courses continue the fields of
study found in the district school curricula with additional
courses in dialectic and historical materialism, political
39
economy, foreign policy, and international relations.
At the highest level in the chain of formal schools
for the menders of Party cadres, there are two institutions:
the Higher Party School and the Academy of Social Sciences.
The former is placed under the jurisdiction of the Department
of Cadres and the latter under the Department of Propaganda
and Agitation. The distinction made by this arrangement
reflects the type of students studying at these two differ-
ent, higher institutions of communist ideology* To the
Higher Party School, under the Department of Cadre-, go the
functionaries of State and Party, Party secretaries, chair
-
40
men of ministries, and the like. To the Academy of Social
Sciences go the theoreticians, students, and teachers in
39Inkeles, o£. cit . , pp. 54-71, passim .
40
Decree of 2 August 1946, "On the Training and Re-
training of the Leading Party and Soviet Workers" (no








such fields as government and law, international relations,
logic and psychology.
In general, a Party member finds his own level in
this schooling system. An agitator needs less grounding in
Party doctrine than does a top leader or propagandist. A
propagandist needs a firm grasp of such doctrine and an in-
formed world view. An administrator needs a solid founda-
tion in doctrine but also requires an understanding of his
country's geography, economy, and political and economic
system. A top leader or potential theorist who is to serve
as "custodian of the sacred Bolshevik word" needs the most
careful and continued training in all aspects of Bolshevik
doctrine and practice. Any of the curricula may be sup-
plemented by special training—military instruction for
culture officers who are to serve with the armed forces;
government accounting for appropriate personnel; practical
experience in management and organization.
Thus educated, the Combat Party is uniformly well
trained. The two-way channel of communication provided by
the Department of Propaganda and Agitation insures that the
Party is well informed as well. It is well disciplined and
well controlled. In the totality of its program, it ap-
proaches its targets with every weapon that is available and
appropriate
—
persuasion, infiltration, espionage, maneuver,





Soviet psychological warfare directs its operations
against three principal targets outside of the Party itself.
The first of these is the main enemy himself. Here
the approved tactics are pressure—diplomatic, economic,
propaganda, and, as appropriate, military. The struggle is
Intense and the pressure exerted is maximum. Since the time
of Lenin, Soviet leaders have warned against making anything
less than a maximum effort, or exerting any less than maximum
pressure.
A second target is that part of the enemy's power
structure which is "ripe for the picking." This includes
the areas of tension and dissatisfaction, the colonial coun-
tries, and the semi-feudal and underdeveloped countries,
which are vulnerable to the communist approach. No matter
how backward a country is, it is a worthwhile target. Every
doubtful area must be seized, otherwise the enemy will do so.
In assaulting targets of this kind, the organizational weapon
of the Combat Party is unsurpassed. No advance is too small
to be worthwhile. Yet the Party is warned not to expect to
communize all of these lands in accordance with pure commu-
nist principles nor to expect the subversive process to be a
rapid one.
The revolution of the colonies is not going to be a
Communist revolution in its first stages .... In
.-
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Its first stages, the revolution in the colonies must
be carried on with a program which will include many
petty bourgeois reform classes, such as division of
land, etc. But from this it does not follow at all
that the leadership of the revolution will have to
be surrendered to the bourgeois democrats. 4 !
Thus, throughout Asia, the Combat Party offered a
division of the land amongst the landless peasants; and when
North Korea and China fell, such bourgeois arrangements as
land reform were instituted. However, the Communist Party
was firmly in charge, guiding the country on the desired
course. All of the colonial, ex-colonial, and underdeveloped
countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America
are regarded as targets for the Combat Party, which is will-
ing to accept a small advance when a large one is not possi-
ble and which is constantly engaged in a war of organization,
infiltration, and maneuver in an effort to split areas from
the anti-Soviet power structure.
The third principal target is the Soviet mass. The
struggle, in this case, is against what Lenin called that
•terrible force" of values and behaviors built up in long
years under capitalism. All external evidence indicates
that the USSR Party leaders still feel that the Russian
masses are swayed by the "bourgeois remnants of their past."
The tight surveillance, the close control over communications,
41Cited by Schramm, o£. clt . , p. 126, from proceed-












the "Iron Curtain" erected against external ideas and infor-
mation, the vast program of agitation—all argue that the
Party places considerably less faith than could be expected,
after forty-three years of hegemony, in the doctrinal purity
of its masses.
Each of these three targets is integral to the pro-
gram of Soviet psychological operations and each is approached
with the maximum effort permitted by the situation and availa-
ble resources,
XI. COMMUNIST PSYCHOLOGICAL TACTICS
The strategic advantages of communism include (1) its
historic pic isibility, as that is bolstered by its
relation to the Soviet Union, and (2) the instability
of democratic society. In its quest for a monopoly
of power, Bolshevik political strategy links a revo-
lutionary elite to whatever social forces are set in
f
-ion against existing authority. 4 *
This statement penetrates to the heart of communist
psychological tactics. Capitalistic society, like every
other advanced society since the beginning of history, has
certain areas of recurring tension. In their most severe
manifestations, these tensions appear as wars, revolutions,
or economic panics. In colonial or underdeveloped countries,
in countries where one class or group feels discriminated
against, in lands where people are hungry for food, land,





freedom, or status, tensions exist which are highly ex-
ploitable. It is at this point that the communist operation
begins. Perhaps the greatest tactical strength lies in the
capacity to ground basic arguments in these real, deeply-
felt, and well-known tensions. By using these tensions as a
frame of reference, a basis for understanding is achieved.
With a degree of credibility established, the operations
proceed using two additional advantages to broaden the scope
of operations. The first of these is that a democratic
society permits attacks on itself, encouraging its citizens
to propose change and protecting minority viewpoints even
though they may be inimical to the regime. The second
advantage draws from the fact that in Soviet countries some
evidence of the historic plausibility of communism as a cure
for those tensions may be cited. The price of this cure in
terms of terror, fear, and surrender of freedom and human
dignity is not so clear and spectacular outside a sovietized
country as is the need and apparent accomplishment.
The basic tactic, then, is to ground the operation of
the Combat Party in real and generalized tensions throughout
the world.
It is necessary to render genuine oppression even more
severe by adding to it the consciousness of oppression,
and to make shame even more shameful by throwing upon
it the light of publicity. 4 3
43Cited in Domenach, 0£. cit
. ,
p. 266, from the works
of Karl Marx.




Lenin applied this guidance by assigning to the Party
the task of organizing those "• . . political revelations,
embracing all spheres ... [which] ... are the necessary
and fundamental condition to preparing the masses for their
44
revolutionary activity."
This is a mandate to the propagandist and agitator to
examine events in the light of Marxist-Leninist doctrine
and, in the terms of the reality of class struggle, to
interpret the "real meaning" of events to the masses. In-
variably following the basic tactic, the campaign begins
with details which are, or seem, verifiable and which are
often of a very small irritative nature and interprests them
on a grand scale. A political scandal, and unwise statement
by a public official, a desire to bring the young men home
from r'^itary service early, a fear of nuclear fallout—any
of these can provide impetus for the Party to begin to work
its way along the inverse spiral of a propaganda campaign
from the specific to the general doctrinal meaning, so as to
"tear the mask from the face of the enemy."
In this activity, slogans become one of the chief
tactical weapons of the agitator.
We are accused of creating mass opinion. This reproach
is inexact; we are attempting only to formulate it • • •
44Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Selected Works (New York:





the slogans which correspond to the acute need of a
class and epoch themselves create thousands of chan-
nels for their own dissemination. The revolutionary
milieu is marked by a high conductability of ideas .45
"Land and Peace," "bread, peace, and liberty," "for a
liberal, democratic government," " >an the bomb"—these rep-
resent some of the most successful of all the Bolshevik
slogans* One of the great strengths of peace campaigns and
appeals is the endless reiteration of the single word
"Peace," which means "so many things to so many people and
recalls so many of the bruises and hurts of society the
46
world over." Lenin emphasized the importance of grounding
all slogans in the needs and tensions of the masses and the
requirement for clarity and brevity in expressing the politi-
cal line of the moment. Every slogan must appeal as broadly
as possible to the deepest wishes of the common people.
Probably no propagandists have made such use, nor had
the opportunity to make such use, of repetition and variation
as have the communists. There are hundreds of different
kinds of newspapers and magazines throughout the USSR, each
saying the same thing, but translating it into the experi-
ence, the words, and the known tensions of the particular
audience which the publication serves. Throughout the world,
45Cited in Domenach, op_. cit
. , p. 268, from the works
of Leon Trotsky.








the Combat Party devotes extraordinary care to fitting its
activities into the culture where its objectives lie. The
leader of a unit of the Party in India is certain to be an
Indian. When the Party moved into North Korea, a large
cadre of Russian-*trained Koreans were ready to take over
leadership. When the North Korean troops advanced into
South Korea, they brought with them another cadre of South
Koreans who had been trained in China and North Kor^a to
take over the South Korean government at the appropriate
time. Behind Mulah Barzani of the Kurds and Khalid Backdash
of the Syrians stands the parent Party, while the variation
in terms of the audience, the cultural approach, and the
acceptability of the local apostle of the new faith is a
matter of the closest attention.
Since Lenin, Soviet Party leaders have cautioned
against "adventurism" in carrying the attack to the enemy.
The admonition against undertaking an action when the re-
sources are inadequate to carry the project off successfully
seems to apply to psychological operations as well as to the
field of military activity* The Party strives continually
to maintain the psychological initiative by carefully choos-
ing the time, place, and issues. This doctrine of attack is
another key to the Party's psychological strategy. "The





defending, always changing the field of battle to one of its
47
own choosing."
Lenin emphasized that the Party must be ready to
adopt itself to changing conditions. The Party has continu-
ally been counseled to expect setbacks or temporary devia-
tions from the long-term path and to be prepared for deals
and alliances, also temporary, with enemies. This ability
to make a quick shift is in accord with basic political doc-
trine and planning; it also parallels the pattern of anxiety
and fatigue tactics which communists are reported to employ
in obtaining "confessions." Some students detect in the
"quick shift" the potential element of a truly grand tactic
48based on the same psychological approach. It is highly
credible that when the tension of a particular psychological
attack has been raised to a sufficient degree, the Soviet
psychological strategists deliberately give the target tem-
porary relief from that tension in order to teach a desired
response and, gradually, through a succession of such build
ups, inexorably break down the resistance of the enemy.
Party psychological strategists recognize that many
of their most likely converts are individuals who feel re-
jected by the society around them or whose values are in
47Ibid., p. 133.
48Wilbur Schramm submits that the parallel is suf-
ficiently striking to warrant serious study.
;
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flux, and who are looking for firm ideological guidance.
Consequently
f
wherever the Combat Party operates in the
world, it provides groups in which a convert can reinforce
his new beliefs and establish an identification with a work-
ing organization which will give him a sense of mission,
status, and a sense of belonging.
XII. THE CONCEPT OF TOTAL ATTACK
The Sovit view of psychological war and psychologi-
cal operations is a concept of total attack. The Party
trusts no one it does not dominate. Its opponents can ex-
pect a consistently suspicious attitude toward everything
that is said or done. This attitude is not an assumed
defense mechanism but is the predictable heritage of Russian
history and Party experience and doctrine. There is little
cause to regard any settlement offered or entered into by
the USSR as a permanent arrangement, for communist doctrine
demands its abrogation as soon as it has served its intended
purpose.
While the Party is flexible in its line and political
arrangements, it never deviates far from the center of its
pre-surveyed path. Every step taken is directed along the
trend of this path and every step is a move in a war of
maneuver. The Combat Party works in every part of the world




program of organization, indoctrination, infiltration, and
maneuver. It maintains an atmosphere of tension, utilizing
every source of potential dissatisfaction, and constantly
applying pressure.
From its own activities, the Party knows the dangers
of infiltration, and it knows the vulnerability of the
masses. It also harbors very real concern for its o n
masses which it considers still to be "contaminated" from
life under the old regime; this concern becomes increasingly
more active with the inclusion of satellite peoples within
the horizons of Soviet hegemony. The existence of the Iron
Curtain, the Berlin Wall, and the adamant refusal to con-
sider effective, on-sight, inspection teams as part of an
arras control settlement are not surprising. What would be
surprising would be a willing removal of these obstacles.
Should this occur, it might indicate that the masses were at
last considered safe, or that the Party was a different
Party than heretofore, or that, in the estimate of Soviet
planners, there was no escape, no way out, and nothing
further to be feared from the non-Soviet world.
The Western World cannot afford to overlook Nikita
Khrushchev* s statement in Tirana, Albania, in May of 1959.
We do not negotiate on the basis of "give and take."
We have nothing whatsoever to give. We will not
I
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make any concessions because our proposals do not
form the basis of a barter deal, 4 ^




THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
American history, since before the Revolution, is
sprinkled with the recorded use of psychological operations.
In some cases, this employment was sufficiently protracted
and sufficiently integrated to approach the dimensions of
psychological warfare. In the young days of the Republic,
the moralistic undertone to American pragmatism was rarely
allowed to stand in the way of results. Furthermore, the
demanding immediacy of dealing with the day-by-day conquest
and exploitation of the virgin land left insufficient time
for the "native hue of resolution ... [to become] ...
sicklied o*er with the pale cast of thought." So long as
the nation lived with the frontier or with a majority of a
population whose recollections were filled with the actual
or near actual experiences of opening a continent, conscience
made cowards of very few indeed.
I. SOURCES OF AMERICAN AVERSION TO THE
USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Any recognized aversion to the use of psychological
operations in the formative years of the Republic probably
stemmed from three basic sources. American military
ii
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tradition sprang from Europe where it was considered much
more "fitting and proper" to be shot to pieces assaulting a
redoubt than to stand back and talk the defenders into sur-
rendering* The latter performance was not cowardly, exactly,
but it certainly was not a method susceptible to embellish-
ment in the mess* The earliest basis of Illegitimacy lies
here.
Immediate results, drawing from an evaluation of con-
crete facts, were the goals of American operators of all
kinds. This is still an American hallmark* The nebulous,
ill-defined realm of public opinion, the impact of symbols,
the role of ideology—all of these were too distant, too un-
substantial for the American style of taming a country; lack
of means of rapid, mass communications only served to rele-
gate such methods to an even lower priority* Consequently,
the effectiveness of psychological operations as a tool of
policy never approached the proven worth of the Hinie ball*
There developed, therefore, no national basis for confidence
in the employment of psychological operations*
Suspicion of authority and a parallel determination
to compartmentalise all authority into legally controllable
units provided with powers shared with and, thereby, balanced
by other competing units have been features of American
political consideration since 1787* In this context, reflec-
tive thought on the nature of psychological operations e*vrly







discovers the threat of subversion of one organizational
unit by another through the employment of a force which can
leap the barriers of law and a carefully balanced set of
checks and balances. This potential strikes at the heart of
American constitutionalism and gives rise to the "round
house" statement, so frequently used to dismiss its use:
that psychological war is "antithetical to the American way
of life," The habitual objection to its employment has
been the inference that psychological operations are not
consonant with either the past experience or the present-day
interests of the nation.
When forced to resort to arms for redress, an appeal
to the tribunal of the world was deemed proper for our
justification. This was the object of the Declaration
of Independence. Not to find out new principles, or
new arguments, never before thought of, not merely to
say things which had never been said before; but to
A "round house" statement is, by definition, a verbal
refuge where it is difficult to be cornered. The tone of
contemporary reference to that diaphanous web spun of mores,
values, style, heritage, and image of America and her people
is a distressing fact of American political writing. A
search for the stage in our national life when the afore-
mentioned terms ceased to be employed as reasons for acting
and became excuses for not acting at all or in an ineffec-
tive way might be most enlightening. Perhaps there is
validity in the observation that America has ceased to be a
Father-land and has become a Mother-land: that the idiosyn-
cratic feature of the American conscie.ee is that it is pre-
dominantly feminine. Perhaps, also, the old naval shibboleth
that "things aren»t like they were in the old Navy—and be-
sides they never were" is also applicable. Nonetheless, the




place before mankind the common sense of the subject,
in terms so plain and firm as to command their assent
and to justify ourselves in the independent stand we
are compelled to take. Neither aiming at originality
of principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from any
particular or previous writing, it was intended to be
an expression of the American mind, and to give to
that expression the proper tone and spirit called for
by the occasion,
2
Thus, what has come to be one of the documents of the
American spirit was first and foremost a propaganda tract.
It was effective as a psychological instrument not only be-
cause of its powerful annunciation, but because its moral
suasions were supported by action which clearly demonstrated
that Americans had the strength of their convictions.
II. EARLY INSTANCES OF AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Both Franklin and Jefferson were involved in a large-
scale psychological operation against the Hessian mercenar-
ies. Their "Plan to Cause Hessian Desertions" was an early
example of the necessity for high-level political support as
a prerequisite to successful psychological warfare. Without
a congressional resolution authorizing protection, citizen-
ship, and up to one thousand acres of land, depending upon
the rank of the deserter, the program could never have been
2Cited by Oren Stephens, Facts to A Candid World
(Stanford: Stanford University Press T975), p. 29, from a




carried out. It has been estimated that between five and
3
six thousand men deserted as a result. Since this repre-
sented 20 per cent of the Hessian force, the success of the
venture was obvious.
The use of psychological operations , therefore , is
grounded in the very founding of the nation. The indivi-
duals involved certainly did not believe they were engaged
in any sinister or unethical action.
The United States army encountered very effective
psychological operations by the Mexicans during the Mexican
War. A forceful religious appeal, an offer of citizenship,
and 320 acres of land addressed to U. S. soldiers of foreign
birth, particularly the Irish Catholics, had marked effect.
The majority of the deserters were Irishmen who had become
convinced by Mexican propaganda that they were on the wrong
side in a religious war. These men formed the core of the
San Particio Battalion of U. S. deserters in the Mexican
Army. Most of the heavy American losses sustained in the
seizure of Churubusco were attributed to the skill with
which the Mexican cannon were served by members of this
battalion.
Sixty-nine members of the battalion were captured at
Churubusco. Those who had deserted .rior to the declarat
3Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington (ixaw










of war were flogged and branded on the cheek with a "D."
Fifty were hanged, the last thirty of which were executed in
sight of the actual storming of Chapultepec, having been
4
"let live long enough to see the flag raised on the castle."
The failure of the U. •« Array to develop an effective
counter propaganda program presaged a similar failure to
counter the strong ideological approach used by the Commu-
nists against American soldiers in Korea a century later.
III. LINCOLN'S EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION
The composition and timing of the Emancipation Proc-
lamation places it in a category with the Declaration of
Independence as one of the classic feats of American psycho-
logical operations. Lincoln was under attack from the
Northern Abolitionists to which he replied that his "para-
mount object in this struggle ... [was] ... to save the
Union, and ... [was] not either to save or to destroy
5
slavery." In formulating his proclamation, he had to con-
sider the effect of such an instrument not only on the
Northern Abolitionist, but also upon the white population of
4Marshal Andrews, "Psychological Warfare in the
Mexican War," A Psychological Warfare Case Book , William E.
Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (eds.) (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1958), pp. 72-73.
5
J. G. Randall, Lincoln The President (New York:
Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1945), VolTTl, p. 158.





the Confederacy; the slave population of the Southern States;
the white population of the Slave States still on the side
of the North; those Northerners who were opposed to challeng-
ing Southern slavery; and, last, the British, whose govern-
ment was seriously considering recognizing the Confederacy
as an independent state. The record of these considerations
indicates that the last factor ranked in the forefront.
Many Americans were convinced that only when the rebellion
was officially declared to be a war between slavery and indi-
vidual freedom as well as one against disunion would the
British be placed upon such morally thin ice that they would
be forced to cease threatening the Union through their
thinly-veiled support of the Confederate States,
The proper psychological moment to issue the proclama-
tion was a matter of great importance. Improperly timed, the
effect could have been one of "whistling in the dark" or, as
Secretary Seward phrased it, "a last shriek on the retreat,"
The Federal victory at Antietam provided the opportunity.
The wording of the document was military and non-
abolitionist in flavor. It opened with a declaration that
reunion (not abolition) was the object of the war and later
stated that it was warranted by the Constitution upon mili-
tary necessity. This suggestion of military expediency was
6Ibid, t pp. 155-156.
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inserted as an attempt to vitiate ideological reactions in
both the North and the South.
The proclamation placed the North on the side of
humane progress. It retained "the 50,000 bayonets" of the
slave-holding states still loyal to the Union. It aroused
such popular support in England that the British Government
could no longer consider overt support of the Southern
States. As an instrument of psychological warfare, it has
been ranked with the Declaration of Independence and the
Fourteen Points.
IV. ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT WHITE FLEET
By 1907, America had begun her emergence into the
broader scope of the world stage and was encountering some
of the difficulties that accompany such a role. America's
popularity in Japan declined precipitously following the
conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth and as a result of
the State of California's discriminatory actions against
Japanese immigrants. Newspaper sensationalism and political
agitation had created a full-blown issue in the American
West, while public Japanese disappointment over the absence
of a Russian indemnity, a feeling that America had tried to
deprive Japan of the full reward of victory, and outrage
over the treatment of Japanese nationals in America combined
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Tokyo. It was very clear that Japan had emerged as a world
power, equal, in military strength, to France of that day;
in a dominant position in the Far East} and possessed of an
imperialistic drive and hunger. Roosevelt was both con-
ciliatory and pacific. He was outraged by the California
action and feared that in the aftermath of a successful war,
public opinion in Japan might actually force the government,
over its own better judgment, to take up arms in defense of
national honor.
I am exceedingly anxious to impress upon the Japanese
that I have nothing but the friendliest possible in-
tentions toward them, but I am none the less anxious
that they should realize that I am not afraid of them
and that the US will no more submit to bullying than
it will bully. 7
The world cruise of the White Fleet, 1907-1909, was
the tactic decided upon. The psychological implications
were varied. It was directed inward toward the American
people themselves. No comparable fleet had ever rounded
Cape Horn before, and the accomplishment of such a maneuver
would have great domestic impact. The voyage would formally
announce to the world the fact of American interest in the
Pacific with a simultaneous demonstration of the power
available to protect that interest. It certainly was in-
tended to deter the Japanese militarists from any over-hasty
7Cited by Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of
the American People (third edition; New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts , Inc
.
, 1946), pp. 571-572.
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decisions* This action was an excellent psychological
operation. Its results were carefully calculated, the
operations were well executed, and its effect was decisive*
The conduct of American psychological operations
prior to World War I, although on occasion quite effective,
was sporadic and ad hoc in nature* In the light of present-
day definitions of psychological warfare, these activities
would certainly fall under the purview of agencies or ad-
visers assigned the task of coordinating the nation's
activities in the fields of diplomacy, military operations,
and economics* Such, of course, was not the case* The
situations requiring such action generated the need wh_
produced a practical solution based upon an analysis of the
known or suspected variables* There was no coordinating
machinery for a continual sifting of the inputs* There was
no organization to study the effect of long-range trends*
The world was a much larger globe in those earlier years*
Distance, slow travel, and the absence of the means for high
speed, long-range and mass communications were obstacles in
the path of any effective, large psychological campaigns*
When compared to the wide scale and long-term nature of that
integrated series of operations which is connoted by the
term "psychological warfare , * it is probably correct to
regard these earlier examples as psychological operations*
in'* mt
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V. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
EFFORTS IN WORLD WAR I
World War I witnessed psychological operations trans-
formed from an incidental to a major instrument of national
policy. In fact, the post-war period of the 1920 *s saw the
Germans lauding American psychological warfare and counting
it as a major factor of defeat* If psychological warfare is
considered in the broadest sense, it is true that it was
among the decisive instruments. The political policies of
the Allies, the appeal of Wilson's Fourteen Points, the
obsolescence of the German Imperial system, and the resur-
gence of Eastern European Nationalism all played important
roles in forcing Germany to surrender. However, it must be
remembered that following the War, German apologists seized
on every pretext to convince the world, and themselves, that
their surrender had been due to everything but a military
defeat. Therefore, one must be wary of any German evalua-
tion of the efficacy of the American psychological effort.
Propaganda came into prominence in World War I be-
cause the nations involved had already made mass communica-
tions part of their daily lives. It was inevitable that
such civilian developments as huge newspapers, systematic
advertising, calculated political publicity, and other forms
of opinion manipulation would be integrated into the govern-






psychological warfare effort of each of the belligerents was
the direct derivative of peacetime, non-political advertising
patterns
•
The American psychological warfare effort of 1917 to
1919 was no exception and drew heavily on familiar skills.
Soon after the entrance of the United States into the war,
President Wilson appointed a Committee on Public Information.
This committee—known as the Creel Committee—was composed of
the Secretaries of the Navy, State, and War Departments with
Mr. George Creel as chairman. This was equivalent to ap-
pointing a separate cabinet member for psychological warfare;
and Mr. Creel was responsible for every aspect of propaganda
work, both at home, and abroad. One result of this method
of organization was to confer upon the overseas representa-
tives of the committee something of the prestige of the
three great Government Departments. The Creel Committee
enjoyed a tremendous advantage in the person of the chairman,
George Creel. Creel was highly regarded by the President,
enjoyed his complete confidence, and had direct access to
him. Creel's participation in national policy formulation
was, therefore, at a sufficiently high level to provide
propaganda coordination to other governmental policies on a
credible basis.
The Creel view was that previous wars had been purely









importance, whereas World War I was primarily a test of
strength between opposed ideals, with "moral verdicts" hav-
ing as much significance as military decisions. "It was
• . . [a] fight for the minds of men, for the 'conquest of
their convictions,' and the battle line ran through every
Qhome in every country."
The Creel Committee was created to conduct this psy-
chological struggle both at home and abroad* Creel himself
considered this task to be one of advertising. His book,
How We Advertised America , explained in great detail his
efforts and, by its title, indicated the principal short-
coming of the American effort.
The Creel Committee was loosely organized and was run
in a simple, almost chaotic, fashion. Agencies proliferated
whenever a new idea turned up. The basic concept was that
of domestic American agitation as practiced, commercially,
9through advertising and, socially, through the civic clubs.
A news bureau in Washington was established which
supplied material to the domestic and international commer-
cial press and processed other material to publicity mis-
sions abroad. Missions were sent to France, England, Italy,
Q
George Creel, How We Advertised America (New York:
Harper and Bros., 1920), p. 3.
Q
Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (second
edition} New York: Duell, Sloane, and Pearce, 1960), p. 68.
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Switzerland, Holland, Spain, Scandanavia, the Latin American
countries, China, and Russia. The Japanese were given the
American propaganda file and were asked to use it* Heavy
emphasis was placed on the home audience, for the commit-
tee's mission covered all phases of propaganda work. Sec-
tions were established for posters, advertising, "Four
Minute Ken" (volunteer local speakers in all American com-
munities ) , films , American minority groups and the foreign-
language press, women's organizations, information bureaus,
syndicated features, and cartoons. The American motion pic-
ture industry was employed as a channel for domestic and
foreign distribution of American propaganda. Foreign coun-
tries, unwilling to run the propaganda films, found that the
American producers would not supply any feature productions.
It was hardly an exaggeration to say that no special
machinery had to be built up for the conduct of operations.
The major task was more one of coordination and guidance.
The extent of voluntary contribution was amazing.
The Pamphlet Division commanded the services of any
writer it chose to call, and it had ready access to over
three thousand of the leading historians of the country.
Novelists, essayists, and the publicists, without payment
>
worked in the production of articles for syndicated distri-
bution. The objective of the Division of Syndicate Features
was "to sell the war" to the people and to present in
u'
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acceptable newspaper style not only the story of the war but
also the "spirit that was back of the whole adventure." The
stories reached a circulation of twelve million a month. Of
the seventy-five million pamphlets that were distributed,
three quarters were 3ent out on request. Similarly, Ameri-
can painters, sculptors, designers, poster men, illustrators,
and cartoonists were "mobilized on a volunteer basis." The
foreign-language press was kept informed through the efforts
of several hundred volunteer translators.
Through teachers* institutes, summer sessions, and
educational organizations, the school was reached. Twice a
month, a sixteen-page paper was issued to every one of the
five hundred and twenty thousand teachers in the United
States. It gave to the schools the needs and messages of
government in concise and usable form, and it provided the
government a direct medium for reaching the twenty million
homes represented in the schools.
The creation of the "four minute man" was another
effective device. No less than 75,000 speakers volunteered
in 5,200 communities of the United States. They spoke
chiefly in moving picture houses, but, later, this area was
extended to include Sunday schools, churches, lumber camps,
colleges, lodges, and women's clubs. Within a period of
eighteen months, they made about a million speeches and
reached 3ome four hundred million people.
-i
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Nor was the potential of the advertising industry
ignored. The large organizations representing advertising
agencies, advertising clubs, and business papers were re-
quested to name a board of control that would "mobilize the
advertising forces of the country." Advertising space of
various periodic publications having a total circulation of
about 549,000,000 was purchased by advertisers of merchan-
dise or contributed by the publishers without charge and
turned over to the state. The International Association of
Display Men donated display resources in six hundred cities.
Sixty-thousand patriotic window displays could be timed
exactly to supplement the campaigns in periodicals.
We were fighting for ideas and ideals, and somebody
who realized that, and knew it, had to say it and
keep on saying it u it was believed. That was
a part of the function of the Committee on Public
Information. ... It was this unseen but persuasive
and unending flood of ideas that aroused a correct
apprehension of the true spirit and idealism of
America In the war. 1^
Many in Congress did not share this evaluation by the
Secretary of War. The Committee was the subject of bitter
and continuous attack, not only for its activities in this
country but also for its overseas operations. There were
ugly accusations of partisanship, dishonesty, inaccuracy,
and inefficiency. Congress explored Mr. Creel* s background




to study his writings and political thought. As the months
passed, the attacks became more bitter. Additional allega-
tions were developed charging that the program was infil-
trated by spies and saboteurs—a charge to be echoed a
generation later against a successor to the Creel Committee.
Part of the resentment manifested was grounded in the very
heavy emphasis—almost blatant—directed at the home audi-
ence. Creel, as a representative of the administration in
power, was propagandizing the American people. This situa-
tion was inevitably viewed with alarm (and perhaps with some
reason) by the minority party, as well as by a number of the
members of the majority party, in Congress.
The purely technical side of the work was done well
but at the disastrous cost of over-shooting national commit-
ments. "The conquering idea of Justice and freedom as
expressed in American idealism" and the heated propaganda of
"making the world safe for democracy" were discredited at
home and abroad. America emerged from the war disappointed
and with the definite bad taste of its own soured propaganda
in its mouth. In the clear, ever-penetrating light of hind
sight, a less boisterous, a more modest, a more calculated
propaganda effort might have helped forestall certain atti-
tudes which, in a matured form, contributed to the advent of
World War II.
These difficulties also graphically represent the
;:
128
repercussions to be experienced from the development and
annunciation of national policy objectives which are beyond
the State's capacity to implement. Wilson's Fourteen Points
Speech was made, in part, upon Creel's request for a clear
enunciation of United States peace objectives in order to
create dissension between the Bolsheviks and the Imperial
Germans at the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference. Tactically,
the speech provided the operators on the spot with the high-
level support necessary to take bold and aggressive propaganda
action. As a psychologically significant annunciation, the
Fourteen Points are regarded as being on a par with the
Declaration of Independence and the emancipation Proclamation
with respect to the clear, deep appeal voiced, in the name of
universal justice and natural law, to the democratic conscience
of mankind. Strategically, it marked a colossal venture to-
wards ends , the means for the achievement of which were not
even available at the time of promulgation. Psychological
operations grounded on such a policy can be disastrous.
In both the formulation and annunciation of the Four-
teen Points and in the conduct of psychological war, the
United States was involved in matters which were operationally
and philosophically new and advanced by several orders of
Edgar Sisson, One Hundred Red Days : A Personal
Chronicle £f Bolshevik Revolution (New Haven: ~Yale Univer-
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magnitude beyond any operations heretofore attempted. Inex-
perience, nax _
,
unrestrained idealism, all of these con-
tributed to the failure. America had forgotten that beyond
the war lay a peace which would be as grim anc difficult to
win as the war. The Federal Government had won wars, but it
had never been involved in anything that remotely resembled
the approaching peace conferences. It had never conducted
psychological warfare on the scale attempted in World War I.
In both cases, the government had advanced far beyond any of
its experience. The classic American approach to the problem
had little basis of fact from which to project forward for a
solution. The failure may have been tragic, but it was not
shameful. World War I was to be the last of all wars; per-
haps Wilson and Creel believed it themselves.
VI. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IGNORED
BETWEEN THE WARS
On the thirtieth of June, 1919, the Committee on
Public Information, in the pained words of Creel, "was wiped
out of existence ... by action of Congress." The work of
the Committee had been discontinued months before and only
an orderly liquidation was in progress. It was this liquida-
tion that Congress sought to interrupt and confuse. No one
was left with authority to rent a building, employ a cleric,




final report was made only through the medium of a book
printed by a private publisher.
The bitter battle over the "winning" of the peace led
to complete disillusionment when it became apparent that the
peace had not been won at all. Once more, America turned
its energies inward. The experience of the Creel Committee
received practically no attention and little reference was
directed to the lessons learned. The Army War College files
reveal that only two research papers were written on the
subject from 1919 to 1929, and no officer was assigned be-
tween 1925 and 1935 to the full-time study of the problems of
12psychological warfare. This manifestation of reluctance
on the part of the military to accept psychological warfare
was widespread and existed in every department and agency of
the government to a greater or lesser degree. Consequently,
when World War II arrived, the United States was too busy to
devote the time necessary to plan and organize intelligently.
The thinking on the nature of the organization required for
effective operations in psychological warfare was neither
clear nor consistent. The decisions were, once again, ad hoc .
The men who made them were, in many cases, unfamiliar with,
or indifferent to, the instrument they were to use and the
nature of its relationship to the already-established
12Linebarger, o£. cit
• , p. 77.
-"





instruments of state policy. At that time, the Government
literally did not know what it was getting into when it
undertook psychological warfare. News still appeared to be
the main prop and little time was wasted on other considera-
tions. Yet this was news as the term was understood by the
American press. The importance of selecting, explaining,
and interpreting that news was not always grasped, even by
those concerned with distributing it. Before the war, as
well as after the Government entered the field, private
American news and publishing agencies continued to engage in
operations which had the effect, if not the intention, of
propaganda. The Office of War Information (OWI) could
scarcely have reached the audience of the Time-Life-Fortune
group and the Reader ' s Digest , both of which achieved global
coverage during the course of the war. The unwitting propa-
ganda turned out by such sources possessed a quality no
Government information program had—a readership which was
unmistakably voluntary, obtained by the appeal of authentic
interest and entertainment.
VII. ORGANIZING FOR WORLD WAR II
On Sunday, December 7, 1941, the task of disseminat-
ing propaganda to foreign audiences was assigned to two
emergency agencies : The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs (CIAA) which confined its activities to
:
132
developing good inter-American relations, and the Coordi-
nator of Information (COD which operated in the rest of the
world.
The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American
Affairs (CIAA) had been created on 16 August 1940, under the
direction of Nelson Rockefeller • The information aspects of
the CIAA's program was regarded as an integral part of its
general cultural and commercial relations program which was
carried out in close cooperation with the Department of
State.
The Office of the Coordinator of Information (COD
had been established by a military order of President
Roosevelt on 11 July 1941. It was assigned two major func-
tions: the coordination of intelligence collection and
analysis from all sources, including the armed forces; and
the transmission of information abroad to areas outside
Latin America. The second of these two missions was not
clearly stated in the order establishing COI. Although it
was not specifically stated in the order, it was clearly
understood by the Coordinator, William J. Donovan, and the
President that a Foreign Information Service (FIS) was to be
13
established as an integral part of COI. * This service was
13William E. Daugherty, "US Psychological Warfare
Organizations in World War II," A Psychological Warfare Case-
book
, William C. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (eds.
)
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), p. 127.
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directed by the President not to engage in domestic informa-
14tion activities,
Robert Sherwood was appointed as the director of FIS
with principal headquarters established in New York City,
In accordance with its mission, this service, which from the
very beginning was virtually an autonomous agency, undertook
to spread the gospel of democracy and to explain the objec-
tives of the United States throughout the world (except, of
course, in Latin America), Unfortunately, the early radio
scripts were poorly checked; there was chaos in the matter
of policy; little policing was possible; and the output
reflected the enthusiasm of whatever individual happened to
be near the microphone,
VIII. THE LACK OF CENTRALIZED GUIDANCE
The FIS early encountered a pattern of difficulty
that would plague all the information programs. From the
earliest World War II efforts, President Roosevelt's ad-
visers appeared to be opposed to central direction of any
information program. The inevitable result was disunity in
the voices that undertook to set forth our position to the
James Paul Warburg, Unwritten Treaty (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946) contains this document as
well as the other major documents revelant to the conduct of
American Psychological Warfare in World War II,
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world. The information agencies were not advised of politi-
cal or military plans and consequently had no idea how a
government agency should react to developments. Many of the
tools of psychological war remained in private hands. FIS
would provide information to the private American broadcast-
ing companies , but there was no assurance that these
companies would use the data, or if they used it, that they
would hue to the text. Not until the time of the North
African invasions was it decided that official overseas
broadcast should be taken out of private hands and made the
responsibility of the Government.
Although the FIS did not make an effort to find out
what the major policy-formulating departments wanted done in
the field of American propaganda, it would not advise these
same departments on its own intentions or current operations,
Consequently, the departments became uncertain of the trust-
worthiness and security restrictions of FIS. Since they had
no knowledge or control over the FIS operation, the Array,
Navy, and State Departments pursued the policy of providing
the least information and no outline of national plans and
policies on the theory that such action would reduce the
15possibility of official embarrassment. It was a sad
15Murray Dyer, he Weapon on the Wall (Baltimore:






commentary that the source of such vital Information for
psychological operations was the British Political Warfare
executive (PWS). This organization, which was an acknowl-
edged member of the British Policy Organisation, shared the




The overwhelming majority of the major difficulties
encountered by the American psychological warfare effort
were administrative and not operational. The number of
agencies involved in psychological operations literally
mushroomed. A partial list included the following: The
Office of Facts and Figures ; The Office of Government Re*
ports | the general information activities of the Office of
Emergency Management; The Foreign Information Service and
the Research and Analysis Branch of the office of the Co-
ordinator of Information; Military Intelligence; Naval
Intelligence; the State Department; the Office of the Assist-
ant to the President; the Office of Civilian Defense; the
Office of the Librarian of Congress; the Department of
Agriculture; and The Board of Economic Warfare. Thousands
of words in dozens of languages were promulgated throughout
the world. These were composed by personnel who had little
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if any contact with Federal policy and none with the mili-
tary establishment, except for formal security. The plans
at the top bore little discernible relation to the operations
at the bottom. When Washington agencies wanted to find out
what the broadcasts were saying, the working offices at New
York and San Francisco refused—on the basis of their own
security regulations—to let anyone see a word of what they
were sending out.
It is not surprising that jurisdictional disputes,
tests of power, and unwillingness to cooperate were rife.
Rockefeller (Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs) consid-
ered the CIAA responsible solely to the President and re-
fused to submit his proposed operations in Latin America to
the State Department or to predicate CIAA actions on the
Department's approval. Sherwood did not want the State
Department to have any hand in the operations of the Foreign
17Information Service.
This confusion inevitably led to numerous reorganiza-
tion plans, all of which recognized the need for clearly-
fixed lines of administrative responsibility, better integra-
tion of planning, and a system for the coordination of output.
16Linebarger, op_. cit . , pp. 96-97.
17Charles A. H. Thomson, Overseas Information Service
of the United States Government (Washington: The Brookings





After a joint psychological warfare committee had been
established under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had failed
to fulfill an effective policy-coordinating function, on 13
June 1942, the President, by Executive Order 9182, estab-
lished the Office of War Information (OWI). This order was
based upon suggestions contained in a memorandum on the
reorganization of war-information services submitted by the
Director of the Budget on 7 Msurch 1942. Rockefeller success-
fully resisted the integration of the Office of Coordinator
of Inter-American Affairs into a single organization engaged
in foreign information work, and, consequently, the order
establishing OWI left CIAA out of the new organization.
The OWI was created by the transfer of various infor-
mation services, both domestic and foreign, to it. Included
among the war-information agencies or services merged into
OWI were the following: Office of Facts and Figures (OFF);
Office of Government Reports (OGR)j the general information
activities of the Office of Emergency Management (OEM); and
the Foreign Information Service (FIS) of the Office of Co-
ordinator of Information (COD.
Upon merger into OWI, FIS became the Overseas Branch.
The Domestic Branch was originally comprised, mainly, of the
personnel transferred from OFF, OGR, and OEM. Between the
two branches was interposed a Program Planning and Review
aisq
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Board to provide the horizontal lines of communication and
coordination.
The Office of Coordinator of Information (COI), shorn
of its FIS, was transformed into the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS) under which name three major functions were
assigned: (1) continuation of scholastic and Informal in-
telligence; (2) black propaganda operations (authorized in
March, 1943); and (3) subversive operations in collaboration
with regular military authority. The OSS, led by Colonel
Donovan, was made an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS). It was unfortunate that the order creating OWI did
not clearly establish a division of responsibility between
it and OSS for the conduct of psychological operations.
X. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DEVELOPMENT AND
CONDUCT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
From the date of OWI»s establishment in June of 1942
until March of 1943, three factors influenced the conduct of
psychological operations and were to be the bases for the
final form of the organization that would at last evolve.
First, the overseas activities of both OWI and OSS were
vaguely defined. The Overseas Branch of OWI continued to
function virtually as an autonomous unit until mid-1943.
The Domestic-Information Activities of OWI were dominant.
Second, the units comprising the developing psychological
:
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warfare organization—OWI, OSS, and CIAA—were all rent with
inter-agency as well as intra-agency disputes. Third, while
the major efforts of the top echelon leaders in OWI were
largely concerned with the domestic program, OSS developed
far-reaching plans for the conduct of psychological warfare
in connection with the then forthcoming military campaigns.
These plans, however, were not accepted by Robert Sherwood-
Chief of the Overseas Branch, or Elmer Davis, Director of
OWI. 18
XI. ATTEMPTS AT COORDINATION
The compartmentalized nature of the various agencies
prevented any one of them from knowing what the others were
planning or doing. In the early days of the OWI, a War
Information Policy Committee was established. It met only
three times! At the first meeting, either the Director or
Assistant Secretaries of such agencies and departments as
CIAA, the War Production Board, War, and Navy were present.
The Department of State sent only its Public Relations
Officer. At the second meeting, the War and Navy Departments
sent their opposite numbers to the representative of the
State Department. At the third meeting, the representatives
were all information chiefs, none of whom were empowered to
make policy. The committee never reconvened.
18Daugherty, op_. cit
. , p. 128.
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As a very interested bystander, the Military Branch
of the Government had made an early attempt to lend con-
tinuity by the establishment of the Joint Psychological
Warfare Committee (JPWC) within the structure of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Its functions were defined as:
• • • to initiate, formulate and develop psychological
warfare plans • • • [and] under the direction of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff committee to coordinate psycho-
logical warfare of other US governmental agencies and
to collaborate with interested nations to the end that
all psychological warfare is in accord with approved
strategy. 1^
This was an ambitious undertaking in the light of the
intense rivalries that existed* Very little ever came from
the JPWC, and after the establishment of OWI this organiza-
tion refused to cooperate with JPWC. By late 1942, JPWC
ceased to be active and was finally abolished by the JCS,
Following this abolition, no JCS committee possessed or
attempted to exercise any consistent responsibility for
psychological warfare operations.
In December, 1942, the JCS tried once again, this
time to resolve the conflict between OSS and OWI in view of
the first extensive United States military operations of the
war. An order was issued stating that OSS was to have com-
plete authority "to plan, develop, coordinate and execute








consequence, both the head of OWI, Mr. Davis, and the head
of CIAA, Mr, Rockefeller, appealed directly to the President,
protesting the military usurpation of a Presidential delega-
tion of authority,
XII. EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBER 9312
Executive Order No. 9312 was issued on 9 March 1943
and set forth more clearly the responsibility of OWI in the
overseas commands. The order stated that OWI was the desig-
nated agency to conduct foreign information and overt
propaganda operations abroad, but "in areas of actual or
projected military operations" all plans and projects "should
be coordinated with the military plans" and would be "sub-
ject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the
approval of the theater Commander."
The order did not define clearly what, if any, psy-
chological warfare functions were retained by OSS. The
order did not state whether OWI or OSS had jurisdiction
over subversive activities, covert propaganda campaigns, and
the like, and it did little to resolve the problems of co-
ordination between the separate agencies.
Executive Order No. 9312 was, in large measure,
responsible for the character of the psychological warfare
organizations that developed during the war in the overseas





shall be subject to the approval ... of the theater com-
mander" was rigidly adhered to and greatly influenced the
type and extent of operations conducted. The organizations
everywhere were improvised and largely established on an ad
hoc basis. There was relatively little interchange of in-
formation from one major military command to another. There
were important differences in structure from one command to
the next. Perhaps the single clear-cut element common to
all was the concept that the theater Commander had final
authority.
In each of the theaters, the psychological operation
20fell into four categories.
1. In enemy countries, to undermine and destroy the
morale of the enemy population.
2. In enemy-occupied countries, to keep alive hope
of liberation and stimulate resistance to the
enemy forces of occupation.
3. In neutral countries, to win the moral support of
the neutral population.
4. In allied countries, to counter all enemy propa-
ganda aimed at dividing the United Nations, to
promote the morale of the allies, and to foster
a better understanding of the United States.
^0Thomson, o£. cit
• , p. 40.
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It was perfectly conceivable that a theater Commander
would encounter psychological operations in all four of
these categories, simultaneously* Such broad operations
should involve major national policy and decision at the
highest political level. However, both the OWT and the OSS
were under the theater Commander's control and he, in the
last analysis, was the authority—not Washington. Further-
more, whether or not either the OWI or the OSS carried on
operations in a theater was left to the Commander's discre-
tion. The OSS, for example, was not permitted access to the
Southwest Pacific area theater, while, in the same theater,
OWI, although allowed to be present, found that its weekly
21directive from Washington was unacceptable. In the South
Pacific Command, OSS and OWI personnel were refused clearance
for operations. No formal provisions were ever made in this
area for a psychological warfare planning staff; in fact, it
was Just five days before the surrender of Japan that the
Central Pacific Command reached the decision that psycho-
logical warfare was a sufficiently potent support weapon to
deserve the status of a special headquarters branch. The
omnipotence of the theater Commander within his purview was
matched by the refusal of the agencies to accept his
supremacy in matters extending beyond his theater.






XIII. SECURITY AND PLANNING FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
One of the most vexing problems drawing from this
administrative "gordian knot" was that of the vicious circle
established between suspicion, distrust, and security*
Clear-cut authority, judgment, discretion, and a broad under-
standing of the interrelationship between the proper balance
of security and information are factors entering into the
decision to disclose knowledge. If the planners responsible
for the development of psychological operations are not
informed of national policy, then there can be no possibility
of effective planning and, on occasion, the political reper-
cussions can be of tremendous import.
OWI was not informed about the forthcoming landings
in North Africa, even though its members were to participate;
of even greater significance was the fact that our psycho-
logical planners were confronted by the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki nuclear detonations with no "forewarning and had no
chance to plan what should be done to maximize favorable
effects and to offset bad ones; nor was there any plan
22
offered by the leaders." Effective psychological warfare
demands that national plans and operations be known to, at
least, the senior responsible official of the psychological
22Thomas, op_. cit





warfare agency. Without this knowledge, it is impossible to
explain and interpret intelligently. There is always pres-
ent the danger that what may be said because of Ignorance
will be proven false by events. If this truism were even
recognized, it did not govern United States psychological
operations in World War II.
XIV. TOP LEVEL ATTITUDES
It is difficult to explain this American failure to
organise effectively. Probably the single most important
answer lies in the complete lack of interest in psychological
warfare displayed by the majority of top-level American
officials responsible for the policies and conduct of the
war. Following an interview with President Roosevelt, one
author wrote:
It was a curious fact—and I had confirmation of it
later—that the President, who established the OWI,
never knew what it was doing and sometimes, appar-
ently, confused it with the Office of Censorship.
He had been opposed to the creation of a propaganda
service and had established OWI with considerable
reluctance, under pressure from his advisors, whose
primary aim was to provide an adequate flow of in-
formation to the American public. Once the organi-
zation was established, he did not want to be
bothered with it. In his own right Roosevelt was a
great propagandist ... but he did not understand
the systematic use of propaganda in total war. 2
3
23Wallace Carrol, Persuade or Perish (Boston:
Houghton, 1948), p. 7.
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The same author goes on to add that "Cordell Hull
knew even less than the President about OWI and cared about
as much." It is not surprising that American psychological
operations ended the war never having been properly organ-
ized or coordinated as a national instrument and never having
smoothly functioned as one of the nation 1 s policy tools for
the conduct of international affairs.
XV. POST WORLD WAR II DEVELOPMENTS
Two days prior to the formal surrender of Japan, on
31 August 1945, President Truman issued Executive Order No.
9608 which established an Interim International Information
Service (HIS) in the Department of State and transferred to
it the overseas information functions of OWI and the infor-
mation activities of CIAA. "The nature of present day
foreign relations," he stated, "makes it essential for the
United States to maintain informational activities abroad as
24
an integral part of the conduct of our foreign affairs."
The Order provided for the liquidation of OWI and HIS by
31 December 1945. The Secretary of State was authorized to
continue within the Department such foreign information
functions as he considered necessary, to abolish any he
thought undesirable, and to eliminate any or to transfer any
24





to other executive agencies. He was to study the entire
question of continuing a foreign information program and was
to recommend a solution to the President.
William Benton was appointed Assistant Secretary of
State for Public Affairs and made the responsible head of
the new HIS. Despite his efforts, the program languished.
Diplomats of the traditional school were unconvinced and
Congress was uninterested. An Office of International
Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC) was established in
the Department in early ... as an outcome of the study
requested by President Truman. Its activities remained un-
changed until 1948 although its name was changed to the
Office of International Information and Education Exchange
(OIE). The OIE was later to split, amoeba-like, into the
Office of International Information (Oil) and the Office of
Educational Exchange (OEX), both of which were later to be
recombined into the International Information Administration
(HA). Meanwhile, in the atmosphere of the "return to
normalcy" and the glow of victory, the overseas information
services languished, diminished steadily, and came close to
vanishing entirely.
The American people and Congress failed to appreciate
the menace of Communist propaganda to American security and
failed to grasp the potentialities of psychological opera-
tions as an instrument of national policy during time of
iI
.




peace. There was wide opposition from United States commer-
cial press, radio, and film media, which feared government
competition abroad. Many of the most able and skilled per-
sonnel in the fields of information and psychological war-
fare left government service. This loss was irreplaceable.
Throughout the military establishment in Washington,
staff planning activities involving psychological operations
and warfare ceased with the end of hostilities. Not until
June of 1950 did the Department of the Army create the
Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare as a special
staff section. The Department of the Air Force later estab-
lished a Psychological Warfare Division within the Air
Force* s Directorate of Plans. The Navy subsequently as-
signed the task to a branch of the Strategic Plans Division
of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
XVI. THE INFORMATION AND EDUCATION
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1948
By 1948, the chill winds of ideological war were
blowing out of Eurasia in such an unmistakable manner that
Congressional action resulted in the United States Informa-
tion and Education Exchange Act of 1948, Public Law 402 (The
Smith-Mundt Act). This act directed the Secretary of State
to provide for the preparation and dissemination
abroad of information about the United States , its





radio, motion pictures, and other information media,
and through information centers and instructors
abroad
•
The act also provided for
an educational exchange service to cooperate with
other nations in (a) the Interchange of persons,
knowledge, and skills; (b) the rendering of techni-
cal and other services; and (c) the interchange of
developments in the field of education, the arts,
and science. 25
The educational exchange concept was subsequently given sub-
stance with the enactment of the Fulbright Act, which
provided that funds derived from the sale abroad of surplus
war material should be used to finance the exchange of
persons. The administration of the Smith-Mundl; Act was
placed under the International Information Administration
(IIA) of the Department of State.
The Smith-Mundt Act remains the basic legislation for
the conduct of the United States information program today.
The concept in 1948 was defensive and unrealistic. It was
based on the assumption that if other people understood us
they would like us, and, if they liked us, they would do
what we wanted them to do. This concept has not been com-
pletely laid to rest in 1964.
The objective was interpreted once again, as a gigan-
tic advertising campaign, carried on, for the roost part, by
the broadside telling of America's story. The Secretary of









State had been directed by Public Law 402 to "reduce such
government activities whenever corresponding private infor-
mation dissemination ... [was] found to be adequate."
There followed extensive contracts with domestic broadcast-
ing companies for an overseas broadcasting service to present
to the world "a full and fair picture" of the United States.
Very shortly thereafter, Congressional concern over scripts,
art exhibits, and the general concept of operations developed
and threatened, by 1950, to cancel the entire program.
By 1950, however, the international arena was so
troubled that the United States was thoroughly awakened to
the Soviet threat. There could be no disagreement on the
need for a program, and President Truman was given a record
appropriation of $121,000,000 to carry on a "campaign of
truth" against communism. However, the, apparently inevi-
table, bureaucratic struggle was raging behind the scenes.
In addition to the International Information Administration
(IIA), the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), the
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the Mutual Se-
curity Administration (MSA), the three Armed Services, and
the Department of Defense all operated, at one time or
another, in the international field and possessed their own
overt international information services. Many foreigners
preferred the Armed Forces Radio Service (AFRS) newscasts







what the United States Government said to its own citizens
would be free of propaganda. Thus, while AFRS broadcast all
over the world for the entertainment and enlightenment of
American servicemen, large foreign audiences could and did
eavesdrop,
XVII. POST WORLD WAR II EFFORTS
TOWARDS COORDINATION
In the years following World War II, there had been
sporadic efforts between the various Departments towards the
more effective integration of their activities? however, the
concept of all these efforts was that of the coordination of
separate, independent, component parts. Originally, this
work began at the direction of the State-War-Navy Coordinat-
ing Committee (SWNCC). It continued under the State-Army-
Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC). The direc-
tion of action was continued by the later Interdepartmental
Foreign Information Organization (IFIO) which was the policy-
making board for the Interdepartmental Foreign Information
Staff (IFIS). After the IFIS came the Psychological Opera-
tions Coordinating Board (PCB).
Finally, early in 1950, an official peacetime role,
in name, was assigned to psychological warfare with the
creation of the Interdepartmental Psychological Operations




this device, the Armed Forces had hoped to have a direct
voice in advising the Secretary of State on the development
and conduct of an integrated, current foreign information
program, and to plan for full-scale use of psychological
warfare in the case of hostilities. The Department of State
evidenced a reluctance to accept much advice from the mili-
tary, and the committee, contrary to the position taken by
its military members, prepared a plan for a psychological
mechanism which was to be created when, as, and if World War
III began. The Secretary of Defense, through whose office
the plan was routed for approval, took strong exception-
based on the representations of his military chiefs. In a
letter to the President, it was forcefully argued that such
a mechanism should be created not when the war was actually
upon the nation but immediately. This proposal found no
support within the Department of State.
The result of this divergence was the creation, by
Executive Order, on 20 June 1951, of the Psychological Stra-
tegy Board which placed psychological warfare on an even
higher plane. This was to be a high-level planning and
coordinating body responsible to the National Security
Council. Its mission was to plan long-term psychological
approaches to the nation's problems, and to hi influence




national objectives. It was also assigned responsibility
for the
formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the
departments and agencies responsible for psychologi-
cal operations, of over-all national psychological
objectives, policies, and programs, and for the
coordination and evaluation of the national psycho-
logical effort.
Regular members were the Under Secretary of State, Deputy
Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency. Other agencies, such as the Mutual Security
Administration, participac .J as needed. A representative of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff was principal adviser. A staff
was provided to do the planning and the Board's director was
appointed by the President.
XVIII. THE KOREAN WAR
When the Korean War began, psychological warfare once
again was called upon to contribute to the effort. The
Korean experience paralleled far too closely the experience
in World War II. Once again psychological operations were
hampered by security, faulty intelligence, and imperfect
organization. Most of the lessons that should have been
learned from World War II had to be relearned. The experience
United States Congress, Senate, Overseas Informa-
tion Programs of the United States , Report 406, 83rd Con-




and manpower available in the United States Information
Service operation in Korea prior to hostilities was almost
totally ignored. The Psychological Warfare Section of the
Far Cast Command was virtually autonomous, and the Far
Eastern operation proceeded independent of political au-
thority on many of its most urgent problems of psychological
27policy. The strategic radio operation felt the lack of
adequate preparatory measures in terms of organization and
training
•
In August of 1950, the Operations Research Office of
Johns Hopkins University observed that at that date:
... it was assumed ... that there were some masters
of the problem, authorities who had a systematic under-
standing of its full scope. The growing realization
that no transmissible, reliable, fundamental, true body
of knowledge exists on psychological warfare demanded,
and still demands, basic research on the problem so
that valid operational research can be built up. The
lack of a general doctrine on . . . [psychological]
war is now recognized. 28
It should not be a source of surprise to discover
that the Psychological Strategy Board floundered and failed.
It shortly discovered that there was no such thing as "psy-
chological strategy" apart from the other strategies which
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was recognized that the tools of foreign policy--diplomacy,
military policy, economic activity, and psychological opera-
tions—were interdependent, it was not recognized that they
were inseparable. It was believed that if the activities of
these four instruments were "coordinated," as each proceeded
with its own, independent planning and action, a unified,
integrated whole would result. It is, at least, to the
credit of the Board that the hermaphroditic nature of this
concept came to be recognized. In its planning, the Board
swung to the only plausible course of action—one which en-
croached upon the diplomatic, economic, and military fields
of activity. Thus was precipitated a continuous series of
struggles with the responsible officials who were supposed
to execute the Board's plans in those fields.
The foreign information program, itself, became an
increasing source of difficulty. The operation grew so
large and complex that it simply was beyond the capacity of
the existing organization headed by an assistant Secretary
of State. Coordination between all the agencies and nego-
tiation towards voluntary consolidation of redundant opera-
tions were attempted without success. The regular
administrative mechanism of the Department of State was not
designed to cope with such an arrangement. The solution lay
in the establishment of the semi-autonomous International







new activity was to continue to receive policy guidance from
the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs but was
to have a free hand in operations. Dr. Wilson Compton, the
Administrator, quickly found that the achievement of
semi-autonomy implies a high degree of consolidation
of authorities and responsibilities which heretofore
• • • [had] been widely dispersed. There • • • [was]
within the Department a reluctance to accept these
changes, and if not a resistance, at least a formida-
ble inertia, 29
XIX. AFTERMATH OF THE 1952
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Following the 1952 Presidential election, the entire
United States information and psycholgical warfare structure
became the target for searching investigations. The Presi-
dent's Committee on Foreign Information Activities, known as
the Jackson Committee after William H, Jackson, its Chairman,
was to report by the summer of 1953. A subcommittee of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under the Chairmanship
of Senator Fulbright, initially, and subsequently, Senator
Hickenlooper examined subjects related to the overseas in-
formation program. An Advisory Commission on Information,
established pursuant to the Sraith-Mundt Act, convened to
examine the conduct of that program. Simultaneously,
29Stephens, op_. cit . , p. 42, cited from the June 30,






Senator McCarthy conducted his own widely-publicised inves-
tigation of the foreign information program. Except for the
latter "witch-hunt
,
n the results of the investigations, and,
in particular, the findings of the Jackson Committee had
far-reaching effects on the reorganisation of United states
Psychological strategy and Operations*
• . . data has been available to the committee which
suggests that the • • • [Psychological Strategy]
Board is not effectively discharging its function*
The executive Order (June 20, 1951), creating the
Psychological Strategy Board is loosely drawn* It
lodges various responsibilities in the Board but
limits its authority to "guidance" and "reporting"
* • • • Observations of members of the committee
abroad and other evidence moreover suggest that the
component agencies of the board (CIA, Defense, State)
are continuing to go fcb«i* separate ways in matters of
psychological policy* 30
There is no "strategic concept for psychological
operations" separate and distinct from a strategic
concept for gaining national alms from war * * * .
We find that the "psychological" aspect of policy is
not separable from policy, but is inherent in every
diplomatic, economic or military action* There is a
"psychological" implication in every act but this
does not have life apart from the act***
XX* REORGANISES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE—
THE USIA
Out of the recommendations of the three groups emerged
30
United States Congress, Senate, Overseas Informa-
tion Programs of the United states , op * cit ., p* £T"
31Oyer, op* cit *. p* 135, cited from the Report of
the President * s committee on International Information
Activities*
$ ion aJL 6 3.30.3
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Presidential Reorganization Plan 8, approved by the 83rd
Congress and made effective on the first of August, 1953.
By this plan, the overseas information function was removed
from the Department of State and reassigned, along with the
foreign information programs of all other agencies, to a new
and autonomous United States Information Agency (USIA). The
Director of the new Agency was made directly responsible to
the President through the National Security Council; he was
to receive foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of
State.
On recommendation of the National Security Council,
in a directive dated 22 October 1953, the President estab-
lished the basic mission of the Agency as:
to submit evidence to peoples of other nations by
means of communication techniques that the objectives
and policies of the US are in harmony with and will
advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom,
progress, and peace. 32
33This mission was to be accomplished by:
1. Explaining and interpreting to foreign peoples the
objectives and policies of the United States
Government j
2. Depicting 3 unatively the correlation between US
licies and the legitimate aspirations of other
^v-oples of the worldj
3. By unmasking and countering hostile attempts to
distort or to frustrate the objective and policies
of the Government of the USj
32United States Information Agency, Background Infor-





4. By delineating those important aspects of the life
and culture of the United States which facili-
tate understanding of the policies and objectives
of the Government of the United States,
Under this mission, the USIA was to concentrate on
objective, factual news reporting with appropriate commen-
taries, designed to present a full exposition of important
United States actions and policies, especially as they
affected individual countries and areas.
XXI. THE OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
Pursuant to the Jackson Committee report, the Presi-
dent, by Executive Order No. 10483, on 2 September 1953,
abolished the Psychological Strategy Board and replaced it
with the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), under the
National Security Council. However, it was not until 25
February 1957, that the President issued a revised Executive
Order formally placing the OCB within the structure of the
National Security Council as of 1 July 1957. The members of
the Board were the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense the Director of the Foreign Operations
Administration, the Director of Central Intelligence, a
representative of the President (the Special Assistant for
Cold War Planning), and the Director of the USIA (though not
formally appointed a member of the board until the spring of







propaganda, there are no 'psychological warfare' instruments
distinct from traditional instruments of policy." In his
Executive Order, the President stated the mission of the
Operations Coordinating Board as follows:
The National Security Council having recommended a
national security policy and the President having
approved it, the Board shall (1) whenever the Presi-
dent shall hereafter so direct, advise with the agen-
cies concerned as to (a) their detailed operational
planning responsibilities respecting such policy, (b)
the coordination of the interdepartmental aspects of
the detailed operational plans developed by the agen-
cies to carry out such policy, (c) the timely and
coordinate execution of such policy and plans , and
(d) the execution of each security action or project
so that it shall make its full contribution to the
attainment of national security objectives and to the
particular climate of opinion the United States is
seeking to achieve in the world, and (2) initiate new
proposals for actions within the framework of national
security policies in response to opportunity and changes
in the situation, 34
Thus, it was to be the responsibility of this body to
see that actions by other agencies to implement policy were
taken in a coordinated manner. Furthermore, as initially
conceived by the Jackson Committee and as the concept was
first accepted by President Eisenhower, the purpose of this
coordination was to achieve maximum psychological impact
from the integrated application of all the instruments of
policy. However, the OCB not only failed to bring together
the opposing viewpoints held by representatives of the
34United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, Organizing for National Security , Vol. II
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 455.
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Department of State, Department of Defense, and the Central
Intelligence Agency but also gradually evolved almost com-
pletely away from its initial concept as a means for facili-
tating the development of psychological strategy and the
integrated psychological operations of psychological warfare.
The old Psychological Strategy Board had been abol-
ished, among other reasons because it had no authority—it
was limited to "guidance." Paradoxically, the OCB was
created in a similar manner: it lacked authority to formu-
late a single, unified course when opinions differed. Its
actual deliberations bore a close similarity to and paral-
leled the experience of its early predecessor committees
(starting with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee)
when the subject of forging an effective psychological
structure was taken up. The members of the OCB were, first,
departmental representatives and, second, members of a board
intended to coordinate and strengthen the voice with which
government speaks. It follows that any member of the board
could, in effect, veto any proposed action in the field of
psychological operations (or any other field, for that
matter) since the chairman had no authority to proceed on
majority decisions. The board had to agree as a unit. If a
member objected in the name of his department, that department




XXII. THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR COLD WAR PLANNING
A third development, stemming from the recommendations
of the Jackson Committee, was the appointment of a Special
Presidential Assistant to advise on matters relating to for-
eign public opinion. The voice of the President of the
United States was the Voice of America, and his words had a
powerful effect upon foreign audiences. It was, therefore,
absolutely necessary that the President consider the role of
public opinion in World affairs whenever he spoke. To aid
in developing effective Presidential communications, the
requirement for specialized assistance in the formulation of
public pronouncements had come to be recognized. This was
the purview of the Special Assistant for Cold War Planning
who was also designated as the Presidents representative on
the OCB. The position was first held by C. D. Jackson who
was followed by Nelson Rockefeller, and thereafter, William
H. Jackson. These three men had each accumulated extensive
experience In propaganda and psychological operations.
Planners, as well as operators, had long felt the need for
ready access to the President. Before the establishment of
the Special Assistant, access had been primarily through
press secretaries and speech writers who, preoccupied with






knowledgeable or sympathetic on matters of foreign public
opinion* Short of placing the foreign information function
in the Executive Office of the President or investing a new
cabinet status department with this mission, a special
Presidential Assistant seemed to offer an arrangement which
should go far toward satisfying the requirement for close
liaison.
The high point of the role of the Special Assistant
for Cold War Planning within the OCB structure wa3 reached
early in the life of that body when this Special Assistant
35
served as the Board's Executive Officer, The long-term
impact of the Special Assistant for Cold War Planning on the
OCB mission can only be inferred from the mutation of the
field of operations within the OCB of the President's repre-
sentative from concern for the ''climate of opinion" to a
"follow-up function," In July of 1957, with the estab-
lishment of the post of Special Assistant to the President
for Security Operations Coordination, the Cold War Planning
Assistant was demoted from the role of the President's rep-
resentative on the OCB,
XXIII. THE OCB PAILS
By this time, however, the OCB had completely
35Ibid.
,
p. 459. On 4 November 1953, a full-time





developed away from the 1953 concept of a sort of lens which
would gather the departmental threads of potential psycho-
logical operations and focus them into an instrument of
national psychological warfare. Already, it was evident
that the OCB had little impact on the real coordination of
policy execution. The OCB was an interagency committee
which lacked command authority. It always acted by "agree-
ment" or "concurrence." It did not "decide" or "direct"
action on a document j rather it concurred in it and agreed
to carry out any actions it contained. A difference of view
among the OCB members which could not be resolved within the
Board was referred to the respective agency heads. Failing
of resolution at that level, the matter found its way to the
President, either directly or through the National Security
Council. Consequently, many of the most important decisions
affecting the course of programs under the OCB surveillance
were made outside the framework of the Board. Furthermore,
the departments often bypassed the OCB, pursuing their own
interpretations of policy or engaging in "bootleg" coordina-
37tion through extramural means. It appeared ever more
clearly, that an interdepartmental committee cast in the
organizational mold of the OCB could not be counted upon to
discharge effective major responsibilities for follow through.
37United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, Organizing for National Security , Vol. Ill




XXIV. CONFUSION IN THE AREA OF POLICY GUIDANCE
One of the areas heavily scored in the three 1953
investigations was that of the confusion which existed over
responsibility in the field of foreign policy. There was no
clear chain of command below the President. Practice had
nearly shattered the role of the Secretary of State as the
President's executive agent in the field of foreign affairs.
Much of the Secretary's authority had been usurped by Presi-
dent Roosevelt during the course of World War II. The post-
war and Korean problems had resulted in the acquisition by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense of an
ever-increasing voice in foreign affairs. Furthermore,
Congress had created the Economic Cooperation Administration
as an independent agency with cabinet status and, by statute,
gave its administrator direct access to the President.
Overseas, the confusion was even worse where the
separate agencies pursued their own courses of action and
interpreted United States foreign policy as they saw fit.
At one time, in Paris, there were four United States repre-
sentatives with the rank of Ambassador, each independent of
the other three. In the foreign information field, a
variety of separate and un-coordinated programs were being
conducted simultaneously.
President Eisenhower restored the Secretary of State






were to receive policy guidance from the Department of State
and clear their plans through that Department, The State
Department was, in so far as possible, to restrict its own
activities to policy-making and diplomacy. Overseas, to the
American ambassador or minister in each mission was dele-
gated the same responsibility within his purview as the
Secretary of State was now to discharge within the United
States Government. Policy was thus to be placed exclusively
in the hands of the chief of mission and all agency programs
would be under his control.
Reorganization Plan No. 8 and the three additional
corrective actions laid a basis in 1953 for an effective
psychological structure. It never emerged! The failure,
once again, was basically a failure of top-level American
officials responsible for policy formulation and execution.
The OCB failed not only because it was structurally incapable
of accomplishing the job set out for it, but also because it
was permitted to develop, or grow away, from the concept
from which it was born. The role of the President's Special
Assistant for Cold War Planning was permitted to degenerate?
it did not deteriorate of its own accord. Both of these
deteriorations were directly the responsibility of President
Eisenhower and lend credence to the observation that, like
his predecessors, he neither understood nor placed apprecia-
ble store in the worth of psychological warfare, his frequent
protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.
* e:
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XXV. THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION APPROACH
In January, 1960, John Kennedy, inherited the United
States structure for . sychological War. Basically, there
was but one tool available—the USIA. Kennedy's subsequent
elimination of the OCB struck no new blow to psychological
operations—the Board had ceased to contribute to a national
psychological effort long before and, even before that, the
impact of the Special Assistant for Cold War Planning had
been eliminated.
Although a highly-classified Cold War Advisory Panel
was created in the Department of Defense, the Kennedy Admin-
istration's failure to establish any machinery for the
formulation of Integrated psychological policy is a source
for speculation. Possibly the attitude was that the admin-
istration was canny enough to "dead reckon" its way along.
The tendency toward ad hoc solutions would servB to support
this thesis. Perhaps the announced Presidential policy that
each department head was solely responsible for the total
effort of his agency was considered sufficient to insure
that perfect staff work—both vertical and horizontal—would
result in a magic integration. It seems hard to believe
that this was the case, and there early developed some ques-
tion as to the interaction of the functions of the Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs and the Secretary of
State with regard to the formulation of foreign policy. The
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United States Government is, simply, too vast to rely upon
the belief that the complex interrelationship of all its
departments can be ordered merely by informing each depart-
ment head that he is responsible for running his department
correctly. There is also the possibility that the Kennedy
Administration was no more or less interested or knowledgea-
ble in effective psychological operations than any other
administration, and that it was satisfied to proceed with
its only remaining tool, the USIA, in an attempt to obtain
as much mileage out of the "campaign of truth 1 * and news
media facilities available as possible.
XXVI. THE USIA—1964
The USIA in 1963-1964 is a giant organization and
under the very effective guidance of Edward R. Murrow,
capable of giving Mr. Kennedy and, subsequently, Mr. Johnson
much mileage. It employs over eleven thousand people—three
thousand within the United States and the remainder staffing
3ome two hundred and nineteen overseas posts in ninety-nine
countries. This shift in emphasis from Washington to the
field was a most significant factor in the effective develop-
ment of the USIA. Previously, the field missions were
essentially service organizations, receiving and disseminat-
ing material supplied to them by the home office. The result
was that much of this mass-produced material was of little
-
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or no value in a specific area. By shifting emphasis to the
forward theaters , the specific area needs could be examined
and dealt with on the spot within the limits established by
policy from Washington.
With the expanding overseas program, the annual
38budget has also grown. From 1954 to 1960, the budget
varied from eighty-four to one hundred and four million dol-
lars. In fiscal 1963, the figure climbed to one hundred and
forty-three million, and a proposed 1964 budget of over one
hundred and ninety million dollars was placed before Con-
gress,
The extent of the USIA operation is impressive and
39
encompasses the entire spectrum of communications media.
The Voice of America produces continuous short wave broad-
casts to an estimated weekly audience of over twenty million
people. It produces over seven thousand five hundred weekly
hours of taped programs in twenty-seven languages which are
made available to approximately two thousand five hundred
local medium wave radio stations which, in turn, reach an
additional forty-five million people a week. In the field
38Edward R. Murrow, Improved Communication for Better
Understanding (Washington: United States Information Agency,
Office of Public Information, press release No. 32, September
14, 1961), p. 7.
39United States Information Agency, 18tb and 19th






of television, video tapes and films of special merit are
made available to stations in sixty-six countries serving
fifty million sets and reaching approximately one hundred
and sixty million people. The agency also maintains two
hundred and ten film libraries in ninety-eight countries
with each library having between five hundred to one thousand
separate titles all in the native language. Where no thea-
ters are available, USIA has a limited number of mobile
units. The weekly audience for these films averages one
hundred and fifty million people. In addition, the agency
prints and distributes more than eighty magazines and news-
papers, operates a worldwide radio teletype which runs to
ten thousand words a day directed to eighty-three countries,
operates almost two hundred libraries containing over two
and one-half million volumes, and presents exhibits such as
the Friendship Seven space capsule.
Technically and material wise, the USIA is excep-
tionally well equipped and is improving itself yearly. Its
most effective director, Edward R. Murrow, enjoyed an im-
proved, though less than adequate, participation in the
40formulation of psychological policy. It is possible that
this was a function of the prestige which Mr. Murrow brought
The following observations on Mr. Murrow 1 s role in
the policy-maKing process are drawn and inferred from a
series of interviews with Mrs. Edna King of the Office of
Public Information in the United States Information Agency.
•
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to the Agency, and which, undeniably, was transferred to
USIA. It will be necessary to observe the role of his suc-
cessor, Carl Rowan, to determine the extent of this factor.
Mr, Murrow received policy guidance from the Secre-
tary of State. With the elimination of the OCB, he lost his
formal membership in the National Security Council Structure
and seat, as the only observer, at the council table; this
was somewhat compensated for by his designation as a
"Special-Request Member" which gave him a standing Presiden-
tial Invitation to attend those Council meetings which were
concerned with matters relating to his official responsibili-
ties. It should be noted, however, that he attended as a
"junior member," as a guest, not as an equal to the me::,
designated by law and Executive Order. There does not seem
to be any clear definition or guidance to indicate at what
point his presence would not be required. The President
sought his advice on the impact that policies would have on
world opinion before and not after they were implemented.
This was all well and good, but it was, of course, a one-way
arrangement and could be considered as a valid source of
policy formulation and guidance only so long as the Presi-
dent saw fit (or remembered) to consult Mr. Murrow. On
occasion, he was asked to attend Cabinet meetings, but at
unpredictable times. He was also included in small meetings
with the President, the Special Assistant for National




Security Affairs (Bundy), the Director of the State Depart-
ment Policy Planning Council (Rostow), and the Secretary of
State (Rusk). He did not participate in the Policy Planning
Council's work. His representative sat with the Cold War
Advisory Panel. All of this reenforces an underlying sus-
picion that USIA policy guidance is a "jury rig" and defi-
nitely ad hoc . The general flow is downward to the Agency
and while there, quite obviously, is a degree of counter
flow of advice and staff work to figure in national policy
consideration, this input to the national policy machinery
is in the nature of a guest performance and not as a perma-
nent, integral factor.
XXVII. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS UNPREPARED
It would seem that in the last forty-six years, the
United States Government has not yet concluded that the con-
duct of foreign affairs demands identification and considera-
tion of psychological processes in every phase of international
relations. The alleged increased participation of the USIA
in our policy planning is rated by some observers as a dis-
tinct plus. A more restrained view is that it is, at least,
not a minus. It is important that the people of the world
hear and understand, as much as their intellects will permit,
the position and policies of the United States. The fact







necessarily, with their support for United States objectives.
The danger in becoming euphoric over one's information ac-
tivities lies in failing to recognize this limitation on
what "truth" can do. An information program, undeniably,
can have marked psychological effect. It is, however, but
one psychological operation. Psychological war is a product
of many psychological operations, carried on simultaneously,
intensively, for indefinite periods, and so blended, one
with the other, that the cause and effects of each weave
together into a single integrated whole aimed at achieving
national goals. The United States pays lip service to this
theorem but has yet to turn its organizational and creative








ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND
UNITED STATES EFFORTS
Any comparison of Soviet and United States efforts in
the field of psychological operations must begin by noting
the differences between the basic aims of foreign policy and
the conceptions of how foreign policy is to be conducted*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Soviet Union is a revolutionary power with long-
term ideological claims. Its leaders intend to further the
socialist revolution throughout the world* Though different
nations are at different stages, some more or less ripe than
others, for one or another type of revolution, the road is
essentially the same for all* The Soviet leaders are not
necessarily in a hurry* Their determination to expedite the
process of history does not impel them to adventurous or
aggressive action* However, they are unshakeably convinced
that their diagnosis of history is scientific, and they are
constantly on the watch for opportunities to promote their
cause*
The united States is conservative and defensive* It
is not that American leaders do not also hold convictions,
but that they do not plot, through their foreign policies.
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to convert other nations* There is, of course, a strong
strain of missionary zeal which is very dear to the American
heart, but it cannot be said that the makers of United States
policy have set themselves the long-term, ideological aim
of converting the people either of the Soviet bloc or of the
uncommitted countries to the American way of life* Rather,
they are concerned to defend the United States national
interest and to foster a world order in which all men are
uninterfered with and free to choose their own way of life
and government so long as in so doing they do not impinge
upon the same rights of other states and men*
If, in the aims of policy, the Soviet leaders are
doctrinaire and the United States government is empirical,
in the choice of means the opposite is generally the case*
In the United States, there is a great deal of public dis-
cussion, which can hardly fail to make Itself felt within
the Government policy machinery and Department of State, as
to whether the United States should rely on military strength
or economic action, on propaganda or negotiations* This
"either-or-ism H must be incomprehensible to Soviet students
of American affairs* In Soviet foreign policy, all availa-
ble instruments are used, in whatever admixture the circum-
stances of the case would suggest*
II. ANALYSIS OF UHITSD STATfiS SFFORTS
A democracy, by its very nature, contains certain
*t» I*:. »Mmti toa *v/v
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inherent disadvantages in the conduct of psychological op-
erations* The United States is a republic and a democracy
and, consequently, subject to the sharp limitations which
republican, democratic governments possess*
The United States cannot impose a purpose upon man*
kind* It cannot enunciate a policy and then hue to that
line for years on end* Americans are not messiahs* The
limitations of American civilisation over and above those
restraints imposed by American political institutions are
such as to make it impossible for the United States to lead
a fanatical counter crusade against communism or to guaran-
tee to the world that America of 1963 can promise that
America of 1975 will perform any particular action*
Limitations on Psychological Operations
American psychological operations are limited pre-
cisely because they are American* To be American means, to
a certain degree, to be fxwtm The American citizen has a
definite influence and role in the operation of his govern-
ment* A new election and a hostile Congress can cut off the
funds for any project no matter what its merits may be in
the eyes of the policy planners* The rest of the world is
acutely aware of this fact, even though Washington poli-
ticians and bureaucrats sometimes seem to forget* The
promise of a dictator is generally good for his lifetime*
The promise of the United States is good only within the
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letter of the laws e specific treaty, a definite commercial
agreement, a very sharp and very narrow commitment* "in the
propaganda field, America certainly is not promise* H
The American strength in international affairs, there-
fore , does not lie in a propaganda capacity to promise, to
threaten, or to commit the United States Government to
future courses of action* The American strength lies in the
immense probabilities of American life, in the virtual cer-
tainty that the American people will react in a positive
manner to aggression; that the American people will, if
attacked, fight in an implacable manner with every intention
of destroying their attacker { and that the American people,
despite their occasional shortcomings in matters of racial
tolerance and political freedom, will, in the long run, be
solidly ranged behind whatever policies seem to promise
equality, prosperity, and freedom for all men*
The limitations on the United States as a source of
propaganda are sharp* There is no United States party linej
it is virtually impossible to imagine that within the Ameri-
can civilisation, as it exists today* there could be one*
There might be an official United States policy, unanimous
and binding upon all federal departments, but the Federal
Paul M* A* Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (second
edition j New York: Ouell, Sloane, and Pearce, 19^0), p* 279.
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Government itself, is only one among fifty-one separate
governments operating within the United States of America*
The state governments, the cities within the states, and the
people-at-large are free to contradict what the Federal
Government may say at any given point* Therefore, exploita-
tion of United States propaganda strength must always be
developed from the probable or apparent center of American
opinion at that moment* It la impossible to find a United
States policy which can be made compulsory and unanimous
upon all Americans, botn public and private* American
policy planners are faced with the domestic requirement of
devising foreign-policy programs which will command the
decisive assent of the American people—this demands an
adroit combination of leadership, foresight, and a keen
awareness of domestic politics*
The Quest for Lost National Purpose
The less peaceful the world is, the more effective a
"peacetime H psychological campaign can be* In times of ob-
vious peril, the American people close ranks* In times of
relaxation, they scatter In every direction* The American
people seem to be Incapable, psychologically, of carrying
out a crusade without the external stimulus of danger and
trouble* Once a war breaks out, Americans, heretofore, hav.
shown an excellent capacity to unite in winning and finish-
ing the conflict* The perplexing question, lies in how the
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American people, short of involvement in wax can develop the
purpose, decision, and unanimity necessary to take those
actions which will prevent war*
It haa been a century since the Four Horsemen of the
Apocalypse rode through the American countryside* America's
sheltered and peaceful society has diverted the people into
a timid and near sterile pattern of political thought* The
"more abundant life," the quest for security, the adulation
of the "common man" have been thematic byways down which the
American people have wandered away from the highway of
national character and purpose that built their magnificent
country out of a howling wilderness* The character and
purpose to which reference is so frequently made did not
shrink from destroying the native population when such a
course of action augured well for the security of a portion
of the American people* Today, it is highly improbable that
American exploration and colonisation of another planet
would be carried out in a comparable manner* Perhaps this
is for the good* Brutality or atrocity generally breed more
of the same* Nevertheless, it is the manifestation of pur-
pose, the unalterable and unswerving dedication to doing
what must be done to perpetuate this land and its system
which has relaxed under the eroding effect of security*
Part of the answer probably lies in the field of edu-
cation* The American people are still largely Ignorant or
an
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misinformed as to the nature of communism and its relation-
ship to the power politics of the Soviet Union* A small
start has been made in the public school systems of certain
of the states* Florida now requires a course, employing the
text The Meaning of Communism (Simon and Schuster) to be
given in the last years of high school* It is hoped that
such programs will spread* While the American possesses
patience, endurance, and curiosity, the latter faculty is
not generally directed along the historical or political
veins* So long as a rational consensus or basis of under-
standing in these fields is not developed, to that extent
will there continue to be just that much more impetus tc
this aimless drifting or lack of felt national purpose
The never-ending plaints for a regenerated national
purpose and the literary wringing-of-hands over the need for
a rededication overlook the fact that it is not so much a
matter of having lost but more a matter of having forgotten
the already valid and existing precepts that the American
people have developed* Here lies a challenge for the politi-
cal leadership of the nation* It is a double challenge, for
unless conducted scrupulously free of partisan and minority
politics and free of a propaganda tone and motif it can
nmver succeed* The propagandizing efforts of the Creel Com-
mittee amongst the American people have stood as a bar for
forty-five years to governmental efforts to develop the
requisite foundation of understanding which is necessary to








Its policies. It most certainly is a responsibility of
leadership to insure that the public is grounded and in-
formed of the factors which determine the national future.
This is no program for a series of press conferences or an
occasional fireside chatj it is a long-term, continuing*
integrated education effort that would require direct par-
ticipation by the President and his most senior advisers*
Statement of the Problem
Over a decade ago, the crux of psychological war was
ably annunciated by President Sisenhower in a campaign
speech at San Francisco:
The present Administration has never yet been able to
grasp the full impact of a psychological effort put
forth on a national scale. What would such a peace-
time of 'cold war ' national strategy mean. It would
mean, in the first place, the selection of broad
national purposes and the designation within these
purposes of principal targets. Then it would mean
this: every significant act of government should
be so timed and so directed at a principal target and
so related to other governmental actions that it will
produce the maximum effect. It means that our govern-
ment in this critical matter will no longer be divided
into airtight compartments. It means that in carrying
out a national policy every department and every
agency of government that can make a useful contribu-
tion will bring its full strength to oear under a
coordinated program. We shall no longer have a
Department of State that deals with foreign policy in
an aloof cloister; a defense establishment that makes
military appraisals in a vacuum} a mutual security
administration that, with sovereign independence,
spends billions overseas. We must bring the dozens
of agencies and bureaus into concerted action under
an overall scheme of strategy. And we must have a
.-
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firm hand on the tiller to sail the ship along a
consistent course. 2
Beyond this clear annunciation, little advance has
been made. Total strategies have never been fully developed
or implemented by the United States. The strategies that
have been employed have not provided for the integrated use
of the four major instruments of foreign policy—the diplo-
matic, military, economic, and pyschologleal. There are
many reasons for this. The presidential form of government
with its division of powers between the executive and the
legislature imposes limitations on the probable amount of
integration that can be developed. The democratic process
itself Inhibits the type of central control which can most
readily achieve the coordination necessary to actual totality
of action in the implementation of a decision. The inherent
frictions that exist between Congress and the .'hi e House
can and often result in budgetary or other restrictions on
the scope of implementation of plans developed by the execu-
tive.
The aforementioned limitations ar^ constitutional
weaknesses which must be endured for the sake of the great
strengths and rewards that the system simultaneously affords
us. However, there are at least two additional areas which
are blocked only by inertia or bureaucratic, vested interest.





It is in these axeas where effective Presidential leadership
and sound organization can produce a total diplomacy or
total strategy. In fact, it has always been in these areas
where the answer has lain, and, in the harsh light of re-
sponsibility and accountability, the failure of the United
States Government to develop this totality of effort has
been solely the responsibility of its Chief-Executive-
Officer—the President of the United States.
The Multiplicity of Agencies
The first of these correctable areas centers on the
problem of the multiplicity of agencies with overlapping
authority and responsibility which stultify the foreign
policy decision-making apparatus within the executive branch.
In such a vast operation, it is literally impossible to
develop a neat series of compartmentalized units which are
pure unto themselves. Such an organization could never work
for the simple reason that each is, in some degree, depend-
ent upon the other and finds implications of all the tasks
performed by the other agencies within its own field.
Therefore, the line of attack should be through the "coor-
dinating" machinery and not by successive layering of agency
upon agency or by ad hoc , 'shooting from the hip," emergency
methods of dealing with individual situations as they arise.
Since World War II, there has been a stately procession of
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"coordinating" committee* or boards* All have bean formed
with the bast of intentions; each has represented some im-
provement; and the late OCB even offered promise* All have
failed for the same reason—their titles hold the key:
"Coordination* " If any country should have had its fill of
this term, the united states would rank at the very head of
the list* From the days of the Continental Congress when
"Congress could beg, plead, and implore, but it could not
command," this nation has had nothing but the most unfortu-
nate experience with "coordination* The entire history of
the American people indicates that they simply do not "coor-
dinate" of their own free wills* The vernacular of the
Marine gunnery sergeant, "semper fie, I've got mine, how are
you doing/" seems to express the attitude; it probably lies
deeply grounded in the independence bred of the frontier
experience which is part of American heritage* It cannot be
tolerated within an administrative organisation, yet it has
been tolerated* Eisenhower virtually prostituted his San
Francisco campaign speech of 8 October 1952, with the coor-
dlnative mandate expressed in the promulgation of the OCB*
Probably his concept of military "coordination " colored his
judgment of the effectiveness of a civilian, interdepart-
mental coordinating board* Having lived all one's life in
the glowering shadow of the Articles of War, it would be




incentive to effective coordination • That there ia no such
sanction renders the coordinating concept useless in the
face of vested bureaucratic practice*
The Lack of Understanding
There is a second reason for the United States fail-
ure to develop total strategies* Aiaerlcan leaders have
nev^r truly understood the nature of psychological opera-
tions; and, because the full implications of these opera-
tions have not been understood , they have n&v&c been fully
exploited* Although the history of psychological policy
implications can be traced back to earliest recorded time,
traditionally f psychological operations were not recognized
as a separate instrument of statecraft* This was probably
due to the very narrow, special audience against which the
implications of the traditional tools—diplomacy, military
force, and economic activities—were used, whether singly or
collectively* However, in the twentieth century, for the
first time, it has become possible for the leaders of one
nation to communicate directly with the population of
another nation* Simultaneously, there has been an immense
expansion of the potential or actual power base of a socle
£ven the most totalitarian of today's dictatorships is forced
to solicit the active support of its subjects, whereas its
predecessors could exist with mere passive acquiescence*
Thus, the new-found power of the masses and the ability of a
......
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foreign power to speak directly to these messes have raised
the psychological tool to a level comparable with that of
the three traditional instruments.
American Conceptions and Misconceptions
The American concept of psychological warfare has
always been tainted with a suspicion of the instrument*
Part of this stems from the American public's fear of being
influenced psychologically by the government—a fear which
is inevitable to a certain degree* This has been reenforced
by the spectre of Nazi, Soviet, and Chinese psychological
operations and propaganda* There is also the influence of
the intriguing "all-American boy" complex that is periodi-
cally manifest in a preoccupation with a variation of the
Marquis of Queensberry rules in so far as international
relations are concerned* The U-2 incident was disturbing to
many people simply because we were occupied in spying (and
blatant spying at that), not because we got caught at it*
The pathetic performance put on by every senior official
concerned was capped only by the even more pathetically
noble assumption of responsibility by the President* Of
course, he was responsible i And every international poli-
tician knew that* The public expiation of this interna-
tional sin was a reflection of the American bent of
character which is somehow ashamed of anything that smacks
of the underhanded or devious* Under this spell, the word











propaganda has meant something evil* It has meant the dirty
weapon of the opponent. Extensive literary effort has been
expended to develop some nice, clean, unalarming substitute
for such terms as psychological war and propaganda—evi-
dently on the assumption that a rose by any other name will
somehow not smell like a rose*
American Usage and Propaganda
Psychological warfare and psychological operations,
in American usage, have come largely to connote propaganda*
The earliest large-scale experience of the nation was in
World War I with the efforts of the Creel Committee* This
was primarily a propaganda campaign based almost entirely
upon an expansion of domestic advertising techniques* Two
basic misconceptions have generally eiXpc^B»ed themselves in
all American psychological warfare programs ever since* The
first is the idea that the conduct of psychological warfare
and propaganda is just like advertising* The second is that
foreigners think, or wish to think, like Americans*
There has been, for many years, a wide-spread belief
that, since Americans are smart advertisers, all that the
government needs to do is project this domestic form of agi-
tation on a worldwide basis* Yet this approach is precisely
what the world situation does not require* The United States
is dealing with a world revolutionary situation involving
races, cultures, and aspirations totally alien to American
lane--
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experience. Political propaganda is a task of extraordinary
complexity and demand* the moat skilled and sophisticated
American political guidance*
What is Good for the United States is Good for the World
Since the earliest days of the Republic, Americans
have demonstrated a national ethnocentrlsm* The New World
was, in fact, new, and it bred a new type of man, a new set
of values, and new outlooks* Those who did not develop re-
turned to Europe or were swallowed up in the process of the
development of American culture* The period of the nine-
teenth century, during which the great focus of American
attention was turned inward to continental consolidation,
reenforced the opinion that the American way was a superior
way | the spectacular growth which burst forth in the last
quarter of the nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth
centuries served as proof of the theorem* The American
inclination to assume that what was good for America was
good for everyone, the tendency to disregard the basic in-
terest and outlooks of the foreign audiences to which
America has addressed itself stem from this experience*
Consequently, factual statements that the American working
man or farmer has a carpet In his home, shoes for all his
children, an automobile of his own, and liberty to do as he







peasant, who simply cannot imagine that one worker or farmer
could possibly own such tangible and intangible things.
There has been a realistic trend away from this form
of propaganda as the USIA has matured* The non-governmental
media of communication, however, film, television, and maga-
zines still convey this message and under the American system
cannot be restrained from so doing. This poses an even
greater problem for the USXA, for America possesses no revo-
lutionary ideology to fire imaginations and to substitute
for the material yearnings of the less-developed peoples of
the world. Unfortunately, "you can't fill the baby's bottle
3
with liberty"; and there is the ever-present danger of talk-
ing only to one's friends who already share American expec-
tations and thereby losing "the great majority of mankind
that is still searching for a hope and a vision."
III. ANALYSIS OF SOVIET EFFORTS
When one pauses to contemplate the use that the
Soviet Union has made of the psychological tool, one cannot
fail to be impressed by i fficient and workmanlike manner
in which psychological operations have been woven through
3Saul K. Padover, "Psychological Warfare and Foreign
Policy," Propaganda and International Relations , Urban 0.
Whitaker, Jr. fed.) (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co.,
1962), p. 143, cited from a quotation of Maury Mavenck.
4Ibid.
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the Soviet system. This does not mean that fern* men should
adopt a similar course, but it does indicate that psycho-
logical operations can be effective* The United states
would be foolish not to recognise the operational strength
of the Soviet structure and profit from those lessons which
may be drawn in the light of the American experience*
A Total Program
The goals of Soviet foreign policy have been achieved
and projected in terms of all resources , capabilities, and
the entire machinery of Government* In Soviet hands, psy-
chological operations have proven to be both flexible and
responsive to initiative* Time after time in the last
twenty years, the speed and efficiency with which the Soviets
have moved from a military posture to political action and
thence to economic pressure have caught the United States
unprepared with any reply except one devised under the im-
pelling pressure of the latest challenge*
Perhaps the single most striking feature of the
Soviet effort is its totality, for the Soviet operation is
an organisational one, and its strength lies in the rise of
organisation as a weapon* It is not the power of persuasion
so much as it is the power that flows from a dedicated,








The Soviet Value System
The national values which ground the employment of
the Combat Party derive from Marxist-Leninist Bolshevik doc-
trine, portions of which have expanded and contracted,
mutated and atrophied as the Soviet Union has progressed
from the virulent, but "have not," revolutionary stage to
the status of a great world power, rich and growing richer—
a definite have" state. Nevertheless, the communist
ideology underlies the organizational and operational frame
of the nation*
There exists a considerable body of opinion that
holds that this Bolshevik ideology has little or no bearing
on the operations or planning factors of the USSR* The
observation that "dialectical materialism affected Stalin
. • . (and by implication any of the Soviet leaders) . • .
about as much and as little as the doctrine of Christian
charity affected Ivan the Terrible" is picturesque and per-
5haps of value, in a rhetorical mmi9m» Such opinion main-
tains that the confrontation of the mid-twentieth century is
a derivative of pure power politics, and that its polar star
is power—nothing more nor less* This approach neglects the
important role of values in the development of national
goals and a national security policy. The leaders of the
5Robert V. Daniels, "What the Russians Mean,"
Commentary (October, 1962) p. 47.




Soviet Union believe in their value system Marxist-
Leninism—as firmly and deeply as their American counter-
parts believe in democracy « It is no more possible to claim
that Soviet foreign policy is conceived independent of that
nation *s value system, than it is to hold tnat American
values are eliminated during the development of United
States policy*
Unless we are able to devise political tactics and an
organizational plan based precisely upon calculations
for work over a long period of time, and at the same
time, in the very process of this work, put our party
in readiness to spring to its post • . • at the very
first, even unexpected, call, as soon as the progress
of events becomes accelerated, we will prove to be
but miserable political adventurers • ... It would
be a grievous error indeed to build up the party
organisation in the expectation only of outbreaks of
street-fighting, or only upon the "forward march of the
drab, everyday struggle* H We must always carry on
our every day work and always be prepared for every-
thing, for very frequently it is almost impossible
to foresee beforehand when periods of outbreaks will
give away to periods of calm* And even in those
cases when it is possible to do so, it will not be
possible to utilise this foresight for the purpose of
reconstructing our organisation, cause • • • these
changes from turmoil to calm take place with astonish-
ing rapidity.'
Thus, in 1902, Lenin enunciated the basic organiza-
tional requirements for flexibility and long-range planning
with no sharp distinction between words and deeds or between
psychological or military warfare*
Vladimir llyich Lenin, Collected Works (New York!
International Publishers, 1927), pp. 4 and! 244-245*
ICfc fl
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The department of propaganda and Agitation
To accomplish this organisation, control of psycho-
logical operations is located at a very high point in the
hierarchy of the government* The Department of Propaganda
and Agitation, located within the executive Staff of the
Party Secretariat, exercises vast authority* This mandate
touches every form of activity which might conceivably
influence opinion* It functions as the planner, director,
and supervisor for all media* Its mission includes that of
providing the Presidium and Central Committee with analysed
data upon which these two high policy bodies can act in the
development of a total national policy* The Department
supervises the rigorous political education program from
which it develops and maintains a well-trained and well-
informed Combat Party structure throughout the world*
Aqitataya i Propaganda
Soviet Russia is the first nation ...a history to pro-
duce such a trained ci<~3S of full-time propagandists, admin-
istrators, agitators, and organisers in a Combat Party*
Contrary to the democratic attitude towards propaganda and
psychological warfare and those who conduct it, AGITATSYA i
propaganda are honorific words in the Soviet Union* They
are honorable because the importance of these activities in
the pattern of world revolution is recognized and respected
•
Consequently, the "psychological troops" have a sense of
•* 4 XO"J
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mission, a sense of contributing to the National destiny.
Such regard is not accorded to American operators by their
nation* Since there is no such division or separation of
political, military, and civilian planning and executive
efforts as exist within the American governmental structure,
the Soviets experience little trouble in extracting the
maximum psychological return from the integrated, total
policy*
The Soviet Concept of Public Opinion
There are additional factors that render the organi-
zation of the Combat Party even more formidable* One of
these lies in the fundamental distinction between public
opinion as it is conceived in a democratic state and as it
is conceived in the USSR. A democracy regards public
opinion in terms of citizens freely taxing a stand on an
issue of public importance* The ve. Lottl media of mass com-
munications are operated so as to present facts on which
citizens may make up their minds on any given issue—the
creation of diversity of opinions is encouraged* Through a
process of f£^9 elections, the majority opinion is expressed
and the government is modified accordingly* In the Soviet
Union, quite the opposite is the case. A highly-organized
central control of the media of mass communications is
manipulated as a guide since the reader looks at the official
communications to discover the correct position—not to find
HR09 «»« 20 m£b*m e
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conflicting arguments from which he may make up his mind.
The f arty and its communications serve to mobilise and for-
mulate public opinion on all important issues. This is not
to ignore the state of public attitudes and understanding,
however. The Department of Propaganda and Agitation is
careful to maintain a close evaluation of the attitudes of
the masses so as to be able to estimate how ready they are
to support a given policy. Once the direction and intensity
of the attitudinal winds are determined, the Department then
guides the vanguard and persuades or coerces the laggards.
The elections which are held are designed to provide a sym-
bolic expression of this unity. The change which follows
such an election will not be reflected upward but downward.
The state continues along a predetermined course and the
population is expected to conform to the established Party
line.
Scope of Operations
The sheer size and variety of th*, combat resources
available are staggering. In all the Soviet world, the
entire communications system is at the service of the Party.
In any part of the world where the Combat Party functions,
it may draw on as many of the proved devices as it can main-
tain. Furthermore, this Soviet program is a total program.




expected to Approach its targets with every weapon that is
available and appropriate.
It has been estimated that the cost of the most
direct means, measures stemming from the professional propa-
gandists, amount to at least five hundred million dollars a
year* Indirect means of operation appear in the form of sup-
port for parallel organizations that do not openly avow the
communist ideology but covertly follow the directions of
Moscow) in infiltration tactics employed in schools, churches,
trade unions, the press and most other communications media;
and in the promotion of various front organizations which are
directed at specific objectives such as the anti-European
Defense Community campaign and the Stockholm Peace Appeal,
as well as in the popular front movement which embrace na-
tionalistic aspirations. When these are all added together
they represent an immense psychological effort* A rough
estimate is that the entire program involves the utilization
of five hundred thousand men and an annual expenditure of
7
some two billion dollars* In comparison, the USIA»s total
budget is more than matched by the Soviet expenditures
simply to jam the Voice of America* This gigantic total is
7United States Congress, Senate, The Technique of
Soviet Propaganda (Washington: Government Printing OfrTce,
1960), pp. 2-17 passim .
8Edward R* Murrow, Who Speaks for America (Washington:
United States Information Agency Office of Public Informa-
tion, Press Release No* 24, Kay 24, 1961), p* 13.
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one indication of the value placed on propaganda and the
worth of psychological operations*
Role of the Philosophy of Class struggle
The philosophy of class struggle conceives of every
group not dominated by the Party as an enemy md permits no
solution to world tension until the Party dominates all
'aer groups—-or is itself destroyed* The Combat Party is
not a political party such as democratic countries are accus-
tomed to foster and protect , but, rather, an instrument of
war in a conflict which the Communists expect ultimately to
win.
It would be a great mistake to believe that a peaceful
agreement about concessions is a peaceful agreement
with capitalists* This agreement is equivalent to
war. 9
In the face of this point of view, so often and
clearly stated, it is hard to believe that a settlement
between the Soviets and the United States, by which they can
live together indefinitely in peace, is conceivable to the
Party leaders* on the other hand, arrangements with the
United States, "codifying the momentary relationship of
forces" and permitting time to regroup fo. ces for the next
advance, are possible and often desirable*
iNathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Polit-
buro (New York: McGraw Hill, 195 *,-, p. 88, quoted from
Lenin.




The Worldwide Opinion Campaigns
The great worldwide opinion campaigns are notable for
their length and for the skill with which changes and varia-
tions were introduced so as to maintain interest over a long
period* They all illustrate the choice of agitational ma-
terial for wide and continued psychological operations* The
peace campaign, the germ warfare campaign, the disarmament
campaign, the peaceful coexistence campaign: they are all
grounded in tensions of great potency and wide extent* The
world is sick of war. The world is fearful of what Chemical-
Biological-Radiological (CBR) warfare may bring* The world
dreads the possibility of a thermonuclear exchange. In the
latter case, oople of Asia are keenly aware that the
United States has employed the nuclear weapon only against
the yellow people of the Far Seat* These themes lend them-
selves to all kinds of specific as well as "rigged" events
and evidence. In addition, they possess the beauty of being
susceptible to simplification down to the level where the
agitator can operate most effectively*
These car iigns have also served as most effective
political lubricants for Soviet foreign poll y. In his
report on "Peace and War," made during the Seventh Congress
of the Russian Communist Party, following the signing of the
1918 Brest-Litovsk peace treaty with Germany, Lenin estab-






1* Compare strengths and avoid war under unfavorable
cireumstances
•
2* Peace negotiations are a means of accumulating
power and should be used to seek temporary
respite in preparation for new *ars*
$« Be willing to retreat so as to plan for future
attacks* If all men cannot be withdrawn in
complete safety » at least try in half safety*
Never hesitate to counter-attack in order to
take the best advantage for all chances and
opportunities
4* Trade space for time*
5* Divide the enemies » strength and secure the
fruits of revolution* Take maximum advantage
of mistrust and discord within the enemy*
6* Crawl in deep mud to brew world revolution*
There is nothing to which one cannot or must
not resort in order to accomplish one's goals*
Thus Lenin projected the teachings of Marx and Cngels
who, when faced with serious defeats or frustatlons, were
always ready to resort to the so-called "peaceful " strata-
gems* £ngels, In this connection, held that on occasion one
might be forced by circumstances to accept a compromise*
When so confronted, however, the true revolutionary aim must








under whatever circumstances , its ultimate achievement must
be pursued*
Stalin wielded the "peace strategy" weapons most
effectively* During his dictatorship, the "united front"
and "peaceful coexistence" themes were developed as meant to
seek cooperation with the Western democracies* During the
late 1930 • s , Russian policy had led her to enter into peace-
ful coexistence arrangements with both sides of the approach-
ing war*
Stalin's otrateqlc Concept for Peaceful Coexistence
Less than a year before his death, in an article in
the September IS, 1952, issue of Pravda . entitled "Economic
Problems of Socialism in Soviet Russia, " Stalin, following
in Lenin* s steps, bequeathed the basic strategic direction
for the skillful use of the "peaceful coexistence" campaign
which was soon to blossom forth* Peaceful coexistence was
to be employed as a psychological instrument of Soviet for-
eign policy so as to:
1* Prevent the premature outbreak of the decisive
war against the Western World; !•••, before the
Soviet Union was completely prepared, so as to
avoid an irreparable defeat.
2* Win sufficient time behind the banner of "peaceful
coexistence" so that the Soviet Union could
accumulate its strength, multiply the production
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of atomic weapons, and advance from an inferior
position to a superior one.
3. Dampen the morale of the democratic countries,
slow down their rearmament, and weaken their
war potential*
4* Carry out, behind the call for p *ce, political
infiltration throughout the free world, and by
using neutralists and selfish peoples who want
peace at any price sabotage the democratic
world from within and place it entirely on the
defensive.
5. Divide the democracies by the peace offensive
and, above all, isolate the United states from
its allies*
Despite his posthumous public degradation, Stalin's
strategic legacy remains as valid, subject to Khrushchev's
variation on Clausewits's statement that "war is the con-
tinuation of policy by other means. " peace, in dialectic
terms, is therefore struggle, it differs from war not by
its objectives, but by the means used* Peace, then, is the
absence of military hostilities and nothi- g more* It is
within this frame of reference that current Russian inter-
pretation of peaceful coexistence is fixed* It is precisely
this formulation which lends psychological operations their
great utility in pursuing the Stalinist strategy*
'
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The Soviet Jlsarmament Campaign
The really exquisite degree of policy integration,
however, becomes strikingly apparent when the Soviet dis-
armament campaign is examined for the psychological implica-
tions and ramifications of this Kremlin polic
Soviet national security objectives direct major
effort toward the neutralization and removal of American
power from Eurasia and eventual elimination of any form of
military threat from the Western Hemisphere- • These national
security goals can be combined in proposals for disarmament,
the guiding principle of which is: for the USSR, invulnera-
11bilityj for the United states, paralysis.
The individual goals of this Soviet policy include
12
the following:
1* The paralysis of American will to use strategic
nuclear weapons and, if possible, the elimina-
tion of all American and other Western nuclear
weapons, both strategic and tactical*
2. The weakening or disintegration of the American
alliance system, especially MATC.
llJ* M. Mackintosh, strategy and Tactics of Soviet
yllcv (London: Ox? iT*""
12
Foreign Po i y : ford tinlversity Press , 1962 ) , p
•
"John W. Spanier and Joseph L. lfogee, The Politics




3* The identification of Soviet policies with the
aspiration* and aims of the neutral nations
recently liberated from Western Colonialism.
Psychological warfare has served as a principal
vehicle for the pursuit of those goals* It has
been, from the beginning, a camp, gn designed
to place the USSR in a favorable position, to
appeal to the different segments of world
public opinion-—the Communist bloc, the Western
World, and the uncommitted or neutral nations*
The tactical approach has h9mn to attempt to create a
worldwide revulsion against nuclear weapons and to prompt
peoples and governments all over the world to exert pressure
on the American Government to forestall a possible resort to
these arms in crisis* The end sought is to force the leader-
ship elite to become unsure of their own capabilities, inten-
tions, rights, and, above all, of their chances of success*
This is to be accomplished by the neutralization of allies
and by paralysing principal sources of support, thereby
causing the national leaders to vacillate*
By maneuvering American spokesmen into admitting that
nuclear weapons are indeed terrible, the USSR has been able
to place the United States in the paradoxical position
whereby, on the one hand, her mil^*ry power depends
almost exclusively on nuclear weapons, while, on the
other, her own representatives have stigmatized the
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very strategy on which the United States and her
r.13allies rely for their security,
Thus the focus of global concern is disassociated from
crises inspired or exploited by the communists and fixed
upon the purported immorality of the employment of nuclear
weapons, the danger of a nuclear holocaust, and American
"atomic aggression*
"
Classic Bolshevik doctrine holds that communists can-
not fight an unjust war, even if they initiate it, since
wars fought by communism are, by definition, progressive and
revolutionary, the qualifications for "just" war* Khrushchev
carefully maintained the distinction between just and unjust
wars, thereby retail . *ar as a permissible instrument of
revolutionary change so long as it serves the interests of
communism and so long as conditions are suitable for waging
it* The Soviet disarmament campaign has represented a major
attempt to keep the path to world revolution open to all
means of struggle, including whatever use of military force
may be necessary, to reach the Soviet goal of global
supremacy*
Associated psychological threads weave through all of
these programs with the common psychological goals of total
paralysis of Western will and debilitation of Western mili-




coexistence, disarmament, world peace—the ultimate inter-
related and integrated goals are identical*
IV. A COMPARISON OP SOVIET AHD
UNITED STATES EFFORTS
A comparison of t . ganizations existing within the
Soviet Union and the United States designed for the conduct
of the psychological operations of psychological warfare is a
discouraging exer;. ise* It is difficult to compare such dis-
similar operations* However, certain relative factors do
emerge which demarcate areas of American weakness; these are
as followss
I* A* The Soviet Union is completely organised for
the waging of total, full-scale, psychologi-
cal warfare during peace time and has been
so for over cy years*
B* The United States has barely started its
organizational development and has no policy
guidance body specifically designated with
the responsibility of insuring the develop-
ment of an integrated, psychological program*
II* A* Soviet psychological operations ar :m
and centrally directed in accordance with
the integrated plans of the communist party*
The control of these activities is absolute,
-fc
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is at a very high point in the Party, and
is the responsibility of a separate depart-
ment within the Executive Staff of the Party
Secretariat*
S* American psychological warfare is only par-
tially uniform. It tends heavily towards
information activities conducted by the
U5IA. There is no central guidance or con-
trol} instead, there is a somewhat informal
coordination wit tie compulsion, other
than an Individual's devotion to duty, to
insure that policies, plans, and public an-
nouncements are compatible*
. . A* The Soviet Union has waged psychological war-
fare for forty-six years and has developed
advanced orgauinational and operational
techniques* The strategy is a total pro-
grain, integrating military force, diplomacy,
economic activity, and psychological opera-
tions into a detailed interlocking plan of
action*
B* The United States waged psychological war for
the first time in World War 1 . t carried
out extensive operations in World IX
and the Korean War* After each of the first
i s^
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two conflicts, the organizations were
hastily disbanded and no scientific,
scholarly examination of the lessons to be
learned was conductec. Consequently, no
effective organization has been developed.
The USZA under the guidance of Edward R.
Murrow, evolved into a first-class informa-
tion operation, but lacks the proper psycho-
logical matrix to be truly effective as a
tool for psychological operations. There
is no total United States program; foreign
policy is still carried out largely through
individual, as opposed to the collective,
efforts pursued along the parochial lines
of action of the various components of
foreign policy.
IV. A. The communist apparatus for psychological war
is aggressive and is on the constant offen-
sive—thus giving the USSR a psychological
superiority.
B. United States psychological operations, having
no clearly-defined place in the conduct of
national strategy and not stridently on the
offensive, are forced or, in the eyes of
';.-.
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the World, appear to be forced continually
into a defensive position*
V, A, The Soviet program fights for the " liberation
"
of the suppressed and underprivileged* The
program is repeated with an uncompromising
insistence*
B. The United States has tended to be out of
touch with the miseries and aspirations of
the masses in the foreign countries, par-
ticularly those of the Kiddle East and
Southeast Asia* As a result, the "pitch"
has been too high and complicated—appeal-
ing to the spirit instead of the flesh*
These tendencies began to diminish under
Kurrow's directorship of the USIA* Commer-
cial means of mass communications retain
the Madison Avenue-Hollywood approach*
United States psychological efforts are
certainly not insistent*
VI* A* Communist propaganda is spread by the largest
propaganda organization in the world* Dip-
lomats, trained underground organs, and the
Communist Party sell the ideas of the propa-
ganda war*
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psychological warfare organization and no
"psychological troops" to give unanimity to
the utterances of the program, such as it
may be.
VII. The people of the United States are generally
ignorant or ill informed of the interrelation-
ship between communism and the foreign policy
of the Soviet Union. They are equally out of
touch with their own heritage and national for-
eign policy. This has bred an apathy and aim-
lessness that, through the elected leaders,
tends to blur the policy formulation process.
In turn, a less than incisive and decisive for-
eign policy has become the hallmark of United
States international relations.
However, before one becomes too despondent over these
less than fatal frailities of the American nation, it should
be remembered that:
... the United States remains the largest extant revo-
lutionary experiment in the world—the first immense
human community which survives without profound dogma
or profound hatred and which attempts to make short-
range, practical, and warm hearted (though ideologically
superficial) concurrence the foundation for a political
and industrial civilization. If the United States ...
[can survive the cold war] it may be that the rest of
mankind will be persuaded that our kind of practicality
is not only humanly preferable, but scientifically more
defensible than the philosophies of competing civiliza-
tions. 14







Many distinguished minds have been directed at the
solution to the difficulties encountered in organising for
the conduct of psychological operations* Simultaneously,
there has been a curious reluctance to undertake the tasks
necessary to the attainment of the objectives of the organi-
sations created* It is the conclusion of this paper that
the access route to the development of total strategies,
which are. after all, well thought out, integrated plans of
action to achieve the goals of American foreign policy, lies
through organisation and the assumption of the responsibili-
ties of leadership*
Familiarity with a weapon or tool comes only with the
employment and use of the instrument* It does not come from
philosophic, detached observations* This is not to imply
lack of regard for the role of scholarly research) but
operational experience derives fundamentally from operating*
Scholarship and research can provide theory and tentative
doctrine* Its worth is no greater than the practical use to
which this theory and doctrine are, or can, be put* The
clarity with which the theory and doctrine can be stated and
refined requires an operational input* Operational
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requirements should dictate the doctrinal requirements, not
vice versa .
It has been developed that in the United States there
is neither a clearly-articulated nor a widely-accepted con-
cept of the nature of the psychological instrument of for-
eign policy. This follows from the Jackson Committee's
valid observation that the psychological aspect of policy is
not separable from policy and that the psychological impli-
cation in every act does not have life apart from the act.
The American pragmatic approach yearns for a clear-cut doc-
trine, a check-off list of "do's" and "don't's." Conse-
quently there is a frustration that derives from attempting
to define a function the nature of which is dependent upon
the operational requirements of unforeseen contingencies.
In vernacular terms, it leaves one with the problem of
trying to explain to a person, blind from birth, how purple
might taste; in other words, "you simply can't get there
from here." One can write around this vicious circle of
cause and effect, discoursing upon the innumerable variations
on the basic theme, indefinitely. This much is clear, how-
ever; so long as the United States awaits the birth of a
clear-cut articulation of the role of the psychological in-
strument before it attempts to utilize the instrument, the
understanding needed to articulate the role will never be







and will remain this way until an operational start is made*
Action and only action will break the circle and dispel the
fussy notion • • • [that psychological operations are
limited to] a contest between two gladiators with the
"minds of men" at stake • • . [accomplished through a
process of] providing information or of cracking the
Iron Curtain with a battering ram of truth, 1
To organize the tools of foreign policy so as to pro-
vide an integrated strategy requires machinery for the resolu-
tion of conflicting department viewpoints and positions*
Policy i once formulated, requires methods of evaluation to
insure that it is being carried out* In effect, this de-
mands a policing of the departments of government in order
to assure the executive leadership that progress toward the
policy objective is being made in the way the leadership
wants it made. There can be no place for unresolved posi-
tions on important national issues simply because the
resolution will tread on the toes of one department or
another
•
II, AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONAL EFFORTS
Since 1941, several distinct organisational approaches
to the solution of the problem have been employed. Under
Roosevelt, the solution was to proliferate agencies and to
Robert T. Holt and Robert w. van de Velds, strategic
Psychological yt rations and American Foreign Policy




layer successive committees, offices, and bureaus, one upon
the other* The administrative maze that resulted was breath-
taking. The almost total elimination of the psychological
program following World War II had its bright side, for, at
least, it wiped from the governmental complex a truly mon-
strous, almost grotesque arrangement*
Shortly after World War II, the second conception
began to appear in the early State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee (SWNCC), The pattern developed through a variety
of larval stages and eventually appeared within the Depart-
ment of State structure as the Interdepartmental Psychologi-
cal Operations Coordinating Committee.
The path of development then passed through the
Psychological Strategy Board (PS3) which was created by
Executive Order In If51* The PSB was to be responsible for
the
formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the
departments and agencies responsible for psycho-
logical operations, of over-all national psychological
objectives, policies and programs, and for the coor-
dination and evaluation of the national psychological
effort* 2
It was established outside the National Security Council
structure but reported to the NSC on its activities and its
2United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, "National Policy Machinery in the Soviet
Union," Organs ^lnq for National Security , Volume 2 (Washing-






•valuation of national psychological operations including
implementation of approved objectives, policies, and pro-
grams by the departments and agencies concerned* The FSB
failed, primarily, because it was founded upon the basic
misconception that psychological operations existed apart
from official policies and actions and could be dealt with
independently by experts in this field*
The last and most refined stage was reached in the
establishment, by another Executive Order, of the Operations
Coordinating Board* The OCB was, at first, outside the
structure of the National Security Council and was not
incorporated within the NSC structure for another four years.
Following his election, President Kennedy eliminated the
Board, thereby, at least temporarily, ending this direction
of organizational development*
All of the bodies that were developed in this second
approach to the problem suffered from a common, fatal flaw*
They attempted to coordinate, to conciliate, to synchronise
a total program out of the individual programs of the member
activities* None of these bodies could direct or impose a
solution* All of them were heeded only, if, as, and when it
suited the member activities to act in effective concert*
The decision to act in concert was retained on the
departmental level* No organisation can function properly
if presumptuous Juniors are permitted to decide whether or
•.,. T-V • '











not they will carry out the letter and spirit of the poli-
cies of the chief executive* This observation remains as
valid today as it was when Napoleon expounded it* A chief
executive who permits the establishment of such an organisa-
tion and subsequently does not correct any proclivities to
parochialism is culpably responsible for the inevitable
failure of the organisation*
The third approach is really no approach at all* It
was manifest by the Kennedy Administration's tendency to
form policy out of small intimate meetings* This is the ad
hoc method which may work satisfactorily in periods of
comparative calm* The Cuban crisis produced food for some
disturbing thought as to the degree of adaptability of the
Kennedy approach to a multiple , high intensity, high risk
crisis situation* The intellectual resources of the Govern-
ment were totally committed during the October 1962 crisis;
it is difficult to perceive how a similar or several similar
crises could have been handled simultaneously* An effective
organisation for the employment of the tools of foreign
policy must be able to serve in peace, "cold" war, or "hot"
war without any major structural adjustments* The govern-
ment must go on j it cannot pause in mid stride, drop every-
thing else it is doing, and deal with the crisis of the
moment* To operate and organize for such a method of prob-





III. THE POTENTIAL OF WIE OPERATIONS
COORDINATING BOARD
The first and third patterns are considered to be
very poor and to offer little security if pursued, But the
second approach still offers much promise provided it is
corrected so as to function vlably. The Operations Coor-
dinating Board could have performed as it was intended to
perform had iti
1. Been able to direct the members to develop long-
range and integrated plans under the policy
guidance of the National Security Council.
2. Been able to direct the members to carry out the
plans and policy as formulated.
3. Not been allowed to develop away from its original
concept. Its official inclusion within the
National Security Council Structure in 1957 was
bound to result in its performing less of its
designed function and more as a NSC staff arm.
This is precisely what occurred.
4. Been endowed with sufficient status to deal, at
least, on an equal level with the operating
agencies and departments. Access to <
-
dent, the Cabinet, and the National Security
Council must not only be possible, but it must
be easy as well, under the existing conditions
mU
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of overlap and multiplicity of responsibility
and authority, an agency attempting to develop
long-range, integrated plans simply will not be
able to conduct effective operations if it is
on a lower level of importance than the Depart-
ment of State off the Def^ns% Department*
IV* CORRECTIVE MEASURES
Status of the Agency Head
Were such a body, as heretofore outlined, to exist,
the position of its head within the government hierarchy
would be of vital importance* He should attend all meetings
of the Cabinet and all National Security Council meetings*
He should be at no lower organizational level than that of a
Cabinet member* These requirements stem from the following
consideration i
First, he must be sufficiently high in rank to speak
on equal terms with the department heads of the government*
If his organization is to be effective, he must participate,
as an equal, in the highest staff levels of policy formula*
tion where his views on the susceptibility of emerging
policy to integration into a coordinated planning system
could be voiced positively and authoritatively* since he
would be directly concerned with the psychological implica-








policy goals, he should inject directly into the policy
formulation process a feeling for the important psychologi-
cal implications which would be expressed much later in
those psychological operations developed as part of an inte-
grated national planning process in support of policy* Had
such a high level of advice been available, it is possible
that decisions which led to such sources of long-term
political discomfort as the recognition of Israel, the
refusal to fund the Aswan Dam, and the -Sky-Bolt might have
been viewed in a different manner* Therefore, his position
would be untenable if he must participate as a guest or a
junior member in any of the policy process*
A second consideration is that his contribution must
be made expeditiously so that it may have its impact before
policy is formulated* To consult with, or to be consulted
by, a Cabinet member or a member of a Cabinet member's staff,
out of the context of the actual discussion and after the
fact is unsatisfactory* Policy formulation as well as plan-
ning for policy execution must be integrated* In many cases,
there will be no time or opportunity for altering decisions
or changing the course of policy action taken by the Presi-
dent and his principal advisers after they have determined
whet the decisions and courses should be*
There is one government official whose position
within the executive hierarchy vests him with the stature




necessary for such a post: the Vice President of the United
States* His post already exists} he is ranked only lay the
President himself ; and he poBBeBB^B a direct route of com-
munication to the President which is unsurpassed* His
direct participation in this foreign policy process would
also serve the Country in the most advantageous manner with
respect to preparing the Vice President for the full respon-
sibility of the Presidency should he be called upon to
succeed to this post*
Agency Location and Authority
An agency such as has been implied might well be
established within the Executive Offices of the President
and titled the "President's Planning Board*" It would have
its function stated in the Executive Order establishing its
existence as follows:
The National Security Council having recommended a
national security policy and the President having
approved it* the Planning Board shall t (1) whenever
the President shall hereafter so direct, establish,
develop, and formulate with the participation of the
3The statement of function for the OCB serves as an
excellent basis for this proposed ''President's Planning
Board." The original, from section 2 of the Executive Order
establishing the OCB, appears on page 455 of U.S. Congress,
Senate, Organising for National Security « op * cit* he OCB,
even to its last days exhibited" so many possibilities , had
it not been "still-born, 1 so to speak, and had it been allowed
to develop and not permitted to fall prey to staff absorption





agencies concerned (a) detailed operational planning
responsibilities respecting such policy, (b) the
integration of the interdepartmental aspects of the
detailed operational plans developed by the agencies
to carry out such policy , (c) a tiisely and integrated
schedule for execution of such plans, and (d) national
plans in such a manner as to exploit the full psycho-
logical aspects and implications of the nation's
national security policy* (2) initiate new proposals
in response to opportunity and changes in the situa-
tion* The Board shall from time to time make reports
to the National Security Council with respect to the
implementation of this order*
The Board thus would start life invested with the
I residential mandate to act , to formulate coordinated policy ,
and to direct the constituent agencies to carry out the
plans developed * It would face the agencies with the neces-
sity to consider individually and collectively the psycho-
logical implications throughout the total program*
Membership and Organisation
The membership and organisation of the President *s
Planning Board would include the following:
The Director
i
-i m i in . i n . m
The Director of the President's Planning Board
would be the Vice President of the United States*
The Director would participate in all National
Security Council and Cabinet meetings and preside at
all meetings of the Planning Board*
The Planning Board
The Planning Board would be composed of the
following officials:








1. The Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs*
2* The Deputy Secretary of Defense*
3* The Director of the U5IA.
4* The irector of the U.S. Arms Control and
.sarmament Agency*
5. The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency*
6* The Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs*
4
?he Planning Board Working Groups
These groups would he composed of responsible
operating officials from the agencies concerned with
policy implementation* The chairman of each group
would be representative of the Planning Board staff,
and his deputy would be the group member from the
agency which had chief responsibility* £ach group
would include a member from the Bureau of the Budget*
The functions of these working groups would be two
fold i (1) to provide a standing mechanism at the
working level for the development of integrated
actions to implement national security policies, and
4Patterned after the OCB working groups* In this
case, however, Chairmanship devolves upon a Staff member of
the Planning Board, providing a tighter control than existed
under the OCB system*
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(2) to prepare operations plana and progreaa reports
for consideration by the Planning Board*
The Planning Board Assistants
A Board Assistant would be designated from each
agency represented on the Planning Board* The mem-
bership WOMld Include a representative from the
Bureau of the Budget* Duties would be to provide
staff support for each Board Member; to assist him in
interdepartmental as well as intradepartmental plan-
ning and negotiation on subjects dealt with by the
Board | and to aid the respective agency *s Working
oroup members in meeting the requirements laid down
by the Planning Board* In order to meet his respon-
sibilities, an official designated for duty as a
Board Assistant would have to hold sufficient rank
within his organisation to give him direct access to
the principal operating officials of his agency*
As a group, the Planning Board Assistants would
meet weekly, under the Chairmanship of the Special
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security
Planning, to review papers prepared by the working
groups in order to insure that the documents were
Patterned directly after the OCB Assistants or
'Board Assistants" as they were commonly called*
mbXtnoa -..
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ready for Board action* It is at this point that
most careful attention would be directed to the ade-
quacy of a paper, the accurate reflection of any
differences of view among the agencies, and the
development of a proposed course of action for fur-
ther consideration by the Board.
The Planning Board .staff
The Planning Boa,- aff would be composed of
the following elements:
1. The Office of the Planning Board Staff
..rector and the Deputy Director* The
Special Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Planning would be
the Director*
2* The Secretariat, which would be the source
of executive secretaries for the working
groups and would generally assist and
provide substantive staff support for the
process by which member agencies reached
decisions and developed actions to carry
out national security policies*
3* The Supervisory Staff which would be the
source for all chairmen of feh nning







Board Working Groups. The Deputy Direc-
tor of the F leaning Soard staff would
assume direct responsibility for the
operational guidance of this staff ele-
ment.
4. The Special Studies staff which would pro-
vide the Special Assistant to the Vice
resident for National Security Planning
and the Supervisory - taff with current
background information on foreign politi-
cal, military, economic, social, and
ideological developments effecting the
psychological aspects of implementation
of national security policies.
The executive Office of the Director
The Executive Office of the Director would in-
clude the Vice President's personal Planning Board
Staff which would be headed by the Special Assistant
to the Vice President for National Security Planning.
It would also include an Office of Inspector General
which would be competent to review and evaluate any
and all aspects of the operations of Planning Board
Agencies.
The Special Assistant to the Vice President for Nationalmmmmmm M i , in i I I I p n I I ' i m I I i. I n I I I i I p i n I -
Security Planning
The Special Assistant to the Vice President for
'i
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National Security Planning would be the Vice Presi-
dent* s principal staff officer for national security
affairs* He would be a person without departmental
ties who, through a direct and close staff relation-
ship with the Vice President t would be fully cogni-
zant of the desires and the requirements of the Vice
President. The Special Assistant would sit with the
State Department Policy Planning Council* He would
also sit with the Cold War Advisory Panel of the
Department of Defense* He would act as the Executive
and principal staff Officer for the Planning Board,
would be the director of the Planning Board Staff,
and would chair the Planning Board Assistants*
In a further attempt to improve the quality of input
to the Planning Board and the policy formulation process,
the Director of the USIA would be designated a member of the
Policy Planning Council of the Department of State* He
would attend, as s guest, all Cabinet meetings and all
National Security Council meetings* He would continue to be
represented on the Cold War Advisory Panel of the Department
of Defense*
Operational Evaluation
At this point, the concept of operational evaluation





the idea of the General Accounting Office which acta aa a
form of independent follow-up and fiacal conscience for the
department* and agencies of the Government* The resistance
to enforced policy integration will extend downward in all
the agencies* It is a peculiar bureaucratic phenomenon that
the more junior the official, the more vested becomes the
interest and operational patterns* In agencies as large as
are those concerned with the formulation and execution of
National Security Policy, the dragging of myriads of "little"
feet can paralyse the production of total plans* The road
to the little man's heart is through his efficiency report,
and it would be the role of the Inspector General 'a staff to
shed light on the degree of effective staff work within the
agencies*
In the same manner that the Vice President would
s%rv in a way no other official could as the eyes and ears
of the President, so would the Inspector General Bmrvm the
Vice President* The Inspector General would report directly
to the Vice President on the results of a continuous series
of surprise working inspections administered by his staff to
the various headquarters and field offices of Board agencies*
These reports would be the basis for Improvements in a weak
post or activity* The personnel assigned to this office
should Bmrvm extended tours, on loan from the agencies com-
prising the Board* They must have demonstrated unquestioned
•L* -. '. :- Hi £*.' ;:
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integrity, objective judgment, end marked ability in a
variety of headquarters and field posts of the parent agency
before consideration for assignment to the Planning Board
Staff*
V. COKCLUSIOU
It is not intended to delve further into this organi-
zation. In the research and studies incident to the develop-
ment and writing of this paper, a conspicuous lacuna in the
American efforts to evolve an organization for the conduct
of psychological warfare has been the marked failure to
profit from past mistakes* There has been a reluctance to
modify and to utilise anything of the past* New structures
have h^ma erected and discarded to be replaced by entirely
different arrangements* Some of the proposals have been
truly mammoth in concept and design, extending to the advo-
cacy of an additional department of the Federal Government*
While the American quest has been definitely along the
organisational line, its philosophy seems to be that the
answer can only lie in something predominantly new and un-
tried*
There seemw little doubt that the path is, indeed, an
organisational route* However, organisation can be expected
to produce only a partial answer* President Truman kept a
small sign on his White House Desk; it read: "The Buck




Stops Here." The acceptance of the inescapable responsi-
bility of leadership can never be avoided through some piece
of organizational legerdemain. The unending series of
organisational failures are silhouetted in the light of this
reality.
It is submitted that the time is long past when we
should look over our shoulder; survey where we have been;
and divest ourselves of the American preoccupation with the
organizational extravaganza.
The proposed solution makes but three claims to any
originality* It attempts to employ an old, familiar frame-
work which, if properly restructured, could function effec-
tively. It focuses attention upon the responsibility of
leadership and annunciates an unequivocal, positive guidance
which demands, rather than requests, a specific performance
from the governmental agencies. At all levels, direction
and control are retained tightly, under the interlocking
supervision of the Planning Board's permanent staff members.
Finally, it is comparatively simple and attempts to profit
from the more obvious lessons of the past. In the last
analysis, however, the following words of Theodore Roosevelt
articulate the riddle of national purpose which must be
solved, at all levels of American government and society, if
this Nation is to continue along its path of greatness:
':




If we stand Idly by • • » if we shirk from hard con-
tests where men must win at hazard of their lives and
at risk of all they hold dear, then the bolder and
stronger people will pass us by and will win for them-
selves the domination of the world* 7
7Cited in United states Navy, Leadership Manual
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